SiYuan: Incomplete sensitive path blocklist in globalCopyFiles allows reading /proc and Docker secrets
Description
SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelGo | <= 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 | — |
Affected products
1- Range: < 3.6.1
Patches
19914fd1d39e5:lock: https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6
1 file changed · +31 −9
kernel/util/path.go+31 −9 modified@@ -353,18 +353,28 @@ func IsSensitivePath(p string) bool { if p == "" { return false } - pp := filepath.Clean(strings.ToLower(p)) + toCheckPathLower := filepath.Clean(strings.ToLower(p)) + toCheckNameLower := filepath.Base(toCheckPathLower) // 敏感目录前缀(UNIX 风格) prefixes := []string{ - "/etc/ssh", + "/.", + "/etc", "/root", "/etc", - "/var/lib/", - "/.", + "/var", + "/proc", + "/sys", + "/run", + "/bin", + "/boot", + "/dev", + "/lib", + "/srv", + "/tmp", } for _, pre := range prefixes { - if strings.HasPrefix(pp, pre) { + if strings.HasPrefix(toCheckPathLower, pre) { return true } } @@ -375,7 +385,7 @@ func IsSensitivePath(p string) bool { `c:\windows\system`, } for _, wp := range winPrefixes { - if strings.HasPrefix(pp, strings.ToLower(wp)) { + if strings.HasPrefix(toCheckPathLower, strings.ToLower(wp)) { return true } } @@ -386,17 +396,18 @@ func IsSensitivePath(p string) bool { strings.ToLower(filepath.Join(os.Getenv("ProgramData"), "Microsoft", "Windows", "Start Menu")), } for _, sp := range startMenuPrefixes { - if strings.HasPrefix(pp, sp) { + if strings.HasPrefix(toCheckPathLower, sp) { return true } } // 工作空间/conf 目录(小写比较) workspaceConfPrefix := strings.ToLower(filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "conf")) - if strings.HasPrefix(pp, workspaceConfPrefix) { + if strings.HasPrefix(toCheckPathLower, workspaceConfPrefix) { return true } + // 用户家目录下的敏感目录(小写比较) homePrefixes := []string{ strings.ToLower(filepath.Join(HomeDir, ".ssh")), strings.ToLower(filepath.Join(HomeDir, ".config")), @@ -405,7 +416,18 @@ func IsSensitivePath(p string) bool { strings.ToLower(filepath.Join(HomeDir, ".profile")), } for _, hp := range homePrefixes { - if strings.HasPrefix(pp, hp) { + if strings.HasPrefix(toCheckPathLower, hp) { + return true + } + } + + // 特定的文件名(小写比较) + namePrefixes := []string{ + strings.ToLower("credentials"), + strings.ToLower("id_"), + } + for _, np := range namePrefixes { + if strings.HasPrefix(toCheckNameLower, np) { return true } }
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
5- github.com/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6ghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32747ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/9914fd1d39e5f0a8dcc9fb587e1c0b46f31490a1ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6ghsax_refsource_CONFIRMWEB
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