CVE-2026-34505

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/WebSocket preauth: shorten unauthenticated handshake retention and reject oversized pre-auth frames before application-layer parsing to reduce pre-pairing exposure on unsupported public deployments. (`GHSA-jv4g-m82p-2j93`)(#44089) (`GHSA-xwx2-ppv2-wx98`)(#44089) Thanks @ez-lbz and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/Feishu reactions: preserve looked-up group chat typing and fail closed on ambiguous reaction context so group authorization and mention gating cannot be bypassed through synthetic `p2p` reactions. (`GHSA-m69h-jm2f-2pv8`)(#44088) Thanks @zpbrent and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/LINE webhook: require signatures for empty-event POST probes too so unsigned requests no longer confirm webhook reachability with a `200` response. (`GHSA-mhxh-9pjm-w7q5`)(#44090) Thanks @TerminalsandCoffee and @vincentkoc.
+- Security/Zalo webhook: rate limit invalid secret guesses before auth so weak webhook secrets cannot be brute-forced through unauthenticated churned requests without pre-auth `429` responses. (`GHSA-5m9r-p9g7-679c`)(#44173) Thanks @zpbrent and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/plugins: disable implicit workspace plugin auto-load so cloned repositories cannot execute workspace plugin code without an explicit trust decision. (`GHSA-99qw-6mr3-36qr`)(#44174) Thanks @lintsinghua and @vincentkoc.
 
 ### Changes

@@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ describe("handleZaloWebhookRequest", () => {
 
     try {
       await withServer(webhookRequestHandler, async (baseUrl) => {
+        let saw429 = false;
         for (let i = 0; i < 200; i += 1) {
           const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/hook-query-status?nonce=${i}`, {
             method: "POST",
@@ -292,10 +293,15 @@ describe("handleZaloWebhookRequest", () => {
             },
             body: "{}",
           });
-          expect(response.status).toBe(401);
+          expect([401, 429]).toContain(response.status);
+          if (response.status === 429) {
+            saw429 = true;
+            break;
+          }
         }
 
-        expect(getZaloWebhookStatusCounterSizeForTest()).toBe(1);
+        expect(saw429).toBe(true);
+        expect(getZaloWebhookStatusCounterSizeForTest()).toBe(2);
       });
     } finally {
       unregister();
@@ -322,6 +328,91 @@ describe("handleZaloWebhookRequest", () => {
     }
   });
 
+  it("rate limits unauthorized secret guesses before authentication succeeds", async () => {
+    const unregister = registerTarget({ path: "/hook-preauth-rate" });
+
+    try {
+      await withServer(webhookRequestHandler, async (baseUrl) => {
+        const saw429 = await postUntilRateLimited({
+          baseUrl,
+          path: "/hook-preauth-rate",
+          secret: "invalid-token", // pragma: allowlist secret
+          withNonceQuery: true,
+        });
+
+        expect(saw429).toBe(true);
+        expect(getZaloWebhookRateLimitStateSizeForTest()).toBe(1);
+      });
+    } finally {
+      unregister();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("does not let unauthorized floods rate-limit authenticated traffic from a different trusted forwarded client IP", async () => {
+    const unregister = registerTarget({
+      path: "/hook-preauth-split",
+      config: {
+        gateway: {
+          trustedProxies: ["127.0.0.1"],
+        },
+      } as OpenClawConfig,
+    });
+
+    try {
+      await withServer(webhookRequestHandler, async (baseUrl) => {
+        for (let i = 0; i < 130; i += 1) {
+          const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/hook-preauth-split?nonce=${i}`, {
+            method: "POST",
+            headers: {
+              "x-bot-api-secret-token": "invalid-token", // pragma: allowlist secret
+              "content-type": "application/json",
+              "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.10",
+            },
+            body: "{}",
+          });
+          if (response.status === 429) {
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+
+        const validResponse = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/hook-preauth-split`, {
+          method: "POST",
+          headers: {
+            "x-bot-api-secret-token": "secret",
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+            "x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.20",
+          },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ event_name: "message.unsupported.received" }),
+        });
+
+        expect(validResponse.status).toBe(200);
+      });
+    } finally {
+      unregister();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("still returns 401 before 415 when both secret and content-type are invalid", async () => {
+    const unregister = registerTarget({ path: "/hook-auth-before-type" });
+
+    try {
+      await withServer(webhookRequestHandler, async (baseUrl) => {
+        const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/hook-auth-before-type`, {
+          method: "POST",
+          headers: {
+            "x-bot-api-secret-token": "invalid-token", // pragma: allowlist secret
+            "content-type": "text/plain",
+          },
+          body: "not-json",
+        });
+
+        expect(response.status).toBe(401);
+      });
+    } finally {
+      unregister();
+    }
+  });
+
   it("scopes DM pairing store reads and writes to accountId", async () => {
     const { core, readAllowFromStore, upsertPairingRequest } = createPairingAuthCore({
       pairingCreated: false,

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
   WEBHOOK_ANOMALY_COUNTER_DEFAULTS,
   WEBHOOK_RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULTS,
 } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/zalo";
+import { resolveClientIp } from "../../../src/gateway/net.js";
 import type { ResolvedZaloAccount } from "./accounts.js";
 import type { ZaloFetch, ZaloUpdate } from "./api.js";
 import type { ZaloRuntimeEnv } from "./monitor.js";
@@ -109,6 +110,10 @@ function recordWebhookStatus(
   });
 }
 
+function headerValue(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {
+  return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
+}
+
 export function registerZaloWebhookTarget(
   target: ZaloWebhookTarget,
   opts?: {
@@ -140,6 +145,33 @@ export async function handleZaloWebhookRequest(
     targetsByPath: webhookTargets,
     allowMethods: ["POST"],
     handle: async ({ targets, path }) => {
+      const trustedProxies = targets[0]?.config.gateway?.trustedProxies;
+      const allowRealIpFallback = targets[0]?.config.gateway?.allowRealIpFallback === true;
+      const clientIp =
+        resolveClientIp({
+          remoteAddr: req.socket.remoteAddress,
+          forwardedFor: headerValue(req.headers["x-forwarded-for"]),
+          realIp: headerValue(req.headers["x-real-ip"]),
+          trustedProxies,
+          allowRealIpFallback,
+        }) ??
+        req.socket.remoteAddress ??
+        "unknown";
+      const rateLimitKey = `${path}:${clientIp}`;
+      const nowMs = Date.now();
+      if (
+        !applyBasicWebhookRequestGuards({
+          req,
+          res,
+          rateLimiter: webhookRateLimiter,
+          rateLimitKey,
+          nowMs,
+        })
+      ) {
+        recordWebhookStatus(targets[0]?.runtime, path, res.statusCode);
+        return true;
+      }
+
       const headerToken = String(req.headers["x-bot-api-secret-token"] ?? "");
       const target = resolveWebhookTargetWithAuthOrRejectSync({
         targets,
@@ -150,16 +182,12 @@ export async function handleZaloWebhookRequest(
         recordWebhookStatus(targets[0]?.runtime, path, res.statusCode);
         return true;
       }
-      const rateLimitKey = `${path}:${req.socket.remoteAddress ?? "unknown"}`;
-      const nowMs = Date.now();
-
+      // Preserve the historical 401-before-415 ordering for invalid secrets while still
+      // consuming rate-limit budget on unauthenticated guesses.
       if (
         !applyBasicWebhookRequestGuards({
           req,
           res,
-          rateLimiter: webhookRateLimiter,
-          rateLimitKey,
-          nowMs,
           requireJsonContentType: true,
         })
       ) {