css-svqggc-polyfill

Details

**Severity:** Critical

**Affected versions:** `= 1.0.0`

## Source: amazon-inspector (6b23cf39720388bcf9f26621bd52e256e18a011bf3b6821b7d9f5f60115b9663)
Package masquerades as a CSS polyfill while impersonating internal Wix Thunderbolt registry modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, and other namespace stubs), with a shipped registry-manifest pointing those names at parastorage.com URLs under this package's own name — a dependency-confusion shape. thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on require that purges its own entries from require.cache so each require re-runs the payload, obtains child_process via multiple fallbacks (including constructing a fresh Module instance to bypass sandboxed require stubs), and executes reconnaissance commands (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, /etc/hosts) via execSync. The command output plus host beacon fields (node version, platform, pid, hostname, site) are sent over cleartext HTTP via fetch GET to the hardcoded endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f. The Proxy-based stub exports ensure the import appears to succeed silently after exfiltration.

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Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malicious/npm/css-svqggc-polyfill/MAL-2026-17557.json))

**References:**
- https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/28e8e300c79177f2cb1eb131ae981c3c0e639495/osv/malicious/npm/css-svqggc-polyfill/MAL-2026-17557.json
- https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-svqggc-polyfill/v/1.0.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-67vj-fvv3-m9f5

Compromised versions (1)

• = 1.0.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.