OpenClaw < 2026.2.14 - Path Traversal in apply_patch via Crafted Paths

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/BlueBubbles: reject ambiguous shared-path webhook routing when multiple webhook targets match the same guid/password.
 - Security/BlueBubbles: harden BlueBubbles webhook auth behind reverse proxies by only accepting passwordless webhooks for direct localhost loopback requests (forwarded/proxied requests now require a password). Thanks @simecek.
 - Security/BlueBubbles: require explicit `mediaLocalRoots` allowlists for local outbound media path reads to prevent local file disclosure. (#16322) Thanks @mbelinky.
+- Security/Agents: enforce workspace-root path bounds for `apply_patch` in non-sandbox mode to block traversal and symlink escape writes. Thanks @p80n-sec.
 - Cron/Slack: preserve agent identity (name and icon) when cron jobs deliver outbound messages. (#16242) Thanks @robbyczgw-cla.
 - Cron: deliver text-only output directly when `delivery.to` is set so cron recipients get full output instead of summaries. (#16360) Thanks @rubyrunsstuff.
 - Cron: repair missing/corrupt `nextRunAtMs` for the updated job without globally recomputing unrelated due jobs during `cron update`. (#15750)

@@ -70,4 +70,72 @@ describe("applyPatch", () => {
       expect(contents).toBe("line1\nline2\n");
     });
   });
+
+  it("rejects path traversal outside cwd", async () => {
+    await withTempDir(async (dir) => {
+      const escapedPath = path.join(path.dirname(dir), "escaped.txt");
+      const relativeEscape = path.relative(dir, escapedPath);
+
+      const patch = `*** Begin Patch
+*** Add File: ${relativeEscape}
++escaped
+*** End Patch`;
+
+      await expect(applyPatch(patch, { cwd: dir })).rejects.toThrow(/Path escapes sandbox root/);
+      await expect(fs.readFile(escapedPath, "utf8")).rejects.toBeDefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects absolute paths outside cwd", async () => {
+    await withTempDir(async (dir) => {
+      const escapedPath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `openclaw-apply-patch-${Date.now()}.txt`);
+
+      const patch = `*** Begin Patch
+*** Add File: ${escapedPath}
++escaped
+*** End Patch`;
+
+      try {
+        await expect(applyPatch(patch, { cwd: dir })).rejects.toThrow(/Path escapes sandbox root/);
+        await expect(fs.readFile(escapedPath, "utf8")).rejects.toBeDefined();
+      } finally {
+        await fs.rm(escapedPath, { force: true });
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("allows absolute paths within cwd", async () => {
+    await withTempDir(async (dir) => {
+      const target = path.join(dir, "nested", "inside.txt");
+      const patch = `*** Begin Patch
+*** Add File: ${target}
++inside
+*** End Patch`;
+
+      await applyPatch(patch, { cwd: dir });
+      const contents = await fs.readFile(target, "utf8");
+      expect(contents).toBe("inside\n");
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects symlink escape attempts", async () => {
+    await withTempDir(async (dir) => {
+      const outside = path.join(path.dirname(dir), "outside-target.txt");
+      const linkPath = path.join(dir, "link.txt");
+      await fs.writeFile(outside, "initial\n", "utf8");
+      await fs.symlink(outside, linkPath);
+
+      const patch = `*** Begin Patch
+*** Update File: link.txt
+@@
+-initial
++pwned
+*** End Patch`;
+
+      await expect(applyPatch(patch, { cwd: dir })).rejects.toThrow(/Symlink not allowed/);
+      const outsideContents = await fs.readFile(outside, "utf8");
+      expect(outsideContents).toBe("initial\n");
+      await fs.rm(outside, { force: true });
+    });
+  });
 });

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import type { AgentTool } from "@mariozechner/pi-agent-core";
 import { Type } from "@sinclair/typebox";
 import fs from "node:fs/promises";
-import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
 import type { SandboxFsBridge } from "./sandbox/fs-bridge.js";
 import { applyUpdateHunk } from "./apply-patch-update.js";
+import { assertSandboxPath } from "./sandbox-paths.js";
 
 const BEGIN_PATCH_MARKER = "*** Begin Patch";
 const END_PATCH_MARKER = "*** End Patch";
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ const MOVE_TO_MARKER = "*** Move to: ";
 const EOF_MARKER = "*** End of File";
 const CHANGE_CONTEXT_MARKER = "@@ ";
 const EMPTY_CHANGE_CONTEXT_MARKER = "@@";
-const UNICODE_SPACES = /[\u00A0\u2000-\u200A\u202F\u205F\u3000]/g;
 
 type AddFileHunk = {
   kind: "add";
@@ -262,36 +261,17 @@ async function resolvePatchPath(
     };
   }
 
-  const resolved = resolvePathFromCwd(filePath, options.cwd);
+  const resolved = await assertSandboxPath({
+    filePath,
+    cwd: options.cwd,
+    root: options.cwd,
+  });
   return {
-    resolved,
-    display: toDisplayPath(resolved, options.cwd),
+    resolved: resolved.resolved,
+    display: toDisplayPath(resolved.resolved, options.cwd),
   };
 }
 
-function normalizeUnicodeSpaces(value: string): string {
-  return value.replace(UNICODE_SPACES, " ");
-}
-
-function expandPath(filePath: string): string {
-  const normalized = normalizeUnicodeSpaces(filePath);
-  if (normalized === "~") {
-    return os.homedir();
-  }
-  if (normalized.startsWith("~/")) {
-    return os.homedir() + normalized.slice(1);
-  }
-  return normalized;
-}
-
-function resolvePathFromCwd(filePath: string, cwd: string): string {
-  const expanded = expandPath(filePath);
-  if (path.isAbsolute(expanded)) {
-    return path.normalize(expanded);
-  }
-  return path.resolve(cwd, expanded);
-}
-
 function toDisplayPath(resolved: string, cwd: string): string {
   const relative = path.relative(cwd, resolved);
   if (!relative || relative === "") {