confluence-editor

Details

**Severity:** Critical

**Affected versions:** `= 30.0.0`

## Source: amazon-inspector (e7615f50c489336db7800ea3b79ef26a4e5af311f0484ee31871000e329c2813)
package.json declares a dependency whose value is a bare HTTPS URL (https://repo.securityctrl.com/confluence-editor) rather than a semver range published to the npm registry. The dependency key equals the package's own name, matching a dependency-confusion shape, and the version 30.0.0 is implausibly high for a package of this name. On npm install, npm fetches whatever tarball that URL currently returns and executes any lifecycle scripts inside it, with no version pin, no integrity check, and no registry provenance. The shipped index.js is an inert stub, so the manifest line itself is the entire published attack surface — the actual code that runs on installers is served from repo.securityctrl.com and can be changed by whoever controls that host at any time.

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Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/d75ebb673b0185a99abe46e9e4a60aaa467fa7d8/osv/malicious/npm/confluence-editor/MAL-2026-15531.json))

**References:**
- https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/d75ebb673b0185a99abe46e9e4a60aaa467fa7d8/osv/malicious/npm/confluence-editor/MAL-2026-15531.json
- https://www.npmjs.com/package/confluence-editor/v/30.0.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2rqw-xmmh-wfr9

Compromised versions (1)

• = 30.0.0

Any computer that installed or ran a compromised version should be considered fully compromised. Rotate every secret on that machine from a clean environment.