CVE-2026-74682
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs
data_ep_set_params() sizes each URB transfer buffer before it adds the Format Type II transfer delimiter:
u->packets = urb_packs; u->buffer_size = maxsize * u->packets;
if (fmt->fmt_type == UAC_FORMAT_TYPE_II) u->packets++; /* for transfer delimiter */ u->urb = usb_alloc_urb(u->packets, GFP_KERNEL);
buffer_size is computed from the pre-increment packet count and never recomputed, so for a Type II endpoint the buffer is one packet short of the packet count the URB is built with.
prepare_inbound_urb() then lays out one iso frame per packet and never consults buffer_size:
offs = 0; for (i = 0; i < urb_ctx->packets; i++) { urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset = offs; urb->iso_frame_desc[i].length = ep->curpacksize; offs += ep->curpacksize; }
urb->transfer_buffer_length = offs; urb->number_of_packets = urb_ctx->packets;
The last descriptor therefore points one packet past the end of the transfer buffer, where the host controller writes device data on every inbound transfer. prepare_silent_urb() and prepare_playback_urb() bound their fill loops by ctx->buffer_size, so only capture is affected.
fmt_type comes from the device's audio streaming descriptors, so any device advertising a Type II capture format hits this once userspace sets hw_params on the stream.
KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64) with a dummy_hcd/raw-gadget device, one report per inbound transfer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer Write of size 64 at addr ffff0000186171c0 by task cons02/166 __asan_memcpy dummy_timer hrtimer_run_softirq Allocated by task 166: usb_alloc_coherent snd_usb_endpoint_set_params The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000018617180, ffff0000186171c0)
Compute buffer_size after the delimiter packet has been accounted for, and bound the fill loop by buffer_size, as prepare_silent_urb() already does on the outbound side. This grows every Type II URB allocation by one maxsize packet.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]>
Affected products
1Patches
Vulnerability mechanics
References
8- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a235379825e1a6194e43861ee6658e5fc35686dnvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/137bf034740e5a2734794908d0aff1e0bd7cee6envd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/6607f85242577f33d4540a0d1f4a6137f5367058nvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/69ee44e1a23be62318189dc4b37fa4ad94053269nvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/6af5f29af7711233ae68d3b25c15d67478468900nvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca22c94bdfc22c564ca2e11c87ba4d17ebeaaa9anvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ed4e6321bb453757044cb9e5ecb30a33f04903nvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1fbb50b99311b35c2e85cc70341d62082dca4b5nvd
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