Low severity3.3NVD Advisory· Published Apr 23, 2026· Updated Apr 29, 2026

CVE-2026-41357

Description

OpenClaw before 2026.3.31 contains an environment variable leakage vulnerability in SSH-based sandbox backends that pass unsanitized process.env to child processes. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging non-default SSH environment forwarding configurations to leak sensitive environment variables from parent processes to SSH child processes.

Affected products

OpenClaw/Openclaw
cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
Range: <2026.3.31

Patches

cfe14459531e

Sandbox: sanitize SSH subprocess env (#57848)

https://github.com/openclaw/openclawJacob TomlinsonMar 30, 2026via nvd-ref

commit

12 files changed · +1005 −320

docs/.generated/plugin-sdk-api-baseline.json+606 −174 modified
docs/.generated/plugin-sdk-api-baseline.jsonl+187 −139 modified

extensions/openshell/src/backend.test.ts+29 −0 added

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { buildOpenShellSshExecEnv } from "./backend.js";
+
+describe("openshell backend env", () => {
+  const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
+      if (!(key in originalEnv)) {
+        delete process.env[key];
+      }
+    }
+    Object.assign(process.env, originalEnv);
+  });
+
+  it("filters blocked secrets from ssh exec env", () => {
+    process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY = "sk-test-secret";
+    process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY = "sk-ant-test-secret";
+    process.env.LANG = "en_US.UTF-8";
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+
+    const env = buildOpenShellSshExecEnv();
+
+    expect(env.OPENAI_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env.LANG).toBe("en_US.UTF-8");
+    expect(env.NODE_ENV).toBe("test");
+  });
+});

extensions/openshell/src/backend.ts+7 −2 modified

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import {
   disposeSshSandboxSession,
   resolvePreferredOpenClawTmpDir,
   runSshSandboxCommand,
+  sanitizeEnvVars,
 } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/sandbox";
 import {
   buildExecRemoteCommand,
@@ -41,6 +42,10 @@ type PendingExec = {
   sshSession: SshSandboxSession;
 };
 
+export function buildOpenShellSshExecEnv(): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
+  return sanitizeEnvVars(process.env).allowed;
+}
+
 export type OpenShellSandboxBackend = SandboxBackendHandle &
   RemoteShellSandboxHandle & {
     mode: "mirror" | "remote";
@@ -123,7 +128,7 @@ async function createOpenShellSandboxBackend(params: {
       const pending = await impl.prepareExec({ command, workdir, env, usePty });
       return {
         argv: pending.argv,
-        env: process.env,
+        env: buildOpenShellSshExecEnv(),
         stdinMode: "pipe-open",
         finalizeToken: pending.token,
       };
@@ -180,7 +185,7 @@ class OpenShellSandboxBackendImpl {
         const pending = await self.prepareExec({ command, workdir, env, usePty });
         return {
           argv: pending.argv,
-          env: process.env,
+          env: buildOpenShellSshExecEnv(),
           stdinMode: "pipe-open",
           finalizeToken: pending.token,
         };

src/agents/sandbox/sanitize-env-vars.test.ts+11 −0 modified

@@ -54,4 +54,15 @@ describe("sanitizeEnvVars", () => {
     expect(result.allowed).toEqual({ NODE_ENV: "test" });
     expect(result.blocked).toEqual(["FOO"]);
   });
+
+  it("skips undefined values when sanitizing process-style env maps", () => {
+    const result = sanitizeEnvVars({
+      NODE_ENV: "test",
+      OPTIONAL_SECRET: undefined,
+      OPENAI_API_KEY: undefined,
+    });
+
+    expect(result.allowed).toEqual({ NODE_ENV: "test" });
+    expect(result.blocked).toEqual([]);
+  });
 });

src/agents/sandbox/sanitize-env-vars.ts+2 −2 modified

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ function matchesAnyPattern(value: string, patterns: readonly RegExp[]): boolean
 }
 
 export function sanitizeEnvVars(
-  envVars: Record<string, string>,
+  envVars: Record<string, string | undefined>,
   options: EnvSanitizationOptions = {},
 ): EnvVarSanitizationResult {
   const allowed: Record<string, string> = {};
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ export function sanitizeEnvVars(
 
   for (const [rawKey, value] of Object.entries(envVars)) {
     const key = rawKey.trim();
-    if (!key) {
+    if (!key || value === undefined) {
       continue;
     }

src/agents/sandbox/ssh-backend.test.ts+31 −0 modified

@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ async function expectBackendCreationToReject(params: {
 }
 
 describe("ssh sandbox backend", () => {
+  const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
+
   beforeEach(async () => {
     vi.clearAllMocks();
     sshMocks.createSshSandboxSessionFromSettings.mockResolvedValue(createSession());
@@ -157,6 +159,12 @@ describe("ssh sandbox backend", () => {
   });
 
   afterEach(() => {
+    for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
+      if (!(key in originalEnv)) {
+        delete process.env[key];
+      }
+    }
+    Object.assign(process.env, originalEnv);
     vi.restoreAllMocks();
   });
 
@@ -316,6 +324,29 @@ describe("ssh sandbox backend", () => {
     expect(sshMocks.disposeSshSandboxSession).toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
+  it("filters blocked secrets from exec subprocess env", async () => {
+    process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY = "sk-test-secret";
+    process.env.LANG = "en_US.UTF-8";
+    const backend = await createSshSandboxBackend({
+      sessionKey: "agent:worker:task",
+      scopeKey: "agent:worker",
+      workspaceDir: "/tmp/workspace",
+      agentWorkspaceDir: "/tmp/agent",
+      cfg: createBackendSandboxConfig({
+        target: "peter@example.com:2222",
+      }),
+    });
+
+    const execSpec = await backend.buildExecSpec({
+      command: "pwd",
+      env: {},
+      usePty: false,
+    });
+
+    expect(execSpec.env?.OPENAI_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(execSpec.env?.LANG).toBe("en_US.UTF-8");
+  });
+
   it("rejects docker binds and missing ssh target", async () => {
     await expectBackendCreationToReject({
       binds: ["/tmp:/tmp:rw"],

src/agents/sandbox/ssh-backend.ts+2 −1 modified

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
   createRemoteShellSandboxFsBridge,
   type RemoteShellSandboxHandle,
 } from "./remote-fs-bridge.js";
+import { sanitizeEnvVars } from "./sanitize-env-vars.js";
 import {
   buildExecRemoteCommand,
   buildRemoteCommand,
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ class SshSandboxBackendImpl {
             remoteCommand,
             tty: usePty,
           }),
-          env: process.env,
+          env: sanitizeEnvVars(process.env).allowed,
           stdinMode: "pipe-open",
           finalizeToken: { sshSession } satisfies PendingExec,
         };

src/agents/sandbox/ssh.spawn-env.test.ts+123 −0 added

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import type { ChildProcess, SpawnOptions } from "node:child_process";
+import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";
+import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";
+import { afterEach, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+const spawnMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
+
+type MockChildProcess = EventEmitter & {
+  stdin: PassThrough;
+  stdout: PassThrough;
+  stderr: PassThrough;
+  kill: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
+};
+
+function createMockChildProcess(): MockChildProcess {
+  const child = new EventEmitter() as MockChildProcess;
+  child.stdin = new PassThrough();
+  child.stdout = new PassThrough();
+  child.stderr = new PassThrough();
+  child.kill = vi.fn();
+  return child;
+}
+
+vi.mock("node:child_process", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("node:child_process")>();
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    spawn: spawnMock,
+  };
+});
+
+let runSshSandboxCommand: typeof import("./ssh.js").runSshSandboxCommand;
+let uploadDirectoryToSshTarget: typeof import("./ssh.js").uploadDirectoryToSshTarget;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  ({ runSshSandboxCommand, uploadDirectoryToSshTarget } = await import("./ssh.js"));
+});
+
+describe("ssh subprocess env sanitization", () => {
+  const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
+      if (!(key in originalEnv)) {
+        delete process.env[key];
+      }
+    }
+    Object.assign(process.env, originalEnv);
+  });
+
+  it("filters blocked secrets before spawning ssh commands", async () => {
+    spawnMock.mockImplementationOnce(
+      (_command: string, _args: readonly string[], _options: SpawnOptions): ChildProcess => {
+        const child = createMockChildProcess();
+        process.nextTick(() => {
+          child.emit("close", 0);
+        });
+        return child as unknown as ChildProcess;
+      },
+    );
+
+    process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY = "sk-test-secret";
+    process.env.LANG = "en_US.UTF-8";
+
+    await runSshSandboxCommand({
+      session: {
+        command: "ssh",
+        configPath: "/tmp/openclaw-test-ssh-config",
+        host: "openclaw-sandbox",
+      },
+      remoteCommand: "true",
+    });
+
+    const spawnOptions = spawnMock.mock.calls[0]?.[2] as SpawnOptions | undefined;
+    const env = spawnOptions?.env;
+    expect(env?.OPENAI_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env?.LANG).toBe("en_US.UTF-8");
+  });
+
+  it("filters blocked secrets before spawning ssh uploads", async () => {
+    spawnMock
+      .mockImplementationOnce(
+        (_command: string, _args: readonly string[], _options: SpawnOptions): ChildProcess => {
+          const child = createMockChildProcess();
+          process.nextTick(() => {
+            child.emit("close", 0);
+          });
+          return child as unknown as ChildProcess;
+        },
+      )
+      .mockImplementationOnce(
+        (_command: string, _args: readonly string[], _options: SpawnOptions): ChildProcess => {
+          const child = createMockChildProcess();
+          process.nextTick(() => {
+            child.emit("close", 0);
+          });
+          return child as unknown as ChildProcess;
+        },
+      );
+
+    process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY = "sk-test-secret";
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+
+    await uploadDirectoryToSshTarget({
+      session: {
+        command: "ssh",
+        configPath: "/tmp/openclaw-test-ssh-config",
+        host: "openclaw-sandbox",
+      },
+      localDir: "/tmp/workspace",
+      remoteDir: "/remote/workspace",
+    });
+
+    const sshSpawnOptions = spawnMock.mock.calls[1]?.[2] as SpawnOptions | undefined;
+    const env = sshSpawnOptions?.env;
+    expect(env?.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env?.NODE_ENV).toBe("test");
+  });
+});

src/agents/sandbox/ssh.ts+5 −2 modified

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { parseSshTarget } from "../../infra/ssh-tunnel.js";
 import { resolvePreferredOpenClawTmpDir } from "../../infra/tmp-openclaw-dir.js";
 import { resolveUserPath } from "../../utils.js";
 import type { SandboxBackendCommandResult } from "./backend.js";
+import { sanitizeEnvVars } from "./sanitize-env-vars.js";
 
 export type SshSandboxSettings = {
   command: string;
@@ -212,10 +213,11 @@ export async function runSshSandboxCommand(
     remoteCommand: params.remoteCommand,
     tty: params.tty,
   });
+  const sshEnv = sanitizeEnvVars(process.env).allowed;
   return await new Promise<SandboxBackendCommandResult>((resolve, reject) => {
     const child = spawn(argv[0], argv.slice(1), {
       stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
-      env: process.env,
+      env: sshEnv,
       signal: params.signal,
     });
     const stdoutChunks: Buffer[] = [];
@@ -266,14 +268,15 @@ export async function uploadDirectoryToSshTarget(params: {
     session: params.session,
     remoteCommand,
   });
+  const sshEnv = sanitizeEnvVars(process.env).allowed;
   await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
     const tar = spawn("tar", ["-C", params.localDir, "-cf", "-", "."], {
       stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
       signal: params.signal,
     });
     const ssh = spawn(sshArgv[0], sshArgv.slice(1), {
       stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
-      env: process.env,
+      env: sshEnv,
       signal: params.signal,
     });
     const tarStderr: Buffer[] = [];

src/agents/sandbox.ts+1 −0 modified

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ export {
   shellEscape,
   uploadDirectoryToSshTarget,
 } from "./sandbox/ssh.js";
+export { sanitizeEnvVars } from "./sandbox/sanitize-env-vars.js";
 export { createRemoteShellSandboxFsBridge } from "./sandbox/remote-fs-bridge.js";
 export { createWritableRenameTargetResolver } from "./sandbox/fs-bridge-rename-targets.js";
 export { resolveWritableRenameTargets } from "./sandbox/fs-bridge-rename-targets.js";

src/plugin-sdk/sandbox.ts+1 −0 modified

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ export {
   resolveWritableRenameTargets,
   resolveWritableRenameTargetsForBridge,
   runSshSandboxCommand,
+  sanitizeEnvVars,
   shellEscape,
   uploadDirectoryToSshTarget,
 } from "../agents/sandbox.js";

Vulnerability mechanics

Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/cfe14459531e002a1c61c27d97ec7dc8aecddc1fnvdPatch
github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-j9pv-rrcj-6pfxnvdVendor Advisory
www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-unsanitized-environment-variable-leakage-in-ssh-sandbox-backendsnvdThird Party Advisory

News mentions

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cvss	0.214
epss	0.000
exploit	0.000
kev	0.000
patch	-0.070
ransomware	0.000