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High severity8.8NVD Advisory· Published May 29, 2026· Updated May 29, 2026

CVE-2026-45662

CVE-2026-45662

Description

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.0 and earlier, the deleteRegistry function in Dokploy (packages/server/src/services/registry.ts) executes docker logout ${response.registryUrl} without shell escaping. In the same file, the docker login command correctly uses shEscape() to prevent command injection. This inconsistency creates a command injection vulnerability when deleting a registry with a crafted registryUrl.

AI Insight

LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.

Dokploy 0.29.0 and earlier are vulnerable to command injection via unescaped docker logout when deleting a registry, allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands on the host.

Vulnerability

In Dokploy 0.29.0 and earlier, the deleteRegistry function in packages/server/src/services/registry.ts executes docker logout ${response.registryUrl} without shell escaping, while the docker login command properly uses shEscape(). The registryUrl parameter, validated only with z.string(), allows shell metacharacters. This enables command injection when deleting a registry with a crafted registryUrl [1].

Exploitation

An authenticated user with registry management permissions can create a registry with a malicious registryUrl containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ; id > /tmp/pwned #). When the registry is deleted, the server executes the injected command as part of the docker logout command, resulting in remote code execution [1].

Impact

Successful exploitation grants the attacker arbitrary OS command execution on the Dokploy host, leading to server compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement [1].

Mitigation

Not yet disclosed in the available references [1].

References
  1. Command Injection via incomplete shell escaping in docker logout (registry deletion)

AI Insight generated on May 29, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.

Affected products

2
  • Dokploy/Dokployinferred2 versions
    <=0.29.0+ 1 more
    • (no CPE)range: <=0.29.0
    • (no CPE)range: <=0.29.0

Patches

1
98a586478e1b

chore: bump version to v0.29.1 in package.json

https://github.com/Dokploy/dokployMauricio SiuApr 19, 2026Fixed in 0.29.1via release-tag
commit
1 file changed · +1 −1
  • apps/dokploy/package.json+1 −1 modified
    @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
 	"name": "dokploy",
-	"version": "v0.29.0",
+	"version": "v0.29.1",
 	"private": true,
 	"license": "Apache-2.0",
 	"type": "module",

Vulnerability mechanics

Root cause

"Missing shell escaping in the `docker logout` command allows command injection via a crafted `registryUrl`."

Attack vector

An authenticated user with registry management permissions creates a registry with a `registryUrl` containing shell metacharacters (e.g., `;`, `|`, `$()`). The `registryUrl` is validated only with `z.string()` — no regex restriction on special characters [ref_id=1]. When the user subsequently deletes that registry, the server executes `docker logout <crafted-url>` without shell escaping, allowing the injected command to run on the Dokploy host with the privileges of the server process [ref_id=1].

Affected code

The vulnerable function is `deleteRegistry` in `packages/server/src/services/registry.ts` at line 88, which calls `execAsync(`docker logout ${response.registryUrl}`)` without shell escaping. The same file defines `shEscape()` on line 14 and correctly uses it for the `docker login` command (lines 24-27), making the omission in `docker logout` an inconsistency [ref_id=1].

What the fix does

The patch at commit `98a586478e1b8168fab53aefb8fce9f37cfd6aa2` only bumps the version from v0.29.0 to v0.29.1 in `package.json` [patch_id=3102115]. The advisory states that the fix should apply `shEscape()` to `response.registryUrl` in the `docker logout` command, consistent with how `docker login` is handled [ref_id=1]. The patch file included in the bundle does not contain the actual code fix — only the version bump — so the remediation described in the advisory is the authoritative guidance.

Preconditions

  • authAttacker must be an authenticated user with registry management permissions
  • networkAttacker must be able to reach the Dokploy API over the network
  • inputAttacker must supply a crafted registryUrl containing shell metacharacters

Reproduction

1. Create a registry with a malicious URL: `curl -X POST https://dokploy-instance/api/trpc/registry.create -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"registryName":"evil","username":"x","password":"x","registryUrl":"; id > /tmp/pwned #","registryType":"cloud","organizationId":"<org-id>"}'` [ref_id=1] 2. Delete the registry to trigger the vulnerable `docker logout` command: `curl -X POST https://dokploy-instance/api/trpc/registry.remove -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"registryId":"<registry-id>"}'` [ref_id=1] 3. The server executes `docker logout ; id > /tmp/pwned #`, writing the output of `id` to `/tmp/pwned` [ref_id=1].

Generated on May 29, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

1

News mentions

0

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