tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero

@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ contents are never required to be entirely resident in memory all at once.
 filetime = "0.2.8"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
+astral-tokio-tar = "0.5"
 rand = { version = "0.8", features = ["small_rng"] }
 tempfile = "3"
+tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt"] }
+tokio-stream = "0.1"
 
 [target."cfg(unix)".dependencies]
 xattr = { version = "1.1.3", optional = true }

@@ -337,10 +337,11 @@ impl<'a> EntriesFields<'a> {
 
         let file_pos = self.next;
         let mut size = header.entry_size()?;
-        if size == 0 {
-            if let Some(pax_size) = pax_size {
-                size = pax_size;
-            }
+        // If this exists, it must override the header size. Disagreement among
+        // parsers allows construction of malicious archives that appear different
+        // when parsed.
+        if let Some(pax_size) = pax_size {
+            size = pax_size;
         }
         let ret = EntryFields {
             size,

@@ -1871,3 +1871,154 @@ fn append_data_error_does_not_corrupt_subsequent_entries() {
     assert_eq!(entries.len(), 1);
     assert_eq!(entries[0].path().unwrap().to_str().unwrap(), "clean.txt");
 }
+
+/// Build the PAX size smuggling archive described in the original report.
+///
+/// A PAX extended header declares `size=2048` for a regular file whose
+/// actual header size field is 8. A symlink entry is hidden inside the
+/// inflated region. A correct parser honours the PAX size and skips over
+/// the symlink; a buggy one reads only the header size and exposes it.
+fn build_pax_smuggle_archive() -> Vec<u8> {
+    const B: usize = 512;
+    const INFLATED: usize = 2048;
+    let end_of_archive = || std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(B * 2);
+
+    let mut ar: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+
+    // PAX extended header declaring size=2048 for the next entry.
+    let pax_rec = format!("13 size={INFLATED}\n");
+    let mut pax_hdr = Header::new_ustar();
+    pax_hdr.set_path("./PaxHeaders/regular").unwrap();
+    pax_hdr.set_size(pax_rec.as_bytes().len() as u64);
+    pax_hdr.set_entry_type(EntryType::XHeader);
+    pax_hdr.set_cksum();
+    ar.extend_from_slice(pax_hdr.as_bytes());
+    ar.extend_from_slice(pax_rec.as_bytes());
+    ar.resize(ar.len().next_multiple_of(B), 0);
+
+    // Regular file whose header says size=8, but PAX says 2048.
+    let content = b"regular\n";
+    let mut file_hdr = Header::new_ustar();
+    file_hdr.set_path("regular.txt").unwrap();
+    file_hdr.set_size(content.len() as u64);
+    file_hdr.set_entry_type(EntryType::Regular);
+    file_hdr.set_cksum();
+    ar.extend_from_slice(file_hdr.as_bytes());
+    let mark = ar.len();
+    ar.extend_from_slice(content);
+    ar.resize(ar.len().next_multiple_of(B), 0);
+
+    // Smuggled symlink hidden in the inflated region.
+    let mut sym_hdr = Header::new_ustar();
+    sym_hdr.set_path("smuggled").unwrap();
+    sym_hdr.set_size(0);
+    sym_hdr.set_entry_type(EntryType::Symlink);
+    sym_hdr.set_link_name("/etc/shadow").unwrap();
+    sym_hdr.set_cksum();
+    ar.extend_from_slice(sym_hdr.as_bytes());
+    ar.extend(end_of_archive());
+
+    // Pad to fill the inflated window.
+    let used = ar.len() - mark;
+    let pad = INFLATED.saturating_sub(used);
+    ar.extend(std::iter::repeat(0u8).take(pad.next_multiple_of(B)));
+
+    // End-of-archive.
+    ar.extend(end_of_archive());
+    ar
+}
+
+/// Regression test for PAX size smuggling.
+///
+/// A crafted archive uses a PAX extended header to declare a file size (2048)
+/// larger than the header's octal size field (8). Before the fix, `tar-rs`
+/// only applied the PAX size override when the header size was 0, so it would
+/// read the small header size, advance too little, and expose a symlink entry
+/// hidden in the "padding" area. After the fix, the PAX size unconditionally
+/// overrides the header size, causing the parser to skip over the smuggled
+/// symlink — matching the behavior of compliant parsers.
+#[test]
+fn pax_size_smuggled_symlink() {
+    let data = build_pax_smuggle_archive();
+
+    let mut archive = Archive::new(random_cursor_reader(&data[..]));
+    let entries: Vec<_> = archive
+        .entries()
+        .unwrap()
+        .map(|e| {
+            let e = e.unwrap();
+            let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
+            let kind = e.header().entry_type();
+            let link = e.link_name().unwrap().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
+            (path, kind, link)
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    // With the fix applied, only "regular.txt" should be visible.
+    // The smuggled symlink must NOT appear.
+    let expected: Vec<(PathBuf, EntryType, Option<PathBuf>)> =
+        vec![(PathBuf::from("regular.txt"), EntryType::Regular, None)];
+    assert_eq!(
+        entries, expected,
+        "smuggled symlink visible or unexpected entries\n\
+         got: {entries:?}"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Cross-validate that `tar` and `astral-tokio-tar` parse the PAX size
+/// smuggling archive identically, guarding against parsing differentials.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn pax_size_smuggle_matches_astral_tokio_tar() {
+    use tokio_stream::StreamExt;
+
+    let data = build_pax_smuggle_archive();
+
+    // Parse with sync tar.
+    let sync_entries: Vec<_> = {
+        let mut ar = Archive::new(&data[..]);
+        ar.entries()
+            .unwrap()
+            .map(|e| {
+                let e = e.unwrap();
+                let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
+                let kind = e.header().entry_type();
+                let link = e.link_name().unwrap().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
+                (path, kind, link)
+            })
+            .collect()
+    };
+
+    // Parse with async astral-tokio-tar.
+    let async_entries: Vec<_> = {
+        let mut ar = tokio_tar::Archive::new(&data[..]);
+        let mut entries = ar.entries().unwrap();
+        let mut result = Vec::new();
+        while let Some(e) = entries.next().await {
+            let e = e.unwrap();
+            let entry_type = e.header().entry_type();
+            result.push((
+                e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf(),
+                // Map through the raw byte so the two crates' EntryTypes compare.
+                EntryType::new(entry_type.as_byte()),
+                e.link_name().unwrap().map(|l| l.to_path_buf()),
+            ));
+        }
+        result
+    };
+
+    // Assert exact expected content for both parsers independently,
+    // so we verify correctness — not just mutual agreement.
+    let expected: Vec<(PathBuf, EntryType, Option<PathBuf>)> =
+        vec![(PathBuf::from("regular.txt"), EntryType::Regular, None)];
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        sync_entries, expected,
+        "tar-rs produced unexpected entries (smuggled symlink visible?)\n\
+         got: {sync_entries:?}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        async_entries, expected,
+        "astral-tokio-tar produced unexpected entries (smuggled symlink visible?)\n\
+         got: {async_entries:?}"
+    );
+}