Electron: Context isolation bypass via Function.prototype.bind hijack
Description
Impact
Apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via contextBridge may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with nodeIntegration enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access.
Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via contextBridge — the standard pattern for wrapping ipcRenderer.invoke — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected.
Workarounds
There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.
Fixed
Versions * 42.0.0-beta.5 * 41.2.2 * 40.9.2 * 39.8.9
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at [email protected]
AI Insight
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Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
electronnpm | < 39.8.9 | 39.8.9 |
electronnpm | >= 40.0.0-alpha.1, < 40.9.2 | 40.9.2 |
electronnpm | >= 41.0.0-alpha.1, < 41.2.2 | 41.2.2 |
electronnpm | >= 42.0.0-alpha.1, < 42.0.0-beta.5 | 42.0.0-beta.5 |
Affected products
1- Range: before 42.0.0-beta.5, 41.x.x before 41.2.2, 40.x.x before 40.9.2, 39.x.x before 39.8.9
Patches
Vulnerability mechanics
References
2News mentions
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