CVE-2026-64361

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length

check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()), off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the bounds check to pass when it should fail.

For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6, which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer.

Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic straightforward.