CVE-2026-35090
Description
In Slican telephone exchanges it is possible to manage the control panel remotely. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the modem via a telephone with a specific caller ID. This allows them to bypass admin authentication and gain full access to the service protocol and configuration panel. This vulnerability is independent of the telephone exchanges configuration. If remote access is disabled, calling with this caller ID will temporarily enable it.
This issue was fixed in versions below: - IPL-256: version 6.61.0040 - IPM-032: version 6.61.0040 - CCT-1668: version 6.56.0430 - MAC-6400: version 6.56.0430 - CXS-0424: version 6.30.0510
The issue STILL EXISTS in End-Of-Life telephone exchanges in versions 4.xx and below: - CCT-1668 (CCT1CPU) - MAC-6400 - CXS-0424 These products were discontinued in 2011 and 2012 and and will not receive updates. These products require a hardware update in order to receive a software update. The vendor recommends that users of these devices contact the their service department directly to determine the options for upgrading.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Remote unauthenticated attackers can bypass admin authentication on Slican telephone exchanges by calling the modem with a specific caller ID, gaining full control.
Vulnerability
An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in Slican telephone exchange firmware. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the modem via a telephone call using a specific caller ID to bypass the admin authentication and gain full access to the service protocol and configuration panel [1]. This issue is independent of the telephone exchange's configuration; even if remote access is disabled, calling with the specific caller ID temporarily enables it. Affected versions are IPL-256 and IPM-032 below 6.61.0040, CCT-1668 and MAC-6400 below 6.56.0430, and CXS-0424 below 6.30.0510 [1]. End-of-life products (CCT-1668 (CCT1CPU), MAC-6400, and CXS-0424, versions 4.xx and below, discontinued in 2011 and 2012) remain vulnerable and will not receive a software patch [1].
Exploitation
An attacker needs only a telephone line and a modem capable of generating a specific caller ID [1]. No authentication is required, and no user interaction on the target device is needed. The attacker places a call to the modem of the Slican telephone exchange with the designated caller ID; upon connection, the attacker immediately bypasses admin authentication and gains access to the service protocol and configuration panel [1].
Impact
Successful exploitation grants an unauthenticated attacker full administrative access to the service protocol and configuration panel of the Slican telephone exchange [1]. This allows complete compromise of the device's configuration, including the ability to alter settings, intercept or redirect communications, and potentially disrupt telephone services. The impact is considered critical due to the lack of required privileges and the ability to bypass authentication entirely [1].
Mitigation
Slican has released fixed firmware versions: IPL-256 and IPM-032 version 6.61.0040, CCT-1668 and MAC-6400 version 6.56.0430, and CXS-0424 version 6.30.0510 [1]. Users of supported devices should upgrade immediately. For end-of-life devices (CCT-1668 (CCT1CPU), MAC-6400, and CXS-0424 versions 4.xx and below), no software patch is available; the vendor recommends contacting their service department to discuss hardware upgrade options [1]. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, disabling remote modem access or physically disconnecting the modem may reduce the attack surface, though the vendor advises that calling with the specific caller ID may still re-enable disabled remote access [1].
AI Insight generated on May 27, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected products
5Patches
0No patches discovered yet.
Vulnerability mechanics
No source-code context for this CVE — mechanics is only generated when we can read the actual fix diff. Without that, the four sections (root cause, attack vector, affected code, fix) would be speculation rather than analysis.
References
1News mentions
0No linked articles in our index yet.