OpenClaw < 2026.2.25 - Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use via Mutable Symlink in system.run cwd Parameter

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Models/Auth probes: map permanent auth failover reasons (`auth_permanent`, for example revoked keys) into probe auth status instead of `unknown`, so `openclaw models status --probe` reports actionable auth failures. (#25754) thanks @rrenamed.
 - Security/Signal: enforce DM/group authorization before reaction-only notification enqueue so unauthorized senders can no longer inject Signal reaction system events under `dmPolicy`/`groupPolicy`; reaction notifications now require channel access checks first. This ships in the next npm release (`2026.2.25`). Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Exec approvals: bind `system.run` approval matching to exact argv identity and preserve argv whitespace in rendered command text, preventing trailing-space executable path swaps from reusing a mismatched approval. This ships in the next npm release (`2026.2.25`). Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Exec approvals: harden approval-bound `system.run` execution on node hosts by rejecting symlink `cwd` paths and canonicalizing path-like executable argv before spawn, blocking mutable-cwd symlink retarget chains between approval and execution. This ships in the next npm release (`2026.2.25`). Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Discord reactions: enforce DM policy/allowlist authorization before reaction-event system enqueue in direct messages; Discord reaction handling now also honors DM/group-DM enablement and guild `groupPolicy` channel gating to keep reaction ingress aligned with normal message preflight. This ships in the next npm release (`2026.2.25`). Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Slack reactions + pins: gate `reaction_*` and `pin_*` system-event enqueue through shared sender authorization so DM `dmPolicy`/`allowFrom` and channel `users` allowlists are enforced consistently for non-message ingress, with regression coverage for denied/allowed sender paths. This ships in the next npm release (`2026.2.25`). Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Telegram reactions: enforce `dmPolicy`/`allowFrom` and group allowlist authorization on `message_reaction` events before enqueueing reaction system events, preventing unauthorized reaction-triggered input in DMs and groups; ships in the next npm release (`2026.2.25`). Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

@@ -83,6 +83,11 @@ describe("nodes-cli coverage", () => {
   const getNodeInvokeCall = () =>
     callGateway.mock.calls.find((call) => call[0]?.method === "node.invoke")?.[0] as NodeInvokeCall;
 
+  const getApprovalRequestCall = () =>
+    callGateway.mock.calls.find((call) => call[0]?.method === "exec.approval.request")?.[0] as {
+      params?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    };
+
   const createNodesProgram = () => {
     const program = new Command();
     program.exitOverride();
@@ -140,6 +145,8 @@ describe("nodes-cli coverage", () => {
       runId: expect.any(String),
     });
     expect(invoke?.params?.timeoutMs).toBe(5000);
+    const approval = getApprovalRequestCall();
+    expect(approval?.params?.["commandArgv"]).toEqual(["echo", "hi"]);
   });
 
   it("invokes system.run with raw command", async () => {
@@ -165,6 +172,8 @@ describe("nodes-cli coverage", () => {
       approvalDecision: "allow-once",
       runId: expect.any(String),
     });
+    const approval = getApprovalRequestCall();
+    expect(approval?.params?.["commandArgv"]).toEqual(["/bin/sh", "-lc", "echo hi"]);
   });
 
   it("invokes system.notify with provided fields", async () => {

@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ export function registerNodesInvokeCommands(nodes: Command) {
               {
                 id: approvalId,
                 command: rawCommand ?? argv.join(" "),
+                commandArgv: argv,
                 cwd: opts.cwd,
                 nodeId,
                 host: "node",

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ describe("handleSystemRunInvoke mac app exec host routing", () => {
     preferMacAppExecHost: boolean;
     runViaResponse?: ExecHostResponse | null;
     command?: string[];
+    cwd?: string;
     security?: "full" | "allowlist";
     ask?: "off" | "on-miss" | "always";
     approved?: boolean;
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ describe("handleSystemRunInvoke mac app exec host routing", () => {
       client: {} as never,
       params: {
         command: params.command ?? ["echo", "ok"],
+        cwd: params.cwd,
         approved: params.approved ?? false,
         sessionKey: "agent:main:main",
       },
@@ -214,6 +216,71 @@ describe("handleSystemRunInvoke mac app exec host routing", () => {
       }),
     );
   });
+
+  it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
+    "denies approval-based execution when cwd is a symlink",
+    async () => {
+      const tmp = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-approval-cwd-link-"));
+      const safeDir = path.join(tmp, "safe");
+      const linkDir = path.join(tmp, "cwd-link");
+      const script = path.join(safeDir, "run.sh");
+      fs.mkdirSync(safeDir, { recursive: true });
+      fs.writeFileSync(script, "#!/bin/sh\necho SAFE\n");
+      fs.chmodSync(script, 0o755);
+      fs.symlinkSync(safeDir, linkDir, "dir");
+      try {
+        const { runCommand, sendInvokeResult } = await runSystemInvoke({
+          preferMacAppExecHost: false,
+          command: ["./run.sh"],
+          cwd: linkDir,
+          approved: true,
+          security: "full",
+          ask: "off",
+        });
+        expect(runCommand).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(sendInvokeResult).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+          expect.objectContaining({
+            ok: false,
+            error: expect.objectContaining({
+              message: expect.stringContaining("canonical cwd"),
+            }),
+          }),
+        );
+      } finally {
+        fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  it("uses canonical executable path for approval-based relative command execution", async () => {
+    const tmp = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-approval-cwd-real-"));
+    const script = path.join(tmp, "run.sh");
+    fs.writeFileSync(script, "#!/bin/sh\necho SAFE\n");
+    fs.chmodSync(script, 0o755);
+    try {
+      const { runCommand, sendInvokeResult } = await runSystemInvoke({
+        preferMacAppExecHost: false,
+        command: ["./run.sh", "--flag"],
+        cwd: tmp,
+        approved: true,
+        security: "full",
+        ask: "off",
+      });
+      expect(runCommand).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        [fs.realpathSync(script), "--flag"],
+        fs.realpathSync(tmp),
+        undefined,
+        undefined,
+      );
+      expect(sendInvokeResult).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          ok: true,
+        }),
+      );
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
   it("denies ./sh wrapper spoof in allowlist on-miss mode before execution", async () => {
     const marker = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `openclaw-wrapper-spoof-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
     const runCommand = vi.fn(async () => {

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 import crypto from "node:crypto";
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
 import { resolveAgentConfig } from "../agents/agent-scope.js";
 import { loadConfig } from "../config/config.js";
 import type { GatewayClient } from "../gateway/client.js";
@@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ import {
 } from "../infra/exec-approvals.js";
 import type { ExecHostRequest, ExecHostResponse, ExecHostRunResult } from "../infra/exec-host.js";
 import { resolveExecSafeBinRuntimePolicy } from "../infra/exec-safe-bin-runtime-policy.js";
+import { sameFileIdentity } from "../infra/file-identity.js";
 import { sanitizeSystemRunEnvOverrides } from "../infra/host-env-security.js";
 import { resolveSystemRunCommand } from "../infra/system-run-command.js";
 import { evaluateSystemRunPolicy, resolveExecApprovalDecision } from "./exec-policy.js";
@@ -110,6 +113,100 @@ function normalizeDeniedReason(reason: string | null | undefined): SystemRunDeni
   }
 }
 
+function isPathLikeExecutableToken(value: string): boolean {
+  if (!value) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (value.startsWith(".") || value.startsWith("/") || value.startsWith("\\")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (value.includes("/") || value.includes("\\")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (process.platform === "win32" && /^[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]/.test(value)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+function hardenApprovedExecutionPaths(params: {
+  approvedByAsk: boolean;
+  argv: string[];
+  shellCommand: string | null;
+  cwd: string | undefined;
+}): { ok: true; argv: string[]; cwd: string | undefined } | { ok: false; message: string } {
+  if (!params.approvedByAsk) {
+    return { ok: true, argv: params.argv, cwd: params.cwd };
+  }
+
+  let hardenedCwd = params.cwd;
+  if (hardenedCwd) {
+    const requestedCwd = path.resolve(hardenedCwd);
+    let cwdLstat: fs.Stats;
+    let cwdStat: fs.Stats;
+    let cwdReal: string;
+    let cwdRealStat: fs.Stats;
+    try {
+      cwdLstat = fs.lstatSync(requestedCwd);
+      cwdStat = fs.statSync(requestedCwd);
+      cwdReal = fs.realpathSync(requestedCwd);
+      cwdRealStat = fs.statSync(cwdReal);
+    } catch {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval requires an existing canonical cwd",
+      };
+    }
+    if (!cwdStat.isDirectory()) {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval requires cwd to be a directory",
+      };
+    }
+    if (cwdLstat.isSymbolicLink()) {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval requires canonical cwd (no symlink cwd)",
+      };
+    }
+    if (
+      !sameFileIdentity(cwdStat, cwdLstat) ||
+      !sameFileIdentity(cwdStat, cwdRealStat) ||
+      !sameFileIdentity(cwdLstat, cwdRealStat)
+    ) {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval cwd identity mismatch",
+      };
+    }
+    hardenedCwd = cwdReal;
+  }
+
+  if (params.shellCommand !== null || params.argv.length === 0) {
+    return { ok: true, argv: params.argv, cwd: hardenedCwd };
+  }
+
+  const argv = [...params.argv];
+  const rawExecutable = argv[0] ?? "";
+  if (!isPathLikeExecutableToken(rawExecutable)) {
+    return { ok: true, argv, cwd: hardenedCwd };
+  }
+
+  const base = hardenedCwd ?? process.cwd();
+  const candidate = path.isAbsolute(rawExecutable)
+    ? rawExecutable
+    : path.resolve(base, rawExecutable);
+  try {
+    argv[0] = fs.realpathSync(candidate);
+  } catch {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval requires a stable executable path",
+    };
+  }
+  return { ok: true, argv, cwd: hardenedCwd };
+}
+
 export type HandleSystemRunInvokeOptions = {
   client: GatewayClient;
   params: SystemRunParams;
@@ -422,6 +519,20 @@ async function evaluateSystemRunPolicyPhase(
     return null;
   }
 
+  const hardenedPaths = hardenApprovedExecutionPaths({
+    approvedByAsk: policy.approvedByAsk,
+    argv: parsed.argv,
+    shellCommand: parsed.shellCommand,
+    cwd: parsed.cwd,
+  });
+  if (!hardenedPaths.ok) {
+    await sendSystemRunDenied(opts, parsed.execution, {
+      reason: "approval-required",
+      message: hardenedPaths.message,
+    });
+    return null;
+  }
+
   const plannedAllowlistArgv = resolvePlannedAllowlistArgv({
     security,
     shellCommand: parsed.shellCommand,
@@ -437,6 +548,8 @@ async function evaluateSystemRunPolicyPhase(
   }
   return {
     ...parsed,
+    argv: hardenedPaths.argv,
+    cwd: hardenedPaths.cwd,
     approvals,
     security,
     policy,