CVE-2026-52739
Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
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LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
zebra-statecrates.io | < 7.0.0 | 7.0.0 |
zebradcrates.io | < 4.5.0 | 4.5.0 |
Affected products
1- Range: <4.5.0
Patches
Vulnerability mechanics
References
7- github.com/advisories/GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/d4cd662c716382f6397d2a730148025a1ca79fec/Cargo.tomlghsaWEB
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/d4cd662c716382f6397d2a730148025a1ca79fec/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rsghsaWEB
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/blob/d4cd662c716382f6397d2a730148025a1ca79fec/zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rsghsaWEB
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6nvdWEB
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d45117557b217a6cdnvd
- github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0nvd
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