VYPR
High severity8.1GHSA Advisory· Published Aug 20, 2026· Updated Aug 20, 2026

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages

CVE-2026-61798

Description

Summary

io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl exposes raw HPKE private key bytes in string representations and error messages. BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString() includes the private-key parameter object, and BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() renders the full byte array with Arrays.toString(bytes). Separately, failed native key initialization includes Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes) in the thrown IllegalArgumentException message. Applications that log key-pair objects or exceptions can persist private key material in logs.

Details

codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java renders private key material through toString():

  • BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString() at lines 72-78 concatenates "privateKey=" + privateKey.
  • privateKey is a BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter created with isPrivate=true at lines 26-36.

codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java then renders all bytes:

  • BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() at lines 70-76 returns "bytes=" + Arrays.toString(bytes) regardless of whether isPrivate is true.

A separate error path in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java also exposes caller-provided private key bytes:

  • EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...) at lines 228-232 throws IllegalArgumentException("privateKeyBytes does not contain a valid private key: " + Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes)) when BoringSSL rejects the key.

Because Java logging frameworks commonly call toString() for structured objects and commonly persist exception messages, these paths can place complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry.

Proof of concept

Safe local verification was performed without native BoringSSL by compiling the relevant Java classes and a no-op native stub for the unused finalizer reference. The observed output includes the full private key byte array:

BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair{privateKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[1, 2, 3, 4], isPrivate=true}, publicKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[5, 6, 7, 8], isPrivate=false}}

Minimal reproducer concept in the same package:

package io.netty.incubator.codec.hpke.boringssl;

public final class VerifyPrivateKeyToString {
  public static void main(String[] args) {
    byte[] privateKey = new byte[] {1, 2, 3, 4};
    byte[] publicKey = new byte[] {5, 6, 7, 8};
    BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair pair = new BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair(privateKey, publicKey);
    System.out.println(pair.toString());
  }
}

The code path is deterministic: the production toString() methods concatenate the raw private-key byte array.

Impact

If an affected key pair or initialization exception is logged, application logs contain complete HPKE private key material. Anyone with access to those logs can recover the key. Depending on key reuse and log retention, this can compromise:

  • confidentiality of OHTTP messages encrypted to the exposed key;
  • integrity/authenticity expectations for future messages if the key remains active;
  • incident response and key rotation assumptions, because logs may retain key material long after the in-memory key is rotated.

Suggested remediation

  • Redact private key material in BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() when isPrivate is true, for example bytes= or only key type/length.
  • Redact privateKey in BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString().
  • Remove Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes) from BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...); report only length and KEM metadata.
  • Add regression tests asserting that toString() and exception messages do not contain private key byte values.
  • Consider making key pair classes avoid implementing detailed toString() for sensitive material entirely.

References

  • codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java:72-78
  • codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java:70-76
  • codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java:228-232

Affected products

1

Patches

Vulnerability mechanics

References

3

News mentions

0

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