OpenClaw < 2026.3.7 - Custom Authorization Header Leakage via Cross-Origin Redirects

@@ -601,6 +601,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 ### Fixes
 
 - Models/provider config precedence: prefer exact `models.providers.<name>` matches before normalized provider aliases in embedded model resolution, preventing alias/canonical key collisions from applying the wrong provider `api`, `baseUrl`, or headers. (#35934) thanks @RealKai42.
+- Network/fetch guard redirect auth stripping: switch cross-origin redirect handling in `fetchWithSsrFGuard` from a narrow sensitive-header denylist to a safe-header allowlist so custom auth headers like `X-Api-Key` and `Private-Token` no longer leak on origin changes. Thanks @Rickidevs for reporting.
 - Logging/Subsystem console timestamps: route subsystem console timestamp rendering through `formatConsoleTimestamp(...)` so `pretty` and timestamp-prefix output use local timezone formatting consistently instead of inline UTC `toISOString()` paths. (#25970) Thanks @openperf.
 - Feishu/Multi-account + reply reliability: add `channels.feishu.defaultAccount` outbound routing support with schema validation, prevent inbound preview text from leaking into prompt system events, keep quoted-message extraction text-first (post/interactive/file placeholders instead of raw JSON), route Feishu video sends as `msg_type: "file"`, and avoid websocket event blocking by using non-blocking event handling in monitor dispatch. Landed from contributor PRs #31209, #29610, #30432, #30331, and #29501. Thanks @stakeswky, @hclsys, @bmendonca3, @patrick-yingxi-pan, and @zwffff.
 - Feishu/Target routing + replies + dedupe: normalize provider-prefixed targets (`feishu:`/`lark:`), prefer configured `channels.feishu.defaultAccount` for tool execution, honor Feishu outbound `renderMode` in adapter text/caption sends, fall back to normal send when reply targets are withdrawn/deleted, and add synchronous in-memory dedupe guard for concurrent duplicate inbound events. Landed from contributor PRs #30428, #30438, #29958, #30444, and #29463. Thanks @bmendonca3 and @Yaxuan42.

@@ -154,7 +154,12 @@ describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => {
           "Proxy-Authorization": "Basic c2VjcmV0",
           Cookie: "session=abc",
           Cookie2: "legacy=1",
+          "X-Api-Key": "custom-secret",
+          "Private-Token": "private-secret",
           "X-Trace": "1",
+          Accept: "application/json",
+          "Content-Type": "application/json",
+          "User-Agent": "OpenClaw-Test/1.0",
         },
       },
     });
@@ -164,7 +169,12 @@ describe("fetchWithSsrFGuard hardening", () => {
     expect(headers.get("proxy-authorization")).toBeNull();
     expect(headers.get("cookie")).toBeNull();
     expect(headers.get("cookie2")).toBeNull();
-    expect(headers.get("x-trace")).toBe("1");
+    expect(headers.get("x-api-key")).toBeNull();
+    expect(headers.get("private-token")).toBeNull();
+    expect(headers.get("x-trace")).toBeNull();
+    expect(headers.get("accept")).toBe("application/json");
+    expect(headers.get("content-type")).toBe("application/json");
+    expect(headers.get("user-agent")).toBe("OpenClaw-Test/1.0");
     await result.release();
   });
 

@@ -52,12 +52,21 @@ type GuardedFetchPresetOptions = Omit<
 >;
 
 const DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
-const CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT_SENSITIVE_HEADERS = [
-  "authorization",
-  "proxy-authorization",
-  "cookie",
-  "cookie2",
-];
+const CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT_SAFE_HEADERS = new Set([
+  "accept",
+  "accept-encoding",
+  "accept-language",
+  "cache-control",
+  "content-language",
+  "content-type",
+  "if-match",
+  "if-modified-since",
+  "if-none-match",
+  "if-unmodified-since",
+  "pragma",
+  "range",
+  "user-agent",
+]);
 
 export function withStrictGuardedFetchMode(params: GuardedFetchPresetOptions): GuardedFetchOptions {
   return { ...params, mode: GUARDED_FETCH_MODE.STRICT };
@@ -87,9 +96,12 @@ function stripSensitiveHeadersForCrossOriginRedirect(init?: RequestInit): Reques
   if (!init?.headers) {
     return init;
   }
-  const headers = new Headers(init.headers);
-  for (const header of CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT_SENSITIVE_HEADERS) {
-    headers.delete(header);
+  const incoming = new Headers(init.headers);
+  const headers = new Headers();
+  for (const [key, value] of incoming.entries()) {
+    if (CROSS_ORIGIN_REDIRECT_SAFE_HEADERS.has(key.toLowerCase())) {
+      headers.set(key, value);
+    }
   }
   return { ...init, headers };
 }