CVE-2026-46728
Description
Das U-Boot before 2026.04 allows FIT (Flat Image Tree) signature verification bypass because hashed-nodes is omitted from a hash.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
U-Boot before 2026.04 allows FIT signature verification bypass by omitting hashed-nodes from the hash, enabling boot of tampered images.
Vulnerability
The vulnerability resides in the FIT (Flat Image Tree) signature verification process in Das U-Boot versions before 2026.04. When a signed FIT image is verified, the hashed-nodes property of the signature node lists which nodes are included in the hash. However, the hashed-nodes property itself is not part of the hash, allowing an attacker to modify it to include or exclude arbitrary nodes from verification. This flaw exists in boot/image-fit-sig.c and is addressed by commit [1].
Exploitation
An attacker with the ability to modify a signed FIT image (e.g., through physical access or by supplying a malicious image) can alter the hashed-nodes property to remove critical nodes, such as those containing the actual boot image, from the hash verification. The attacker then presents the modified FIT image to the bootloader, which verifies the signature against the tampered list, resulting in acceptance of untrusted components [2].
Impact
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to bypass signature verification and boot arbitrary, unsigned images. This leads to arbitrary code execution at the bootloader level, potentially compromising the entire system's confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Mitigation
The fix is included in U-Boot version 2026.04 and later (commit [1]). Users should update to the latest version. For systems that cannot be updated immediately, ensure that only trusted, externally generated FIT images are used. The barebox bootloader has also been patched [2].
AI Insight generated on May 21, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected products
2Patches
12092322b31ccboot: Add fit_config_get_hash_list() to build signed node list
3 files changed · +201 −53
boot/image-fit-sig.c+182 −45 modified@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR; #include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> #define IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES 100 +#define FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF 4096 /** * fit_region_make_list() - Make a list of image regions @@ -229,6 +230,179 @@ int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset, return 0; } +/** + * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list + * + * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher + * subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer. + * + * @fit: FIT blob + * @image_noffset: Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1) + * @node_inc: Array of path pointers to fill + * @count: Pointer to current count (updated on return) + * @max_nodes: Maximum entries in @node_inc + * @buf: Buffer for packed path strings + * @buf_used: Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return) + * @buf_len: Total size of @buf + * Return: 0 on success, -ve on error + */ +static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset, + char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes, + char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len) +{ + int noffset, hash_count, ret, len; + + if (*count >= max_nodes) + return -ENOSPC; + + ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used, + buf_len - *buf_used); + if (ret < 0) + return -ENOENT; + len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1; + node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used; + *buf_used += len; + + /* Add all this image's hash subnodes */ + hash_count = 0; + for (noffset = fdt_first_subnode(fit, image_noffset); + noffset >= 0; + noffset = fdt_next_subnode(fit, noffset)) { + const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL); + + if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME, + strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME))) + continue; + if (*count >= max_nodes) + return -ENOSPC; + ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used, + buf_len - *buf_used); + if (ret < 0) + return -ENOENT; + len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1; + node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used; + *buf_used += len; + hash_count++; + } + + if (!hash_count) { + printf("No hash nodes in image '%s'\n", + fdt_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL)); + return -ENOMSG; + } + + /* Add this image's cipher node if present */ + noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME); + if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) { + if (noffset < 0) + return -EIO; + if (*count >= max_nodes) + return -ENOSPC; + ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used, + buf_len - *buf_used); + if (ret < 0) + return -ENOENT; + len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1; + node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used; + *buf_used += len; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash + * + * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the + * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and + * cipher subnodes. + * + * Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible, + * default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default. + * + * @fit: FIT blob + * @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset + * @node_inc: Array to fill with path string pointers + * @max_nodes: Size of @node_inc array + * @buf: Buffer for packed null-terminated path strings + * @buf_len: Size of @buf + * Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error + */ +static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, + char **node_inc, int max_nodes, + char *buf, int buf_len) +{ + const char *conf_name; + int image_count; + int prop_offset; + int used = 0; + int count = 0; + int ret, len; + + conf_name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL); + + /* Always include the root node and the configuration node */ + if (max_nodes < 2) + return -ENOSPC; + + len = 2; /* "/" + nul */ + if (len > buf_len) + return -ENOSPC; + strcpy(buf, "/"); + node_inc[count++] = buf; + used += len; + + len = snprintf(buf + used, buf_len - used, "%s/%s", FIT_CONFS_PATH, + conf_name) + 1; + if (used + len > buf_len) + return -ENOSPC; + node_inc[count++] = buf + used; + used += len; + + /* Process each image referenced by the config */ + image_count = 0; + fdt_for_each_property_offset(prop_offset, fit, conf_noffset) { + const char *prop_name; + int img_count, i; + + fdt_getprop_by_offset(fit, prop_offset, &prop_name, NULL); + if (!prop_name) + continue; + + /* Skip properties that are not image references */ + if (!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DESC_PROP) || + !strcmp(prop_name, FIT_COMPAT_PROP) || + !strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DEFAULT_PROP)) + continue; + + img_count = fdt_stringlist_count(fit, conf_noffset, prop_name); + for (i = 0; i < img_count; i++) { + int noffset; + + noffset = fit_conf_get_prop_node_index(fit, + conf_noffset, + prop_name, i); + if (noffset < 0) + continue; + + ret = fit_config_add_hash(fit, noffset, node_inc, + &count, max_nodes, buf, &used, + buf_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + image_count++; + } + } + + if (!image_count) { + printf("No images in config '%s'\n", conf_name); + return -ENOMSG; + } + + return count; +} + /** * fit_config_check_sig() - Check the signature of a config * @@ -269,20 +443,16 @@ static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset, FIT_DATA_POSITION_PROP, FIT_DATA_OFFSET_PROP, }; - - const char *prop, *end, *name; + char *node_inc[IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES]; + char hash_buf[FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF]; struct image_sign_info info; const uint32_t *strings; - const char *config_name; uint8_t *fit_value; int fit_value_len; - bool found_config; int max_regions; - int i, prop_len; char path[200]; int count; - config_name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL); debug("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n", __func__, key_blob, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL), fit_get_name(key_blob, required_keynode, NULL)); @@ -297,45 +467,12 @@ static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset, return -1; } - /* Count the number of strings in the property */ - prop = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-nodes", &prop_len); - end = prop ? prop + prop_len : prop; - for (name = prop, count = 0; name < end; name++) - if (!*name) - count++; - if (!count) { - *err_msgp = "Can't get hashed-nodes property"; - return -1; - } - - if (prop && prop_len > 0 && prop[prop_len - 1] != '\0') { - *err_msgp = "hashed-nodes property must be null-terminated"; - return -1; - } - - /* Add a sanity check here since we are using the stack */ - if (count > IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES) { - *err_msgp = "Number of hashed nodes exceeds maximum"; - return -1; - } - - /* Create a list of node names from those strings */ - char *node_inc[count]; - - debug("Hash nodes (%d):\n", count); - found_config = false; - for (name = prop, i = 0; name < end; name += strlen(name) + 1, i++) { - debug(" '%s'\n", name); - node_inc[i] = (char *)name; - if (!strncmp(FIT_CONFS_PATH, name, strlen(FIT_CONFS_PATH)) && - name[sizeof(FIT_CONFS_PATH) - 1] == '/' && - !strcmp(name + sizeof(FIT_CONFS_PATH), config_name)) { - debug(" (found config node %s)", config_name); - found_config = true; - } - } - if (!found_config) { - *err_msgp = "Selected config not in hashed nodes"; + /* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */ + count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset, + node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES, + hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf)); + if (count < 0) { + *err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list"; return -1; }
doc/usage/fit/signature.rst+13 −6 modified@@ -353,28 +353,35 @@ meantime. Details ------- The signature node contains a property ('hashed-nodes') which lists all the -nodes that the signature was made over. The image is walked in order and each -tag processed as follows: +nodes that the signature was made over. The signer (mkimage) writes this +property as a record of what was included in the hash. During verification, +however, U-Boot does not read 'hashed-nodes'. Instead it rebuilds the node +list from the configuration's own image references (kernel, fdt, ramdisk, +etc.), since 'hashed-nodes' is not itself covered by the signature. The +rebuilt list always includes the root node, the configuration node, each +referenced image node and its hash/cipher subnodes. + +The image is walked in order and each tag processed as follows: DTB_BEGIN_NODE The tag and the following name are included in the signature - if the node or its parent are present in 'hashed-nodes' + if the node or its parent are present in the node list DTB_END_NODE The tag is included in the signature if the node or its parent - are present in 'hashed-nodes' + are present in the node list DTB_PROPERTY The tag, the length word, the offset in the string table, and - the data are all included if the current node is present in 'hashed-nodes' + the data are all included if the current node is present in the node list and the property name is not 'data'. DTB_END The tag is always included in the signature. DTB_NOP The tag is included in the signature if the current node is present - in 'hashed-nodes' + in the node list In addition, the signature contains a property 'hashed-strings' which contains the offset and length in the string table of the strings that are to be
test/py/tests/test_vboot.py+6 −2 modified@@ -362,10 +362,14 @@ def test_with_algo(sha_algo, padding, sign_options): shutil.copyfile(fit, efit) vboot_evil.add_evil_node(fit, efit, evil_kernel, 'kernel@') - msg = 'Signature checking prevents use of unit addresses (@) in nodes' + # fit_check_sign catches this via signature mismatch (the @ + # node is hashed instead of the real one) utils.run_and_log_expect_exception( ubman, [fit_check_sign, '-f', efit, '-k', dtb], - 1, msg) + 1, 'Failed to verify required signature') + + # bootm catches it earlier, at fit_check_format() time + msg = 'Signature checking prevents use of unit addresses (@) in nodes' run_bootm(sha_algo, 'evil kernel@', msg, False, efit) # Create a new properly signed fit and replace header bytes
Vulnerability mechanics
Root cause
"Signature verification reads the 'hashed-nodes' property from the FIT signature node, which is not itself covered by the signature hash, allowing an attacker to omit nodes from the hash and bypass verification."
Attack vector
An attacker with the ability to modify a signed FIT image can craft a malicious image where the 'hashed-nodes' property in the signature node lists fewer nodes than were actually signed. Since 'hashed-nodes' is not itself included in the hash [CWE-346], the signature can still validate against a reduced set of nodes. The attacker can then substitute a malicious image node (e.g., a kernel with a unit-address suffix like 'kernel@') that is not covered by the hash, causing U-Boot to boot the attacker-controlled payload despite the signature check passing.
Affected code
The vulnerability is in boot/image-fit-sig.c, specifically in the fit_config_check_sig() function. The old code read the 'hashed-nodes' property from the signature node to determine which FDT nodes to include in the hash. The patch replaces this with fit_config_get_hash_list(), which builds the node list from the configuration's own image references.
What the fix does
The patch removes the trust in the 'hashed-nodes' property during verification. A new function, fit_config_get_hash_list() [patch_id=424453], rebuilds the node list from scratch by iterating the configuration's image references (kernel, fdt, ramdisk, etc.) and collecting each image node plus its hash and cipher subnodes. The old code that parsed 'hashed-nodes' from the FIT blob is deleted. The signature now covers exactly the nodes that the configuration actually references, closing the bypass. The documentation is updated to state that 'hashed-nodes' is only a hint written by the signer and is not read during verification.
Preconditions
- authAttacker must have access to a valid signed FIT image to modify.
- inputAttacker must be able to supply a crafted FIT image to the target system (e.g., via update mechanism or boot media).
- configTarget must be using FIT image signature verification (not just FIT format checking).
Generated on May 19, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
2News mentions
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