NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL
Description
Summary
The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's redirect_url to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirect_url; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].
Details
The vulnerable sink is in packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts:
isValidRedirectUrlvalidated onlytypeof === 'string'and non-empty trim — no scheme check.- The submit branch built an anchor element, compared
anchor.hosttowindow.location.host, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assignedwindow.location.href = redirectUrl(otherwise). - For non-network schemes such as
javascript:,data:,vbscript:, andfile:,anchor.hostis the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch — executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.
The redirect_url field is writable by any user with editor role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.
Impact
- Same-origin script execution in the viewer's NocoDB tab. The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at
localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].token. - Action under the viewer's identity. With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.
- Single-click viewer flow. Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.
Credit
This issue was reported by @kah-ja (turingpoint.de).
Affected products
1Patches
0No patches discovered yet.
Vulnerability mechanics
Root cause
"The same-host check for redirect URLs does not validate the URL scheme, allowing non-network schemes to bypass the check."
Attack vector
An attacker with editor role on any NocoDB base can set a `javascript:` URL as the `redirect_url` for a form. When an authenticated viewer opens the shared form link and submits it, the `javascript:` URL is executed within the viewer's NocoDB origin. This allows the payload to access the session token stored in `localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"]` [ref_id=2]. The attacker can then use this token to make authenticated API calls as the viewer.
Affected code
The vulnerability resides in the `useSharedFormViewStore.ts` file within the `packages/nc-gui` directory. Specifically, the `isValidRedirectUrl` function and the subsequent submit handler logic are implicated. The code fails to validate the URL scheme, leading to the bypass of the same-host check for non-network schemes [ref_id=2].
What the fix does
The advisory indicates that the `isValidRedirectUrl` function did not properly validate the URL scheme, allowing non-network schemes like `javascript:` to be processed. The fix likely involves enhancing this validation to reject such schemes, preventing them from being assigned to `window.location.href` [ref_id=2]. This ensures that only valid HTTP or HTTPS URLs are redirected to, mitigating the risk of script execution.
Preconditions
- authAttacker must have 'editor' role (or above) on a NocoDB base.
- inputAttacker must be able to set a `javascript:` URL as the `redirect_url` for a form.
- authVictim must be an authenticated viewer of the shared form link.
Generated on Jun 5, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
3News mentions
1- Nocodb: 14 Vulnerabilities Disclosed Together, Including XSS and SQL InjectionVypr Intelligence · Jun 5, 2026