http4k: Unbounded gzip decompression in `ServerFilters.GZip` / `RequestFilters.GunZip` allowed memory-exhaustion DoS

Impact

ServerFilters.GZip and RequestFilters.GunZip (and the underlying Gzip functions used to decompress request bodies) did not impose any cap on the decompressed size. A small malicious gzip-encoded request body (on the order of kilobytes) could decompress to gigabytes, exhausting the JVM heap and denying service to other clients.

Who is affected: any http4k server that accepts gzip-encoded requests via ServerFilters.GZip or RequestFilters.GunZip. Exploitable by any unauthenticated client. The vulnerability was introduced on 2017-08-01 (commit 2618fe08f9) and was present for ~9 years.

Patches

| Line | Fixed in | Edition | |------|----------|---------| | v6.x (Community) | 6.49.0.0 | Community | | v5.x (LTS) | 5.42.0.0 | Enterprise — contact [email protected] | | v4.x (LTS) | 4.51.0.0 | Enterprise — contact [email protected] |

The fix caps decompression at 10MB by default; oversized requests through ServerFilters.GZip / RequestFilters.GunZip now return 413 Request Entity Too Large, and decompressing elsewhere throws SizeLimitExceededException. The keyed hmacSHA256 helper and other safe paths are unaffected.

Workarounds

For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: - Replace the GZip / GunZip filters with custom versions that wrap the decompressed InputStream in a size-limited reader, or - Strip gzip-encoded request support at the edge (CDN, reverse proxy, or load balancer).

References

• Vulnerability introduced: `2618fe08f9`
• Fix release: v6.49.0.0
• Background: CWE-409 — Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data