CVE-2026-41301

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 ### Changes
 
+- Nostr/inbound DMs: verify inbound event signatures before pairing or sender-authorization side effects, so forged DM events no longer create pairing requests or trigger reply attempts. Thanks @smaeljaish771 and @vincentkoc.
 - LINE/outbound media: add LINE image, video, and audio outbound sends on the LINE-specific delivery path, including explicit preview/tracking handling for videos while keeping generic media sends on the existing image-only route. (#45826) Thanks @masatohoshino.
 - WhatsApp/reactions: agents can now react with emoji on incoming WhatsApp messages, enabling more natural conversational interactions like acknowledging a photo with ❤️ instead of typing a reply. Thanks @mcaxtr.
 - MCP: add remote HTTP/SSE server support for `mcp.servers` URL configs, including auth headers and safer config redaction for MCP credentials. (#50396) Thanks @dhananjai1729.

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ describe("startNostrBus inbound guards", () => {
     mockState.handlers = null;
   });
 
-  it("checks sender authorization before verify/decrypt", async () => {
+  it("checks sender authorization after verify and before decrypt", async () => {
     const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
     const authorizeSender = vi.fn(async () => "block" as const);
     const bus = await startNostrBus({
@@ -114,14 +114,36 @@ describe("startNostrBus inbound guards", () => {
     await emitEvent(createEvent());
 
     expect(authorizeSender).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    expect(mockState.verifyEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(mockState.verifyEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
     expect(mockState.decrypt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
     expect(onMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
     expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsReceived).toBe(1);
 
     bus.close();
   });
 
+  it("rejects invalid signatures before sender authorization", async () => {
+    mockState.verifyEvent.mockReturnValueOnce(false);
+    const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    const authorizeSender = vi.fn(async () => "allow" as const);
+    const bus = await startNostrBus({
+      privateKey: TEST_HEX_PRIVATE_KEY,
+      onMessage,
+      authorizeSender,
+      onMetric: () => {},
+    });
+
+    await emitEvent(createEvent());
+
+    expect(mockState.verifyEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(authorizeSender).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(mockState.decrypt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(onMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.invalidSignature).toBe(1);
+
+    bus.close();
+  });
+
   it("rate limits repeated events before decrypt", async () => {
     const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
     const bus = await startNostrBus({
@@ -146,6 +168,237 @@ describe("startNostrBus inbound guards", () => {
     bus.close();
   });
 
+  it("does not let a blocked sender starve a different verified sender", async () => {
+    const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    const authorizeSender = vi.fn(async ({ senderPubkey }: { senderPubkey: string }) =>
+      senderPubkey.startsWith("blocked") ? ("block" as const) : ("allow" as const),
+    );
+    const bus = await startNostrBus({
+      privateKey: TEST_HEX_PRIVATE_KEY,
+      onMessage,
+      authorizeSender,
+      onMetric: () => {},
+      guardPolicy: {
+        rateLimit: {
+          windowMs: 60_000,
+          maxGlobalPerWindow: 2,
+          maxPerSenderPerWindow: 1,
+          maxTrackedSenderKeys: 32,
+        },
+      },
+    });
+
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "blocked-event",
+        pubkey: `blocked${"a".repeat(57)}`,
+      }),
+    );
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "allowed-event",
+        pubkey: `allowed${"b".repeat(57)}`,
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(authorizeSender).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(mockState.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(onMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.rateLimited).toBe(0);
+
+    bus.close();
+  });
+
+  it("dedupes replayed verified events that authorization blocks", async () => {
+    const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    const authorizeSender = vi.fn(async () => "block" as const);
+    const bus = await startNostrBus({
+      privateKey: TEST_HEX_PRIVATE_KEY,
+      onMessage,
+      authorizeSender,
+      onMetric: () => {},
+    });
+
+    const blockedEvent = createEvent({
+      id: "blocked-replay",
+      pubkey: `blocked${"a".repeat(57)}`,
+    });
+
+    await emitEvent(blockedEvent);
+    await emitEvent(blockedEvent);
+
+    expect(mockState.verifyEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(authorizeSender).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(mockState.decrypt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(onMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    bus.close();
+  });
+
+  it("does not rate limit an allowed sender while another authorization is still pending", async () => {
+    const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    let resolveBlocked: ((value: "block") => void) | undefined;
+    const blockedPromise = new Promise<"block">((resolve) => {
+      resolveBlocked = resolve;
+    });
+    const authorizeSender = vi
+      .fn<(params: { senderPubkey: string }) => Promise<"allow" | "block" | "pairing">>()
+      .mockImplementationOnce(async () => await blockedPromise)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce("allow");
+    const bus = await startNostrBus({
+      privateKey: TEST_HEX_PRIVATE_KEY,
+      onMessage,
+      authorizeSender,
+      onMetric: () => {},
+      guardPolicy: {
+        rateLimit: {
+          windowMs: 60_000,
+          maxGlobalPerWindow: 2,
+          maxPerSenderPerWindow: 1,
+          maxTrackedSenderKeys: 32,
+        },
+      },
+    });
+
+    const blockedEventPromise = emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "blocked-pending",
+        pubkey: `blocked${"a".repeat(57)}`,
+      }),
+    );
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "allowed-during-pending-auth",
+        pubkey: `allowed${"b".repeat(57)}`,
+      }),
+    );
+    resolveBlocked?.("block");
+    await blockedEventPromise;
+
+    expect(authorizeSender).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(mockState.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(onMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.rateLimited).toBe(0);
+
+    bus.close();
+  });
+
+  it("rate limits repeated invalid signatures before authorization work fans out", async () => {
+    mockState.verifyEvent.mockReturnValue(false);
+    const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    const authorizeSender = vi.fn(async () => "allow" as const);
+    const bus = await startNostrBus({
+      privateKey: TEST_HEX_PRIVATE_KEY,
+      onMessage,
+      authorizeSender,
+      onMetric: () => {},
+      guardPolicy: {
+        rateLimit: {
+          windowMs: 60_000,
+          maxGlobalPerWindow: 1,
+          maxPerSenderPerWindow: 10,
+          maxTrackedSenderKeys: 32,
+        },
+      },
+    });
+
+    await emitEvent(createEvent({ id: "invalid-1" }));
+    await emitEvent(createEvent({ id: "invalid-2" }));
+
+    expect(mockState.verifyEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(authorizeSender).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.invalidSignature).toBe(1);
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.rateLimited).toBe(1);
+
+    bus.close();
+  });
+
+  it("counts oversized ciphertext toward the global inbound rate limit", async () => {
+    const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    const bus = await startNostrBus({
+      privateKey: TEST_HEX_PRIVATE_KEY,
+      onMessage,
+      onMetric: () => {},
+      guardPolicy: {
+        maxCiphertextBytes: 4,
+        rateLimit: {
+          windowMs: 60_000,
+          maxGlobalPerWindow: 1,
+          maxPerSenderPerWindow: 10,
+          maxTrackedSenderKeys: 32,
+        },
+      },
+    });
+
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "oversized-global-1",
+        pubkey: `sender1${"a".repeat(57)}`,
+        content: "ciphertext-too-large",
+      }),
+    );
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "oversized-global-2",
+        pubkey: `sender2${"b".repeat(57)}`,
+        content: "ciphertext-too-large",
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.oversizedCiphertext).toBe(1);
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.rateLimited).toBe(1);
+    expect(mockState.verifyEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(mockState.decrypt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(onMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    bus.close();
+  });
+
+  it("does not spend per-sender buckets on oversized ciphertext before verification", async () => {
+    const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
+    const bus = await startNostrBus({
+      privateKey: TEST_HEX_PRIVATE_KEY,
+      onMessage,
+      onMetric: () => {},
+      guardPolicy: {
+        maxCiphertextBytes: 4,
+        rateLimit: {
+          windowMs: 60_000,
+          maxGlobalPerWindow: 10,
+          maxPerSenderPerWindow: 1,
+          maxTrackedSenderKeys: 32,
+        },
+      },
+    });
+
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "oversized-sender-1",
+        content: "ciphertext-too-large",
+      }),
+    );
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "oversized-sender-2",
+        content: "ciphertext-too-large",
+      }),
+    );
+    await emitEvent(
+      createEvent({
+        id: "allowed-after-oversized",
+        content: "ok",
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.oversizedCiphertext).toBe(2);
+    expect(bus.getMetrics().eventsRejected.rateLimited).toBe(0);
+    expect(mockState.verifyEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(mockState.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(onMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+    bus.close();
+  });
+
   it("rejects far-future events before crypto", async () => {
     const onMessage = vi.fn(async () => {});
     const bus = await startNostrBus({

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export interface NostrBusOptions {
     reply: (text: string) => Promise<void>,
     meta: { eventId: string; createdAt: number },
   ) => Promise<void>;
-  /** Called before expensive crypto to allow sender policy checks (optional) */
+  /** Called after signature verification and before decrypt to allow sender policy checks (optional) */
   authorizeSender?: (params: {
     senderPubkey: string;
     reply: (text: string) => Promise<void>;
@@ -553,46 +553,71 @@ export async function startNostrBus(options: NostrBusOptions): Promise<NostrBusH
         );
       };
 
-      if (authorizeSender) {
-        const decision = await authorizeSender({
-          senderPubkey: event.pubkey,
-          reply: replyTo,
-        });
-        if (decision !== "allow") {
-          return;
+      const rejectIfGlobalRateLimited = (): boolean => {
+        updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
+        if (globalRateLimiter.isRateLimited("global")) {
+          metrics.emit("rate_limit.global");
+          metrics.emit("event.rejected.rate_limited");
+          updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
+          return true;
         }
-      }
+        updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
+        return false;
+      };
 
-      updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
-      if (globalRateLimiter.isRateLimited("global")) {
-        metrics.emit("rate_limit.global");
-        metrics.emit("event.rejected.rate_limited");
+      const rejectIfVerifiedSenderRateLimited = (): boolean => {
         updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
-        return;
-      }
-      if (perSenderRateLimiter.isRateLimited(event.pubkey)) {
-        metrics.emit("rate_limit.per_sender");
-        metrics.emit("event.rejected.rate_limited");
+        if (perSenderRateLimiter.isRateLimited(event.pubkey)) {
+          metrics.emit("rate_limit.per_sender");
+          metrics.emit("event.rejected.rate_limited");
+          updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
+          return true;
+        }
         updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
-        return;
-      }
-      updateRateLimiterSizeMetric();
+        return false;
+      };
+
+      const markSeen = () => {
+        seen.add(event.id);
+        metrics.emit("memory.seen_tracker_size", seen.size());
+      };
 
       if (Buffer.byteLength(event.content, "utf8") > guardPolicy.maxCiphertextBytes) {
+        if (rejectIfGlobalRateLimited()) {
+          return;
+        }
         metrics.emit("event.rejected.oversized_ciphertext");
         return;
       }
 
+      if (rejectIfGlobalRateLimited()) {
+        return;
+      }
+
       // Verify signature (must pass before we trust the event)
       if (!verifyEvent(event)) {
         metrics.emit("event.rejected.invalid_signature");
         onError?.(new Error("Invalid signature"), `event ${event.id}`);
         return;
       }
 
+      if (rejectIfVerifiedSenderRateLimited()) {
+        return;
+      }
+
+      if (authorizeSender) {
+        const decision = await authorizeSender({
+          senderPubkey: event.pubkey,
+          reply: replyTo,
+        });
+        if (decision !== "allow") {
+          markSeen();
+          return;
+        }
+      }
+
       // Mark seen AFTER verify (don't cache invalid IDs)
-      seen.add(event.id);
-      metrics.emit("memory.seen_tracker_size", seen.size());
+      markSeen();
 
       // Decrypt the message
       let plaintext: string;