gitea-runner: workflow container.options passes host namespaces and capability flags to job container when privileged mode is disabled

### Summary act_runner appends workflow-controlled jobs..container.options directly to the Docker HostConfig for the job container. When runner privileged mode is disabled, only Privileged is forced false. Host namespace flags, capability expansion, and security profile overrides from workflow YAML are preserved in the final HostConfig. A workflow author can enter host PID/IPC namespaces and execute commands on the runner host as root.

Details

Source-to-sink path in act_runner:

- ContainerSpec.Options accepts workflow YAML container.options - RunContext.options() appends workflow options to runner-level container options - Job container is created with Privileged: rc.Config.Privileged but also with Options: rc.options(ctx) - mergeContainerConfigs() parses Docker CLI-style options into HostConfig - When privileged mode is disabled, only copts.privileged is forced false - sanitizeConfig() only filters Binds and Mounts - Preserved dangerous HostConfig fields:

Privileged=false
PidMode=host
IpcMode=host
CapAdd=["ALL"]
SecurityOpt=["seccomp=unconfined","apparmor=unconfined"]

Attacker workflow YAML: ``yaml jobs: breakout: runs-on: ubuntu-latest container: image: ubuntu:22.04 options: >- --pid=host --ipc=host --cap-add=ALL --security-opt seccomp=unconfined --security-opt apparmor=unconfined steps: - name: host namespace marker run: | nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- sh -c "id > /tmp/marker" ``

Impact

An attacker who can submit a workflow to a repository using a shared Docker-backed act_runner can:

• Enter host PID, IPC, and mount namespaces
• Execute arbitrary commands as root on the runner host
• Access runner host secrets, deployment credentials, and environment variables
• Pivot to adjacent jobs running on the same runner
• Access internal build infrastructure reachable from the runner host

Critical severity for shared runners where untrusted users can trigger workflows. High severity for single-tenant runners with privileged mode explicitly disabled as a security control.

Fix

Direction Treat container.options as untrusted input. Reject or strip when privileged mode is disabled:

• Host namespaces: --pid=host, --ipc=host, --uts=host, --network=host
• Capability expansion: --cap-add ALL, --cap-add SYS_ADMIN
• Security overrides: --security-opt seccomp=unconfined, --security-opt apparmor=unconfined
• Device access: --device, --device-cgroup-rule
• Volume inheritance: --volumes-from
• Runtime controls: --runtime, --cgroup-parent