VYPR
High severity8.8NVD Advisory· Published Apr 28, 2026· Updated Apr 30, 2026

CVE-2026-42426

CVE-2026-42426

Description

OpenClaw before 2026.4.8 contains an improper authorization vulnerability where the node.pair.approve method accepts operator.write scope instead of the narrower operator.pairing scope, allowing unprivileged users to approve node pairing. Attackers with operator.write permissions can bypass pairing approval restrictions to gain unauthorized access to exec-capable nodes.

Affected packages

Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.

PackageAffected versionsPatched versions
openclawnpm
< 2026.4.82026.4.8

Affected products

1
  • cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
    Range: <2026.4.8

Patches

1
d7c3210cd6f5

fix(net): skip DNS pinning before trusted env proxy dispatch

https://github.com/openclaw/openclawMaxime GrenuApr 1, 2026via ghsa
3 files changed · +43 4
  • CHANGELOG.md+1 0 modified
    @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
     ### Fixes
     
     - Slack: honor ambient HTTP(S) proxy settings for Socket Mode WebSocket connections, including NO_PROXY exclusions, so proxy-only deployments can connect without a monkey patch. (#62878) Thanks @mjamiv.
    +- Network/fetch guard: skip target DNS pinning when trusted env-proxy mode is active so proxy-only sandboxes can let the trusted proxy resolve outbound hosts. (#59007) Thanks @cluster2600.
     
     ## 2026.4.7-1
     
    
  • src/infra/net/fetch-guard.ssrf.test.ts+38 0 modified
    @@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ async function expectRedirectFailure(params: {
     }
     
     describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => {
    +  const PROXY_ENV_KEYS = [
    +    "HTTP_PROXY",
    +    "HTTPS_PROXY",
    +    "ALL_PROXY",
    +    "http_proxy",
    +    "https_proxy",
    +    "all_proxy",
    +  ] as const;
    +
       type LookupFn = NonNullable<Parameters<typeof fetchWithSsrFGuard>[0]["lookupFn"]>;
       const CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT_STRIPPED_HEADERS = [
         "authorization",
    @@ -100,10 +109,17 @@ describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => {
       const createPublicLookup = (): LookupFn =>
         vi.fn(async () => [{ address: "93.184.216.34", family: 4 }]) as unknown as LookupFn;
     
    +  function clearProxyEnv(): void {
    +    for (const key of PROXY_ENV_KEYS) {
    +      vi.stubEnv(key, "");
    +    }
    +  }
    +
       async function runProxyModeDispatcherTest(params: {
         mode: (typeof GUARDED_FETCH_MODE)[keyof typeof GUARDED_FETCH_MODE];
         expectEnvProxy: boolean;
       }): Promise<void> {
    +    clearProxyEnv();
         vi.stubEnv("HTTP_PROXY", "http://127.0.0.1:7890");
         (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>)[TEST_UNDICI_RUNTIME_DEPS_KEY] = {
           Agent: agentCtor,
    @@ -1032,4 +1048,26 @@ describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => {
         ).rejects.toThrow(/blocked/i);
         expect(fetchImpl).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
       });
    +
    +  it("falls back to DNS pinning in trusted proxy mode when no proxy env var is configured", async () => {
    +    clearProxyEnv();
    +    const lookupFn = createPublicLookup();
    +    const fetchImpl = vi.fn(async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
    +      const requestInit = init as RequestInit & { dispatcher?: unknown };
    +      expect(requestInit.dispatcher).toBeDefined();
    +      expect(getDispatcherClassName(requestInit.dispatcher)).not.toBe("EnvHttpProxyAgent");
    +      return okResponse();
    +    });
    +
    +    const result = await fetchWithSsrFGuard({
    +      url: "https://public.example/resource",
    +      fetchImpl,
    +      lookupFn,
    +      mode: GUARDED_FETCH_MODE.TRUSTED_ENV_PROXY,
    +    });
    +
    +    expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
    +    expect(lookupFn).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
    +    await result.release();
    +  });
     });
    
  • src/infra/net/fetch-guard.ts+4 4 modified
    @@ -313,17 +313,17 @@ export async function fetchWithSsrFGuard(params: GuardedFetchOptions): Promise<G
         try {
           assertExplicitProxySupportsPinnedDns(parsedUrl, params.dispatcherPolicy, params.pinDns);
           await assertExplicitProxyAllowed(params.dispatcherPolicy, params.lookupFn, params.policy);
    -      const pinned = await resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy(parsedUrl.hostname, {
    -        lookupFn: params.lookupFn,
    -        policy: params.policy,
    -      });
           const canUseTrustedEnvProxy =
             mode === GUARDED_FETCH_MODE.TRUSTED_ENV_PROXY && hasProxyEnvConfigured();
           if (canUseTrustedEnvProxy) {
             dispatcher = createHttp1EnvHttpProxyAgent();
           } else if (params.pinDns === false) {
             dispatcher = createPolicyDispatcherWithoutPinnedDns(params.dispatcherPolicy);
           } else {
    +        const pinned = await resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy(parsedUrl.hostname, {
    +          lookupFn: params.lookupFn,
    +          policy: params.policy,
    +        });
             dispatcher = createPinnedDispatcher(pinned, params.dispatcherPolicy, params.policy);
           }
     
    

Vulnerability mechanics

Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

5

News mentions

0

No linked articles in our index yet.