Home Assistant: Exported BroadcastReceiver allows local apps to spoof device location
Description
Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.5.3, the LocationSensorManager BroadcastReceiver is exported with no permission. Any installed app, with zero runtime permissions, can broadcast a forged Google Play Services LocationResult directly to it; the receiver trusts the extra and forwards it to the user's Home Assistant server as the device's real location. This bypasses Android's developer-mode "Mock Location" gate and allows a local malicious app to drive zone-based automations (unlock door / disarm alarm / open garage) by faking the user's GPS position. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.5.3.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Affected products
1- Range: <2026.5.3
Patches
Vulnerability mechanics
Root cause
"The LocationSensorManager BroadcastReceiver is exported with no permission, allowing any installed app to inject a forged Google Play Services LocationResult."
Attack vector
A local malicious app with zero runtime permissions broadcasts a crafted `LocationResult` intent to the exported `LocationSensorManager` BroadcastReceiver. The receiver trusts the extra data without verifying the source, forwarding the fake location to the user's Home Assistant server as the device's real GPS position. This bypasses Android's developer-mode "Mock Location" gate, enabling the attacker to trigger zone-based automations such as unlocking a door or disarming an alarm.
Affected code
The `LocationSensorManager` BroadcastReceiver was exported with no permission, allowing any installed app to send a forged Google Play Services `LocationResult` intent directly to it. The fix introduces `RequestAccurateLocationReceiver` and restricts the export of `LocationSensorManager` so that only the system can deliver location updates.
What the fix does
The patch restricts the `LocationSensorManager` BroadcastReceiver so it is no longer exported to arbitrary apps, and introduces `RequestAccurateLocationReceiver` to handle location requests properly. By removing the exported flag, only the Android system (Google Play Services) can deliver `LocationResult` intents to the receiver, preventing any third-party app from injecting forged location data.
Preconditions
- authThe attacker must have an app installed on the same Android device as the Home Assistant companion app.
- inputNo runtime permissions are required; the receiver is exported without any permission check.
- configThe Home Assistant companion app must be running and listening for location updates.
Generated on Jun 24, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
2- github.com/home-assistant/android/pull/6837mitrex_refsource_MISC
- github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-77r5-pw5w-mgj3mitrex_refsource_CONFIRM
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