OpenClaw < 2026.2.13 - Timing Attack via Hook Token Comparison

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security: fix unauthenticated Nostr profile API remote config tampering. (#13719) Thanks @coygeek.
 - Security: remove bundled soul-evil hook. (#14757) Thanks @Imccccc.
 - Security/Web tools: treat browser/web content as untrusted by default (wrapped outputs for browser snapshot/tabs/console and structured external-content metadata for web tools), and strip `toolResult.details` from model-facing transcript/compaction inputs to reduce prompt-injection replay risk.
+- Security/Hooks: harden webhook and device token verification with shared constant-time secret comparison, and add per-client auth-failure throttling for hook endpoints (`429` + `Retry-After`). Thanks @akhmittra.
 - Gateway: raise WS payload/buffer limits so 5,000,000-byte image attachments work reliably. (#14486) Thanks @0xRaini.
 - Logging/CLI: use local timezone timestamps for console prefixing, and include `±HH:MM` offsets when using `openclaw logs --local-time` to avoid ambiguity. (#14771) Thanks @0xRaini.
 - Gateway: drain active turns before restart to prevent message loss. (#13931) Thanks @0xRaini.

@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ Mapping options (summary):
 - `200` for `/hooks/wake`
 - `202` for `/hooks/agent` (async run started)
 - `401` on auth failure
+- `429` after repeated auth failures from the same client (check `Retry-After`)
 - `400` on invalid payload
 - `413` on oversized payloads
 
@@ -165,6 +166,7 @@ curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18789/hooks/gmail \
 
 - Keep hook endpoints behind loopback, tailnet, or trusted reverse proxy.
 - Use a dedicated hook token; do not reuse gateway auth tokens.
+- Repeated auth failures are rate-limited per client address to slow brute-force attempts.
 - If you use multi-agent routing, set `hooks.allowedAgentIds` to limit explicit `agentId` selection.
 - Avoid including sensitive raw payloads in webhook logs.
 - Hook payloads are treated as untrusted and wrapped with safety boundaries by default.

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import type { IncomingMessage } from "node:http";
-import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
 import type { GatewayAuthConfig, GatewayTailscaleMode } from "../config/config.js";
 import { readTailscaleWhoisIdentity, type TailscaleWhoisIdentity } from "../infra/tailscale.js";
+import { safeEqualSecret } from "../security/secret-equal.js";
 import {
   isLoopbackAddress,
   isTrustedProxyAddress,
@@ -37,13 +37,6 @@ type TailscaleUser = {
 
 type TailscaleWhoisLookup = (ip: string) => Promise<TailscaleWhoisIdentity | null>;
 
-function safeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {
-  if (a.length !== b.length) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a), Buffer.from(b));
-}
-
 function normalizeLogin(login: string): string {
   return login.trim().toLowerCase();
 }
@@ -253,7 +246,7 @@ export async function authorizeGatewayConnect(params: {
     if (!connectAuth?.token) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "token_missing" };
     }
-    if (!safeEqual(connectAuth.token, auth.token)) {
+    if (!safeEqualSecret(connectAuth.token, auth.token)) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "token_mismatch" };
     }
     return { ok: true, method: "token" };
@@ -267,7 +260,7 @@ export async function authorizeGatewayConnect(params: {
     if (!password) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "password_missing" };
     }
-    if (!safeEqual(password, auth.password)) {
+    if (!safeEqualSecret(password, auth.password)) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "password_mismatch" };
     }
     return { ok: true, method: "password" };

@@ -318,4 +318,59 @@ describe("gateway server hooks", () => {
       await server.close();
     }
   });
+
+  test("throttles repeated hook auth failures and resets after success", async () => {
+    testState.hooksConfig = { enabled: true, token: "hook-secret" };
+    const port = await getFreePort();
+    const server = await startGatewayServer(port);
+    try {
+      const firstFail = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/hooks/wake`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: {
+          "Content-Type": "application/json",
+          Authorization: "Bearer wrong",
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ text: "blocked" }),
+      });
+      expect(firstFail.status).toBe(401);
+
+      let throttled: Response | null = null;
+      for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+        throttled = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/hooks/wake`, {
+          method: "POST",
+          headers: {
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            Authorization: "Bearer wrong",
+          },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ text: "blocked" }),
+        });
+      }
+      expect(throttled?.status).toBe(429);
+      expect(throttled?.headers.get("retry-after")).toBeTruthy();
+
+      const allowed = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/hooks/wake`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: {
+          "Content-Type": "application/json",
+          Authorization: "Bearer hook-secret",
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ text: "auth reset" }),
+      });
+      expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
+      await waitForSystemEvent();
+      drainSystemEvents(resolveMainKey());
+
+      const failAfterSuccess = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/hooks/wake`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: {
+          "Content-Type": "application/json",
+          Authorization: "Bearer wrong",
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ text: "blocked" }),
+      });
+      expect(failAfterSuccess.status).toBe(401);
+    } finally {
+      await server.close();
+    }
+  });
 });

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import {
   handleA2uiHttpRequest,
 } from "../canvas-host/a2ui.js";
 import { loadConfig } from "../config/config.js";
+import { safeEqualSecret } from "../security/secret-equal.js";
 import { handleSlackHttpRequest } from "../slack/http/index.js";
 import { authorizeGatewayConnect, isLocalDirectRequest, type ResolvedGatewayAuth } from "./auth.js";
 import {
@@ -49,6 +50,11 @@ import { handleOpenResponsesHttpRequest } from "./openresponses-http.js";
 import { handleToolsInvokeHttpRequest } from "./tools-invoke-http.js";
 
 type SubsystemLogger = ReturnType<typeof createSubsystemLogger>;
+type HookAuthFailure = { count: number; windowStartedAtMs: number };
+
+const HOOK_AUTH_FAILURE_LIMIT = 20;
+const HOOK_AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
+const HOOK_AUTH_FAILURE_TRACK_MAX = 2048;
 
 type HookDispatchers = {
   dispatchWakeHook: (value: { text: string; mode: "now" | "next-heartbeat" }) => void;
@@ -140,6 +146,39 @@ export function createHooksRequestHandler(
   } & HookDispatchers,
 ): HooksRequestHandler {
   const { getHooksConfig, bindHost, port, logHooks, dispatchAgentHook, dispatchWakeHook } = opts;
+  const hookAuthFailures = new Map<string, HookAuthFailure>();
+
+  const resolveHookClientKey = (req: IncomingMessage): string => {
+    return req.socket?.remoteAddress?.trim() || "unknown";
+  };
+
+  const recordHookAuthFailure = (
+    clientKey: string,
+    nowMs: number,
+  ): { throttled: boolean; retryAfterSeconds?: number } => {
+    if (!hookAuthFailures.has(clientKey) && hookAuthFailures.size >= HOOK_AUTH_FAILURE_TRACK_MAX) {
+      hookAuthFailures.clear();
+    }
+    const current = hookAuthFailures.get(clientKey);
+    const expired = !current || nowMs - current.windowStartedAtMs >= HOOK_AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS;
+    const next: HookAuthFailure = expired
+      ? { count: 1, windowStartedAtMs: nowMs }
+      : { count: current.count + 1, windowStartedAtMs: current.windowStartedAtMs };
+    hookAuthFailures.set(clientKey, next);
+    if (next.count <= HOOK_AUTH_FAILURE_LIMIT) {
+      return { throttled: false };
+    }
+    const retryAfterMs = Math.max(1, next.windowStartedAtMs + HOOK_AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS - nowMs);
+    return {
+      throttled: true,
+      retryAfterSeconds: Math.ceil(retryAfterMs / 1000),
+    };
+  };
+
+  const clearHookAuthFailure = (clientKey: string) => {
+    hookAuthFailures.delete(clientKey);
+  };
+
   return async (req, res) => {
     const hooksConfig = getHooksConfig();
     if (!hooksConfig) {
@@ -161,12 +200,24 @@ export function createHooksRequestHandler(
     }
 
     const token = extractHookToken(req);
-    if (!token || token !== hooksConfig.token) {
+    const clientKey = resolveHookClientKey(req);
+    if (!safeEqualSecret(token, hooksConfig.token)) {
+      const throttle = recordHookAuthFailure(clientKey, Date.now());
+      if (throttle.throttled) {
+        const retryAfter = throttle.retryAfterSeconds ?? 1;
+        res.statusCode = 429;
+        res.setHeader("Retry-After", String(retryAfter));
+        res.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8");
+        res.end("Too Many Requests");
+        logHooks.warn(`hook auth throttled for ${clientKey}; retry-after=${retryAfter}s`);
+        return true;
+      }
       res.statusCode = 401;
       res.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8");
       res.end("Unauthorized");
       return true;
     }
+    clearHookAuthFailure(clientKey);
 
     if (req.method !== "POST") {
       res.statusCode = 405;

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {
   getPairedDevice,
   requestDevicePairing,
   rotateDeviceToken,
+  verifyDeviceToken,
 } from "./device-pairing.js";
 
 describe("device pairing tokens", () => {
@@ -41,4 +42,40 @@ describe("device pairing tokens", () => {
     paired = await getPairedDevice("device-1", baseDir);
     expect(paired?.tokens?.operator?.scopes).toEqual(["operator.read"]);
   });
+
+  test("verifies token and rejects mismatches", async () => {
+    const baseDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "openclaw-device-pairing-"));
+    const request = await requestDevicePairing(
+      {
+        deviceId: "device-1",
+        publicKey: "public-key-1",
+        role: "operator",
+        scopes: ["operator.read"],
+      },
+      baseDir,
+    );
+    await approveDevicePairing(request.request.requestId, baseDir);
+    const paired = await getPairedDevice("device-1", baseDir);
+    const token = paired?.tokens?.operator?.token;
+    expect(token).toBeTruthy();
+
+    const ok = await verifyDeviceToken({
+      deviceId: "device-1",
+      token: token ?? "",
+      role: "operator",
+      scopes: ["operator.read"],
+      baseDir,
+    });
+    expect(ok.ok).toBe(true);
+
+    const mismatch = await verifyDeviceToken({
+      deviceId: "device-1",
+      token: "x".repeat((token ?? "1234").length),
+      role: "operator",
+      scopes: ["operator.read"],
+      baseDir,
+    });
+    expect(mismatch.ok).toBe(false);
+    expect(mismatch.reason).toBe("token-mismatch");
+  });
 });

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import fs from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { resolveStateDir } from "../config/paths.js";
+import { safeEqualSecret } from "../security/secret-equal.js";
 
 export type DevicePairingPendingRequest = {
   requestId: string;
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ export async function verifyDeviceToken(params: {
     if (entry.revokedAtMs) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "token-revoked" };
     }
-    if (entry.token !== params.token) {
+    if (!safeEqualSecret(params.token, entry.token)) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "token-mismatch" };
     }
     const requestedScopes = normalizeScopes(params.scopes);

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { safeEqualSecret } from "./secret-equal.js";
+
+describe("safeEqualSecret", () => {
+  it("matches identical secrets", () => {
+    expect(safeEqualSecret("secret-token", "secret-token")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects mismatched secrets", () => {
+    expect(safeEqualSecret("secret-token", "secret-tokEn")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects different-length secrets", () => {
+    expect(safeEqualSecret("short", "much-longer")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects missing values", () => {
+    expect(safeEqualSecret(undefined, "secret")).toBe(false);
+    expect(safeEqualSecret("secret", undefined)).toBe(false);
+    expect(safeEqualSecret(null, "secret")).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+
+export function safeEqualSecret(
+  provided: string | undefined | null,
+  expected: string | undefined | null,
+): boolean {
+  if (typeof provided !== "string" || typeof expected !== "string") {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const providedBuffer = Buffer.from(provided);
+  const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expected);
+  if (providedBuffer.length !== expectedBuffer.length) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return timingSafeEqual(providedBuffer, expectedBuffer);
+}