PraisonAI spider_tools SSRF protection bypass via alternate loopback host encodings

@@ -181,12 +181,15 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Fetch PR branch and Setup Remote
         if: github.event.issue.pull_request
+        env:
+          PR_BRANCH: ${{ steps.check_fork.outputs.pr_branch }}
+          IS_FORK: ${{ steps.check_fork.outputs.is_fork }}
         run: |
           # Fetch PR head from base repo and put it into local branch
-          git fetch origin pull/${{ github.event.issue.number }}/head:${{ steps.check_fork.outputs.pr_branch }}
+          git fetch origin pull/${{ github.event.issue.number }}/head:"${PR_BRANCH}"
           
           # If it's a fork, make origin point to local to trick claude-code-action's `git fetch origin <branch>`
-          if [ "${{ steps.check_fork.outputs.is_fork }}" == "true" ]; then
+          if [ "${IS_FORK}" = "true" ]; then
             git remote set-url origin file://$(pwd)
           fi
 

@@ -268,6 +268,11 @@ def _process_rule_mention(self, rule_name: str) -> Optional[str]:
     def _process_url_mention(self, url: str) -> Optional[str]:
         """Process @url:https://... mention."""
         try:
+            from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools
+
+            if not SpiderTools()._validate_url(url):
+                return f"# URL: {url}\n[Blocked: URL is not allowed]"
+
             import urllib.request
             
             req = urllib.request.Request(

@@ -36,6 +36,30 @@ def _safe_getattr(obj, name, *default):
     return getattr(obj, name, *default) if default else getattr(obj, name)
 
 
+_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS = frozenset({
+    '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
+    '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
+    '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',
+    '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',
+    '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__',
+    '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',
+    '__self__',  # C builtins leak real builtins module (GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh)
+    # Frame/code object introspection
+    'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',
+    'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next',
+    'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code',
+    'co_consts', 'co_names',
+    '__getattribute__', '__getattr__', '__setattr__', '__delattr__',
+    '__dir__', '__get__', '__set__', '__delete__',
+})
+
+_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS = frozenset({
+    'exec', 'eval', 'compile', '__import__',
+    'open', 'input', 'breakpoint',
+    'setattr', 'delattr', 'dir', 'vars',
+})
+
+
 def _validate_code_ast(code: str):
     """Validate code using AST — catches attacks that bypass text checks.
 
@@ -48,52 +72,33 @@ def _validate_code_ast(code: str):
     except SyntaxError:
         return None  # let compile() handle syntax errors later
 
-    # Dangerous dunder attributes attackers use for sandbox escape
-    _blocked_attrs = frozenset({
-        '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
-        '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
-        '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',
-        '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',
-        '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__',
-        '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',
-        # Frame/code object introspection
-        'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',
-        'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next',
-        'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code',
-        'co_consts', 'co_names',
-        '__getattribute__', '__getattr__', '__setattr__', '__delattr__',
-        '__dir__', '__get__', '__set__', '__delete__',
-    })
-
     for node in ast.walk(tree):
         # Block import statements
         if isinstance(node, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):
             return f"Import statements are not allowed"
 
         # Block attribute access to dangerous dunders
         if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
-            if node.attr in _blocked_attrs:
+            if node.attr in _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS:
                 return (
                     f"Access to attribute '{node.attr}' is restricted"
                 )
 
-        # Block calls to dangerous builtins by name
+        # Block calls to dangerous builtins (bare name or attribute access)
         if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
             func = node.func
-            if isinstance(func, ast.Name) and func.id in (
-                'exec', 'eval', 'compile', '__import__',
-                'open', 'input', 'breakpoint',
-                'setattr', 'delattr', 'dir',
-            ):
+            if isinstance(func, ast.Name) and func.id in _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS:
                 return f"Call to '{func.id}' is not allowed"
+            if isinstance(func, ast.Attribute) and func.attr in _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS:
+                return f"Call to '{func.attr}' is not allowed"
                 
         # Block dangerous constants (strings containing dunders)
         # Fallback for Python 3.7 ast.Str
         if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str):
-            if any(attr in node.value for attr in _blocked_attrs):
+            if any(attr in node.value for attr in _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS):
                 return f"String constant contains restricted attribute name"
         elif type(node).__name__ == 'Str':
-            if any(attr in getattr(node, 's', '') for attr in _blocked_attrs):
+            if any(attr in getattr(node, 's', '') for attr in _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS):
                 return f"String constant contains restricted attribute name"
 
     return None
@@ -112,7 +117,16 @@ def _execute_code_sandboxed(
     """
     if limits is None:
         limits = ResourceLimits.minimal()
-    
+
+    ast_error = _validate_code_ast(code)
+    if ast_error:
+        return {
+            'result': None,
+            'stdout': '',
+            'stderr': f'Security Error: {ast_error}',
+            'success': False,
+        }
+
     try:
         # Create temporary file for the code
         with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.py', delete=False) as f:
@@ -151,21 +165,8 @@ def safe_execute():
             }}
         
         # Block dangerous patterns
-        blocked_attrs = {{
-            '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
-            '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
-            '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',
-            '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',
-            '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__',
-            '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',
-            # Frame/code object introspection
-            'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',
-            'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next',
-            'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code',
-            'co_consts', 'co_names',
-            '__getattribute__', '__getattr__', '__setattr__', '__delattr__',
-            '__dir__', '__get__', '__set__', '__delete__',
-        }}
+        blocked_attrs = {set(_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS)!r}
+        blocked_calls = {set(_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS)!r}
         
         for node in ast.walk(tree):
             if isinstance(node, (ast.Import, ast.ImportFrom)):
@@ -182,14 +183,20 @@ def safe_execute():
                     "stderr": f"Access to attribute '{{node.attr}}' is restricted",
                     "success": False
                 }}
-            if isinstance(node, ast.Call) and isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):
-                if node.func.id in ('exec', 'eval', 'compile', '__import__',
-                                     'open', 'input', 'breakpoint',
-                                     'setattr', 'delattr', 'dir'):
+            if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
+                func = node.func
+                if isinstance(func, ast.Name) and func.id in blocked_calls:
+                    return {{
+                        "result": None,
+                        "stdout": "",
+                        "stderr": f"Call to '{{func.id}}' is not allowed",
+                        "success": False
+                    }}
+                if isinstance(func, ast.Attribute) and func.attr in blocked_calls:
                     return {{
                         "result": None,
                         "stdout": "",
-                        "stderr": f"Call to '{{node.func.id}}' is not allowed",
+                        "stderr": f"Call to '{{func.attr}}' is not allowed",
                         "success": False
                     }}
             if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str):
@@ -481,7 +488,7 @@ def _execute_code_direct(
             '__import__', 'import ', 'from ', 'exec', 'eval',
             'compile', 'open(', 'file(', 'input(', 'raw_input',
             '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__globals__', '__code__',
-            '__class__', 'globals(', 'locals(', 'vars('
+            '__class__', '__self__', 'globals(', 'locals(', 'vars('
         ]
 
         code_lower = code.lower()

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 """
 
 import logging
+import ipaddress
+import socket
 from typing import List, Dict, Union, Optional, Any
 from importlib import util
 import json
@@ -20,6 +22,48 @@
 import hashlib
 import time
 
+
+def _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True when hostname resolves to loopback/private/internal targets."""
+    if not hostname:
+        return True
+    host = hostname.lower().rstrip(".")
+    if host in ("localhost", "0.0.0.0", "::1") or host.endswith(".localhost"):
+        return True
+    if host in ("169.254.169.254", "metadata.google.internal"):
+        return True
+    if any(host.endswith(suffix) for suffix in (".local", ".internal", ".localdomain")):
+        return True
+
+    def _ip_blocked(ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> bool:
+        return bool(
+            ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_reserved or ip.is_link_local
+        )
+
+    if host.isdigit():
+        try:
+            return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host)))
+        except (ValueError, OverflowError):
+            return True
+
+    if host.startswith("0x"):
+        try:
+            return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(int(host, 16)))
+        except (ValueError, OverflowError):
+            return True
+
+    try:
+        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+
+    try:
+        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+
+    return False
+
 class SpiderTools:
     """Tools for web scraping and crawling."""
     
@@ -59,31 +103,9 @@ def _validate_url(self, url: str) -> bool:
             if not parsed.hostname:
                 return False
             
-            # Reject local/internal addresses
-            hostname = parsed.hostname.lower()
-            
-            # Block localhost and loopback
-            if hostname in ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '0.0.0.0', '::1']:
-                return False
-            
-            # Block private IP ranges
-            import ipaddress
-            try:
-                ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
-                if ip.is_private or ip.is_reserved or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local:
-                    return False
-            except ValueError:
-                # Not an IP address, continue with domain validation
-                pass
-            
-            # Block common internal domains
-            if any(hostname.endswith(domain) for domain in ['.local', '.internal', '.localdomain']):
-                return False
-            
-            # Block metadata service endpoints
-            if hostname in ['169.254.169.254', 'metadata.google.internal']:
+            if _host_is_blocked(parsed.hostname):
                 return False
-            
+
             return True
             
         except Exception:

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+"""@url mentions must not fetch loopback targets."""
+
+from praisonaiagents.tools.mentions import MentionsParser
+
+
+def test_url_mention_blocks_loopback():
+    parser = MentionsParser()
+    result = parser._process_url_mention("http://127.0.0.1:8765/")
+    assert result is not None
+    assert "Blocked" in result

@@ -112,6 +112,22 @@ def test_dunder_import_blocked(self, sandbox):
         result = sandbox.run("__import__('os')")
         assert result["success"] is False
 
+    def test_print_self_blocked(self, sandbox):
+        """print.__self__ leaks real builtins module (GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh)."""
+        result = sandbox.run("b = print.__self__")
+        assert result["success"] is False
+        assert "restricted" in result["stderr"].lower()
+
+    def test_vars_call_blocked(self, sandbox):
+        """vars() can expose builtins.__dict__ after __self__ leak."""
+        result = sandbox.run("vars({})")
+        assert result["success"] is False
+
+    def test_attribute_dunder_call_blocked(self, sandbox):
+        """Attribute calls bypass bare-name Call checks."""
+        result = sandbox.run("(1).__class__.__mro__")
+        assert result["success"] is False
+
 
 # ── Legitimate Code (all must PASS) ─────────────────────────────────────────
 

@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ def test_still_blocks_loopback():
     assert spider._validate_url("http://localhost/") is False
 
 
+def test_blocks_alternate_loopback_encodings():
+    """GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm: non-canonical loopback host forms."""
+    spider = SpiderTools()
+    assert spider._validate_url("http://localhost.:8765/") is False
+    assert spider._validate_url("http://127.1:8765/") is False
+    assert spider._validate_url("http://0177.0.0.1:8765/") is False
+    assert spider._validate_url("http://0x7f000001:8765/") is False
+    assert spider._validate_url("http://2130706433:8765/") is False
+
+
 def test_rejects_non_string_input():
     spider = SpiderTools()
     assert spider._validate_url(None) is False  # type: ignore[arg-type]

@@ -71,3 +71,39 @@ async def require_workspace_member(
         )
     user.workspace_id = workspace_id
     return user
+
+
+async def require_workspace_admin(
+    workspace_id: str,
+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
+    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+) -> AuthIdentity:
+    """Require admin or owner role in the workspace."""
+    return await require_workspace_member(
+        workspace_id, user, session, min_role="admin"
+    )
+
+
+async def require_workspace_owner(
+    workspace_id: str,
+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
+    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+) -> AuthIdentity:
+    """Require owner role in the workspace."""
+    return await require_workspace_member(
+        workspace_id, user, session, min_role="owner"
+    )
+
+
+def ensure_resource_in_workspace(
+    resource_workspace_id: str | None,
+    workspace_id: str,
+    *,
+    label: str = "Resource",
+) -> None:
+    """Reject cross-workspace access (IDOR) with a generic 404."""
+    if resource_workspace_id != workspace_id:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
+            detail=f"{label} not found",
+        )

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 from praisonaiagents.auth import AuthIdentity
 
-from ..deps import get_db, require_workspace_member
+from ..deps import ensure_resource_in_workspace, get_db, require_workspace_member
 from ..schemas import AgentCreate, AgentResponse, AgentUpdate
 from ...services.agent_service import AgentService
 
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ async def get_agent(
     agent = await svc.get(agent_id)
     if agent is None:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Agent not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(agent.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Agent")
     return AgentResponse.model_validate(agent)
 
 
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ async def update_agent(
     )
     if agent is None:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Agent not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(agent.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Agent")
     return AgentResponse.model_validate(agent)
 
 
@@ -95,6 +97,10 @@ async def delete_agent(
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
     svc = AgentService(session)
+    agent = await svc.get(agent_id)
+    if agent is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Agent not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(agent.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Agent")
     deleted = await svc.delete(agent_id)
     if not deleted:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Agent not found")

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 from praisonaiagents.auth import AuthIdentity
 
-from ..deps import get_db, require_workspace_member
+from ..deps import ensure_resource_in_workspace, get_db, require_workspace_member
 from ..schemas import (
     CommentCreate,
     CommentResponse,
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ async def get_issue(
     issue = await svc.get(issue_id)
     if issue is None:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(issue.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Issue")
     return IssueResponse.model_validate(issue)
 
 
@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ async def update_issue(
     )
     if issue is None:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(issue.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Issue")
     act_svc = ActivityService(session)
     await act_svc.log(
         workspace_id, "issue.updated", "issue", issue.id,
@@ -132,6 +134,10 @@ async def delete_issue(
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
     svc = IssueService(session)
+    issue = await svc.get(issue_id)
+    if issue is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(issue.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Issue")
     deleted = await svc.delete(issue_id)
     if not deleted:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
@@ -148,6 +154,11 @@ async def add_comment(
     user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
+    issue_svc = IssueService(session)
+    issue = await issue_svc.get(issue_id)
+    if issue is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(issue.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Issue")
     svc = CommentService(session)
     comment = await svc.create(
         issue_id=issue_id,
@@ -166,6 +177,11 @@ async def list_comments(
     user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
+    issue_svc = IssueService(session)
+    issue = await issue_svc.get(issue_id)
+    if issue is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace(issue.workspace_id, workspace_id, label="Issue")
     svc = CommentService(session)
     comments = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id)
     return [CommentResponse.model_validate(c) for c in comments]

@@ -9,7 +9,13 @@
 
 from praisonaiagents.auth import AuthIdentity
 
-from ..deps import get_current_user, get_db, require_workspace_member
+from ..deps import (
+    get_current_user,
+    get_db,
+    require_workspace_admin,
+    require_workspace_member,
+    require_workspace_owner,
+)
 from ..schemas import (
     MemberAdd,
     MemberResponse,
@@ -64,7 +70,7 @@ async def get_workspace(
 async def update_workspace(
     workspace_id: str,
     body: WorkspaceUpdate,
-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_admin),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
     ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)
@@ -77,7 +83,7 @@ async def update_workspace(
 @router.delete("/{workspace_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
 async def delete_workspace(
     workspace_id: str,
-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_owner),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
     ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)
@@ -93,10 +99,16 @@ async def delete_workspace(
 async def add_member(
     workspace_id: str,
     body: MemberAdd,
-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_admin),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
     member_svc = MemberService(session)
+    if body.role == "owner":
+        if not await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, "owner"):
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                detail="Only owners can add another owner",
+            )
     member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role)
     return MemberResponse.model_validate(member)
 
@@ -117,10 +129,32 @@ async def update_member_role(
     workspace_id: str,
     user_id: str,
     body: MemberUpdate,
-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_admin),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
     member_svc = MemberService(session)
+    target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)
+    if target is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Member not found")
+    if user_id == user.id and body.role != target.role:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Cannot change your own role",
+        )
+    if body.role == "owner" and not await member_svc.has_role(
+        workspace_id, user.id, "owner"
+    ):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Only owners can assign the owner role",
+        )
+    if target.role == "owner" and not await member_svc.has_role(
+        workspace_id, user.id, "owner"
+    ):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Only owners can change an owner's role",
+        )
     member = await member_svc.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)
     if member is None:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Member not found")
@@ -131,10 +165,25 @@ async def update_member_role(
 async def remove_member(
     workspace_id: str,
     user_id: str,
-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_admin),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
     member_svc = MemberService(session)
+    if user_id == user.id:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Cannot remove yourself from the workspace",
+        )
+    target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)
+    if target is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Member not found")
+    if target.role == "owner" and not await member_svc.has_role(
+        workspace_id, user.id, "owner"
+    ):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Only owners can remove an owner",
+        )
     removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)
     if not removed:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Member not found")

@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ async def login(self, email: str, password: str) -> Optional[tuple[User, str]]:
 
     def _issue_token(self, user: User) -> str:
         """Issue a JWT for a user."""
+        if JWT_SECRET == _DEFAULT_SECRET and os.environ.get("PLATFORM_ENV", "dev") != "dev":
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "Refusing to issue JWT with default PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET outside dev"
+            )
         now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
         payload = {
             "sub": user.id,

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+"""Workspace member RBAC and cross-workspace IDOR guards."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+from praisonai_platform.api.deps import ensure_resource_in_workspace
+
+
+def test_ensure_resource_in_workspace_rejects_mismatch():
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+        ensure_resource_in_workspace("ws-a", "ws-b", label="Issue")
+    assert exc.value.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_ensure_resource_in_workspace_allows_match():
+    ensure_resource_in_workspace("ws-a", "ws-a", label="Issue")

@@ -29,14 +29,26 @@
 # Authentication
 import os
 CALL_SERVER_TOKEN = os.getenv('CALL_SERVER_TOKEN')
+_CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH', '').lower() == 'disabled'
+
 
 async def verify_token(
     request: Request, 
     authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)
 ) -> None:
     """Verify API token for authentication."""
-    if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE or not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:
-        return  # No authentication if FastAPI unavailable or no token set
+    if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE:
+        return
+    if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED:
+        return
+    if not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=503,
+            detail=(
+                "CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is not configured. Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or "
+                "PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication."
+            ),
+        )
         
     token = None
     

@@ -58,9 +58,10 @@ def write_file(
         >>> if result['success']:
         ...     print(f"Wrote to {result['path']}")
     """
-    # Resolve path
-    if workspace and not os.path.isabs(path):
-        abs_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(workspace, path))
+    # Resolve path — default workspace is cwd so relative paths cannot escape
+    effective_workspace = workspace or os.getcwd()
+    if not os.path.isabs(path):
+        abs_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(effective_workspace, path))
     else:
         abs_path = os.path.abspath(path)
     
@@ -73,14 +74,12 @@ def write_file(
             'path': path,
         }
 
-    # Security check - ensure path is within workspace if specified
-    if workspace:
-        if not is_path_within_directory(abs_path, workspace):
-            return {
-                'success': False,
-                'error': f"Path '{path}' is outside the workspace",
-                'path': path,
-            }
+    if not is_path_within_directory(abs_path, effective_workspace):
+        return {
+            'success': False,
+            'error': f"Path '{path}' is outside the workspace",
+            'path': path,
+        }
     
     # Process content
     processed_content = content

@@ -21,6 +21,31 @@
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
+def _resolve_cwd_yaml_path(file_path: str) -> "Path":
+    """Resolve a YAML path strictly inside the current working directory."""
+    from pathlib import Path
+
+    if not isinstance(file_path, str) or not file_path:
+        raise ValueError("file_path must be a non-empty string")
+    if (
+        "/" in file_path
+        or "\\" in file_path
+        or "\x00" in file_path
+        or file_path.startswith(".")
+        or file_path in ("..", ".")
+    ):
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid file_path: {file_path!r}")
+    if not file_path.endswith((".yaml", ".yml")):
+        raise ValueError("file_path must be a .yaml or .yml file")
+    base = Path.cwd().resolve()
+    candidate = (base / file_path).resolve()
+    try:
+        candidate.relative_to(base)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid file_path: {file_path!r}") from exc
+    return candidate
+
+
 def register_cli_tools() -> None:
     """Register CLI-based MCP tools."""
     
@@ -44,7 +69,8 @@ def workflow_validate(file_path: str) -> str:
         """Validate a workflow YAML file."""
         try:
             import yaml
-            with open(file_path, 'r') as f:
+            yaml_path = _resolve_cwd_yaml_path(file_path)
+            with open(yaml_path, 'r') as f:
                 config = yaml.safe_load(f)
             
             required = ["framework", "topic"]
@@ -64,9 +90,10 @@ def workflow_validate(file_path: str) -> str:
     def workflow_show(file_path: str) -> str:
         """Show workflow configuration."""
         try:
-            with open(file_path, 'r') as f:
-                content = f.read()
-            return content
+            yaml_path = _resolve_cwd_yaml_path(file_path)
+            return yaml_path.read_text()
+        except ValueError as e:
+            return f"Error: {e}"
         except FileNotFoundError:
             return f"File not found: {file_path}"
         except Exception as e:
@@ -417,7 +444,8 @@ def deploy_validate(config_path: str = "deploy.yaml") -> str:
         """Validate deployment configuration."""
         try:
             import yaml
-            with open(config_path, 'r') as f:
+            yaml_path = _resolve_cwd_yaml_path(config_path)
+            with open(yaml_path, 'r') as f:
                 config = yaml.safe_load(f)
             
             required = ["name", "type"]

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+"""write_file must constrain paths when workspace is omitted."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+
+from praisonai.code.tools.write_file import write_file
+
+
+def test_write_file_without_workspace_stays_in_cwd(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    ok = write_file("out.txt", "hello", workspace=None)
+    assert ok["success"] is True
+    assert (tmp_path / "out.txt").read_text() == "hello"
+
+
+def test_write_file_without_workspace_blocks_escape(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    project = tmp_path / "project"
+    project.mkdir()
+    monkeypatch.chdir(project)
+    result = write_file("../outside.txt", "nope", workspace=None)
+    assert result["success"] is False
+    assert "outside" in result["error"].lower()

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+"""MCP CLI tools must not read arbitrary filesystem paths."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+
+def test_resolve_cwd_yaml_rejects_traversal(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+    from praisonai.mcp_server.adapters import cli_tools
+
+    (tmp_path / "workflow.yaml").write_text("framework: test\ntopic: t\n")
+
+    path = cli_tools._resolve_cwd_yaml_path("workflow.yaml")
+    assert path.name == "workflow.yaml"
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        cli_tools._resolve_cwd_yaml_path("../../etc/passwd")
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        cli_tools._resolve_cwd_yaml_path("/etc/passwd")

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+"""Call server agent API must not fail open without CALL_SERVER_TOKEN."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib
+import os
+
+import pytest
+
+pytest.importorskip("fastapi")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_verify_token_requires_token_by_default(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.delenv("CALL_SERVER_TOKEN", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH", raising=False)
+
+    mod = importlib.import_module("praisonai.api.agent_invoke")
+    importlib.reload(mod)
+
+    class _Req:
+        query_params = {}
+
+    with pytest.raises(Exception) as exc:
+        await mod.verify_token(_Req(), authorization=None)
+    assert "CALL_SERVER_TOKEN" in str(exc.value)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_verify_token_optout(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.delenv("CALL_SERVER_TOKEN", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH", "disabled")
+
+    mod = importlib.import_module("praisonai.api.agent_invoke")
+    importlib.reload(mod)
+
+    class _Req:
+        query_params = {}
+
+    await mod.verify_token(_Req(), authorization=None)

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ RUN mkdir -p /root/.praison
 # Install Python packages (using latest versions)
 RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
     praisonai_tools \
-    "praisonai>=4.6.39" \
+    "praisonai>=4.6.40" \
     "praisonai[chat]" \
     "embedchain[github,youtube]"
 

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ RUN mkdir -p /root/.praison
 # Install Python packages (using latest versions)
 RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
     praisonai_tools \
-    "praisonai>=4.6.39" \
+    "praisonai>=4.6.40" \
     "praisonai[ui]" \
     "praisonai[chat]" \
     "praisonai[realtime]" \

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ RUN mkdir -p /root/.praison
 # Install Python packages (using latest versions)
 RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
     praisonai_tools \
-    "praisonai>=4.6.39" \
+    "praisonai>=4.6.40" \
     "praisonai[ui]" \
     "praisonai[crewai]"
 

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "praisonaiagents"
-version = "1.6.39"
+version = "1.6.40"
 description = "Praison AI agents for completing complex tasks with Self Reflection Agents"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"

@@ -2992,7 +2992,7 @@ wheels = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "praisonaiagents"
-version = "1.6.39"
+version = "1.6.40"
 source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "aiohttp" },

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "praisonai-platform"
-version = "0.1.2"
+version = "0.1.4"
 description = "Platform layer for PraisonAI — workspace, auth, issues, projects"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"

@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ wheels = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "praisonai-platform"
-version = "0.1.2"
+version = "0.1.4"
 source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "aiosqlite" },

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ def create_dockerfile(self):
             file.write("FROM python:3.11-slim\n")
             file.write("WORKDIR /app\n")
             file.write("COPY . .\n")
-            file.write("RUN pip install flask praisonai==4.6.39 gunicorn markdown\n")
+            file.write("RUN pip install flask praisonai==4.6.40 gunicorn markdown\n")
             file.write("EXPOSE 8080\n")
             file.write('CMD ["gunicorn", "-b", "0.0.0.0:8080", "api:app"]\n')
             

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ class Praisonai < Formula
   
     desc "AI tools for various AI applications"
     homepage "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
-    url "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/archive/refs/tags/v4.6.39.tar.gz"
-    sha256 `curl -sL https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/archive/refs/tags/v4.6.39.tar.gz | shasum -a 256`.split.first
+    url "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/archive/refs/tags/v4.6.40.tar.gz"
+    sha256 `curl -sL https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/archive/refs/tags/v4.6.40.tar.gz | shasum -a 256`.split.first
     license "MIT"
   
     depends_on "python@3.11"

@@ -1 +1 @@
-__version__ = "4.6.39"
\ No newline at end of file
+__version__ = "4.6.40"
\ No newline at end of file

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ dependencies = [
     "rich>=13.7",
     "markdown>=3.5",
     "pyparsing>=3.0.0",
-    "praisonaiagents>=1.6.39",
+    "praisonaiagents>=1.6.40",
     "python-dotenv>=0.19.0",
     "litellm>=1.83.14,<2",
     "PyYAML>=6.0",

@@ -4841,7 +4841,7 @@ wheels = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "praisonaiagents"
-version = "1.6.39"
+version = "1.6.40"
 source = { directory = "../praisonai-agents" }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "aiohttp" },