Netty: Memory Exhaustion in RedisArrayAggregator due to Deeply Nested Arrays
Description
Netty's RedisArrayAggregator is vulnerable to memory exhaustion via deeply nested arrays, leading to Denial of Service.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Netty's RedisArrayAggregator is vulnerable to memory exhaustion via deeply nested arrays, leading to Denial of Service.
Vulnerability
The io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisArrayAggregator in Netty versions <= 4.1.134.Final and >= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final does not limit the depth of nested arrays. When processing a Redis payload, it uses a Deque to track nested arrays and allocates a new AggregateState and ArrayList for each nested array header. This lack of a depth limit allows for excessive memory allocation [3], [4].
Exploitation
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a continuous stream of nested array headers in a Redis payload, such as *1\r\n*1\r\n*1\r\n.... Each header causes the RedisArrayAggregator to push a new state onto its internal stack and allocate memory for an ArrayList. By sending millions of such headers, an attacker can trigger a massive consumption of heap memory [3], [4].
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in a Denial of Service (DoS) due to memory exhaustion. Applications using Netty's RedisArrayAggregator to handle untrusted Redis traffic are susceptible to this condition, which can lead to an OutOfMemoryError and server instability [3], [4].
Mitigation
This vulnerability is fixed in Netty version 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final. Users are advised to upgrade to these patched versions or later. No workarounds are specified in the available references [1], [2], [3], [4].
AI Insight generated on Jun 8, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected products
1Patches
0No patches discovered yet.
Vulnerability mechanics
No source-code context for this CVE — mechanics is only generated when we can read the actual fix diff. Without that, the four sections (root cause, attack vector, affected code, fix) would be speculation rather than analysis.
References
4News mentions
1- Netty: Four High-Severity DoS Vulnerabilities Disclosed TogetherVypr Intelligence · Jun 8, 2026