High severity7.5NVD Advisory· Published Apr 28, 2026· Updated Apr 30, 2026
CVE-2026-42423
CVE-2026-42423
Description
OpenClaw before 2026.4.8 contains an approval-timeout fallback mechanism that bypasses strictInlineEval explicit-approval requirements on gateway and node exec hosts. Attackers can exploit this timeout fallback to execute inline eval commands that should require explicit user approval, circumventing the intended security boundary.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
openclawnpm | < 2026.4.8 | 2026.4.8 |
Affected products
1Patches
1d7c3210cd6f5fix(net): skip DNS pinning before trusted env proxy dispatch
3 files changed · +43 −4
CHANGELOG.md+1 −0 modified@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai ### Fixes - Slack: honor ambient HTTP(S) proxy settings for Socket Mode WebSocket connections, including NO_PROXY exclusions, so proxy-only deployments can connect without a monkey patch. (#62878) Thanks @mjamiv. +- Network/fetch guard: skip target DNS pinning when trusted env-proxy mode is active so proxy-only sandboxes can let the trusted proxy resolve outbound hosts. (#59007) Thanks @cluster2600. ## 2026.4.7-1
src/infra/net/fetch-guard.ssrf.test.ts+38 −0 modified@@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ async function expectRedirectFailure(params: { } describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => { + const PROXY_ENV_KEYS = [ + "HTTP_PROXY", + "HTTPS_PROXY", + "ALL_PROXY", + "http_proxy", + "https_proxy", + "all_proxy", + ] as const; + type LookupFn = NonNullable<Parameters<typeof fetchWithSsrFGuard>[0]["lookupFn"]>; const CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT_STRIPPED_HEADERS = [ "authorization", @@ -100,10 +109,17 @@ describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => { const createPublicLookup = (): LookupFn => vi.fn(async () => [{ address: "93.184.216.34", family: 4 }]) as unknown as LookupFn; + function clearProxyEnv(): void { + for (const key of PROXY_ENV_KEYS) { + vi.stubEnv(key, ""); + } + } + async function runProxyModeDispatcherTest(params: { mode: (typeof GUARDED_FETCH_MODE)[keyof typeof GUARDED_FETCH_MODE]; expectEnvProxy: boolean; }): Promise<void> { + clearProxyEnv(); vi.stubEnv("HTTP_PROXY", "http://127.0.0.1:7890"); (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>)[TEST_UNDICI_RUNTIME_DEPS_KEY] = { Agent: agentCtor, @@ -1032,4 +1048,26 @@ describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => { ).rejects.toThrow(/blocked/i); expect(fetchImpl).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); }); + + it("falls back to DNS pinning in trusted proxy mode when no proxy env var is configured", async () => { + clearProxyEnv(); + const lookupFn = createPublicLookup(); + const fetchImpl = vi.fn(async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + const requestInit = init as RequestInit & { dispatcher?: unknown }; + expect(requestInit.dispatcher).toBeDefined(); + expect(getDispatcherClassName(requestInit.dispatcher)).not.toBe("EnvHttpProxyAgent"); + return okResponse(); + }); + + const result = await fetchWithSsrFGuard({ + url: "https://public.example/resource", + fetchImpl, + lookupFn, + mode: GUARDED_FETCH_MODE.TRUSTED_ENV_PROXY, + }); + + expect(fetchImpl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1); + expect(lookupFn).toHaveBeenCalledOnce(); + await result.release(); + }); });
src/infra/net/fetch-guard.ts+4 −4 modified@@ -313,17 +313,17 @@ export async function fetchWithSsrFGuard(params: GuardedFetchOptions): Promise<G try { assertExplicitProxySupportsPinnedDns(parsedUrl, params.dispatcherPolicy, params.pinDns); await assertExplicitProxyAllowed(params.dispatcherPolicy, params.lookupFn, params.policy); - const pinned = await resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy(parsedUrl.hostname, { - lookupFn: params.lookupFn, - policy: params.policy, - }); const canUseTrustedEnvProxy = mode === GUARDED_FETCH_MODE.TRUSTED_ENV_PROXY && hasProxyEnvConfigured(); if (canUseTrustedEnvProxy) { dispatcher = createHttp1EnvHttpProxyAgent(); } else if (params.pinDns === false) { dispatcher = createPolicyDispatcherWithoutPinnedDns(params.dispatcherPolicy); } else { + const pinned = await resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy(parsedUrl.hostname, { + lookupFn: params.lookupFn, + policy: params.policy, + }); dispatcher = createPinnedDispatcher(pinned, params.dispatcherPolicy, params.policy); }
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
5- github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5nvdPatchWEB
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-q2gc-xjqw-qp89ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-q2gc-xjqw-qp89nvdVendor AdvisoryWEB
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42423ghsaADVISORY
- www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-strictinlineeval-approval-boundary-bypass-via-approval-timeout-fallbacknvdThird Party AdvisoryWEB
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