OpenClaw: Docker container escape via unvalidated bind mount config injection

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 ### Fixes
 
+- Sandbox/Security: block dangerous sandbox Docker config (bind mounts, host networking, unconfined seccomp/apparmor) to prevent container escape via config injection. Thanks @aether-ai-agent.
 - Web UI/Agents: hide `BOOTSTRAP.md` in the Agents Files list after onboarding is completed, avoiding confusing missing-file warnings for completed workspaces. (#17491) Thanks @gumadeiras.
 - Telegram: omit `message_thread_id` for DM sends/draft previews and keep forum-topic handling (`id=1` general omitted, non-general kept), preventing DM failures with `400 Bad Request: message thread not found`. (#10942) Thanks @garnetlyx.
 - Subagents/Models: preserve `agents.defaults.model.fallbacks` when subagent sessions carry a model override, so subagent runs fail over to configured fallback models instead of retrying only the overridden primary model.

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ describe("buildSandboxCreateArgs", () => {
     );
   });
 
-  it("emits -v flags for custom binds", () => {
+  it("emits -v flags for safe custom binds", () => {
     const cfg: SandboxDockerConfig = {
       image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
       containerPrefix: "openclaw-sbx-",
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ describe("buildSandboxCreateArgs", () => {
       tmpfs: [],
       network: "none",
       capDrop: [],
-      binds: ["/home/user/source:/source:rw", "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"],
+      binds: ["/home/user/source:/source:rw", "/var/data/myapp:/data:ro"],
     };
 
     const args = buildSandboxCreateArgs({
@@ -124,7 +124,116 @@ describe("buildSandboxCreateArgs", () => {
       }
     }
     expect(vFlags).toContain("/home/user/source:/source:rw");
-    expect(vFlags).toContain("/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock");
+    expect(vFlags).toContain("/var/data/myapp:/data:ro");
+  });
+
+  it("throws on dangerous bind mounts (Docker socket)", () => {
+    const cfg: SandboxDockerConfig = {
+      image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
+      containerPrefix: "openclaw-sbx-",
+      workdir: "/workspace",
+      readOnlyRoot: false,
+      tmpfs: [],
+      network: "none",
+      capDrop: [],
+      binds: ["/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"],
+    };
+
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSandboxCreateArgs({
+        name: "openclaw-sbx-dangerous",
+        cfg,
+        scopeKey: "main",
+        createdAtMs: 1700000000000,
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(/blocked path/);
+  });
+
+  it("throws on dangerous bind mounts (parent path)", () => {
+    const cfg: SandboxDockerConfig = {
+      image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
+      containerPrefix: "openclaw-sbx-",
+      workdir: "/workspace",
+      readOnlyRoot: false,
+      tmpfs: [],
+      network: "none",
+      capDrop: [],
+      binds: ["/run:/run"],
+    };
+
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSandboxCreateArgs({
+        name: "openclaw-sbx-dangerous-parent",
+        cfg,
+        scopeKey: "main",
+        createdAtMs: 1700000000000,
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(/blocked path/);
+  });
+
+  it("throws on network host mode", () => {
+    const cfg: SandboxDockerConfig = {
+      image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
+      containerPrefix: "openclaw-sbx-",
+      workdir: "/workspace",
+      readOnlyRoot: false,
+      tmpfs: [],
+      network: "host",
+      capDrop: [],
+    };
+
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSandboxCreateArgs({
+        name: "openclaw-sbx-host",
+        cfg,
+        scopeKey: "main",
+        createdAtMs: 1700000000000,
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(/network mode "host" is blocked/);
+  });
+
+  it("throws on seccomp unconfined", () => {
+    const cfg: SandboxDockerConfig = {
+      image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
+      containerPrefix: "openclaw-sbx-",
+      workdir: "/workspace",
+      readOnlyRoot: false,
+      tmpfs: [],
+      network: "none",
+      capDrop: [],
+      seccompProfile: "unconfined",
+    };
+
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSandboxCreateArgs({
+        name: "openclaw-sbx-seccomp",
+        cfg,
+        scopeKey: "main",
+        createdAtMs: 1700000000000,
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(/seccomp profile "unconfined" is blocked/);
+  });
+
+  it("throws on apparmor unconfined", () => {
+    const cfg: SandboxDockerConfig = {
+      image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
+      containerPrefix: "openclaw-sbx-",
+      workdir: "/workspace",
+      readOnlyRoot: false,
+      tmpfs: [],
+      network: "none",
+      capDrop: [],
+      apparmorProfile: "unconfined",
+    };
+
+    expect(() =>
+      buildSandboxCreateArgs({
+        name: "openclaw-sbx-apparmor",
+        cfg,
+        scopeKey: "main",
+        createdAtMs: 1700000000000,
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(/apparmor profile "unconfined" is blocked/);
   });
 
   it("omits -v flags when binds is empty or undefined", () => {

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ import { computeSandboxConfigHash } from "./config-hash.js";
 import { DEFAULT_SANDBOX_IMAGE, SANDBOX_AGENT_WORKSPACE_MOUNT } from "./constants.js";
 import { readRegistry, updateRegistry } from "./registry.js";
 import { resolveSandboxAgentId, resolveSandboxScopeKey, slugifySessionKey } from "./shared.js";
+import { validateSandboxSecurity } from "./validate-sandbox-security.js";
 
 const HOT_CONTAINER_WINDOW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
 
@@ -240,6 +241,9 @@ export function buildSandboxCreateArgs(params: {
   labels?: Record<string, string>;
   configHash?: string;
 }) {
+  // Runtime security validation: blocks dangerous bind mounts, network modes, and profiles.
+  validateSandboxSecurity(params.cfg);
+
   const createdAtMs = params.createdAtMs ?? Date.now();
   const args = ["create", "--name", params.name];
   args.push("--label", "openclaw.sandbox=1");

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+import { mkdtempSync, symlinkSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly,
+  validateBindMounts,
+  validateNetworkMode,
+  validateSeccompProfile,
+  validateApparmorProfile,
+  validateSandboxSecurity,
+} from "./validate-sandbox-security.js";
+
+describe("getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly", () => {
+  it("blocks ancestor mounts that would expose the Docker socket", () => {
+    expect(getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly("/run:/run")).toEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({ kind: "covers" }),
+    );
+    expect(getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly("/var/run:/var/run:ro")).toEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({ kind: "covers" }),
+    );
+    expect(getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly("/var:/var")).toEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({ kind: "covers" }),
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("validateBindMounts", () => {
+  it("allows legitimate project directory mounts", () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      validateBindMounts([
+        "/home/user/source:/source:rw",
+        "/home/user/projects:/projects:ro",
+        "/var/data/myapp:/data",
+        "/opt/myapp/config:/config:ro",
+      ]),
+    ).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("allows undefined or empty binds", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(undefined)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts([])).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("blocks /etc mount", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/etc/passwd:/mnt/passwd:ro"])).toThrow(
+      /blocked path "\/etc"/,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("blocks /proc mount", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/proc:/proc:ro"])).toThrow(/blocked path "\/proc"/);
+  });
+
+  it("blocks Docker socket mounts (/var/run + /run)", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"])).toThrow(
+      /docker\.sock/,
+    );
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/run/docker.sock:/run/docker.sock"])).toThrow(/docker\.sock/);
+  });
+
+  it("blocks parent mounts that would expose the Docker socket", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/run:/run"])).toThrow(/blocked path/);
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/var/run:/var/run"])).toThrow(/blocked path/);
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/var:/var"])).toThrow(/blocked path/);
+  });
+
+  it("blocks paths with .. traversal to dangerous directories", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/home/user/../../etc/shadow:/mnt/shadow"])).toThrow(
+      /blocked path "\/etc"/,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("blocks paths with double slashes normalizing to dangerous dirs", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["//etc//passwd:/mnt/passwd"])).toThrow(/blocked path "\/etc"/);
+  });
+
+  it("blocks symlink escapes into blocked directories", () => {
+    const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "openclaw-sbx-"));
+    const link = join(dir, "etc-link");
+    symlinkSync("/etc", link);
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts([`${link}/passwd:/mnt/passwd:ro`])).toThrow(/blocked path/);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects non-absolute source paths (relative or named volumes)", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["../etc/passwd:/mnt/passwd"])).toThrow(/non-absolute/);
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["etc/passwd:/mnt/passwd"])).toThrow(/non-absolute/);
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["myvol:/mnt"])).toThrow(/non-absolute/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("validateNetworkMode", () => {
+  it("allows bridge/none/custom/undefined", () => {
+    expect(() => validateNetworkMode("bridge")).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateNetworkMode("none")).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateNetworkMode("my-custom-network")).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateNetworkMode(undefined)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("blocks host mode (case-insensitive)", () => {
+    expect(() => validateNetworkMode("host")).toThrow(/network mode "host" is blocked/);
+    expect(() => validateNetworkMode("HOST")).toThrow(/network mode "HOST" is blocked/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("validateSeccompProfile", () => {
+  it("allows custom profile paths/undefined", () => {
+    expect(() => validateSeccompProfile("/tmp/seccomp.json")).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateSeccompProfile(undefined)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("blocks unconfined (case-insensitive)", () => {
+    expect(() => validateSeccompProfile("unconfined")).toThrow(
+      /seccomp profile "unconfined" is blocked/,
+    );
+    expect(() => validateSeccompProfile("Unconfined")).toThrow(
+      /seccomp profile "Unconfined" is blocked/,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("validateApparmorProfile", () => {
+  it("allows named profile/undefined", () => {
+    expect(() => validateApparmorProfile("openclaw-sandbox")).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateApparmorProfile(undefined)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("blocks unconfined (case-insensitive)", () => {
+    expect(() => validateApparmorProfile("unconfined")).toThrow(
+      /apparmor profile "unconfined" is blocked/,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("validateSandboxSecurity", () => {
+  it("passes with safe config", () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      validateSandboxSecurity({
+        binds: ["/home/user/src:/src:rw"],
+        network: "none",
+        seccompProfile: "/tmp/seccomp.json",
+        apparmorProfile: "openclaw-sandbox",
+      }),
+    ).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/**
+ * Sandbox security validation — blocks dangerous Docker configurations.
+ *
+ * Threat model: local-trusted config, but protect against foot-guns and config injection.
+ * Enforced at runtime when creating sandbox containers.
+ */
+
+import { existsSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
+import { posix } from "node:path";
+
+// Targeted denylist: host paths that should never be exposed inside sandbox containers.
+// Exported for reuse in security audit collectors.
+export const BLOCKED_HOST_PATHS = [
+  "/etc",
+  "/private/etc",
+  "/proc",
+  "/sys",
+  "/dev",
+  "/root",
+  "/boot",
+  "/var/run/docker.sock",
+  "/private/var/run/docker.sock",
+  "/run/docker.sock",
+];
+
+const BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = new Set(["host"]);
+const BLOCKED_SECCOMP_PROFILES = new Set(["unconfined"]);
+const BLOCKED_APPARMOR_PROFILES = new Set(["unconfined"]);
+
+export type BlockedBindReason =
+  | { kind: "targets"; blockedPath: string }
+  | { kind: "covers"; blockedPath: string }
+  | { kind: "non_absolute"; sourcePath: string };
+
+/**
+ * Parse the host/source path from a Docker bind mount string.
+ * Format: `source:target[:mode]`
+ */
+export function parseBindSourcePath(bind: string): string {
+  const trimmed = bind.trim();
+  const firstColon = trimmed.indexOf(":");
+  if (firstColon <= 0) {
+    // No colon or starts with colon — treat as source.
+    return trimmed;
+  }
+  return trimmed.slice(0, firstColon);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalize a POSIX path: resolve `.`, `..`, collapse `//`, strip trailing `/`.
+ */
+export function normalizeHostPath(raw: string): string {
+  const trimmed = raw.trim();
+  return posix.normalize(trimmed).replace(/\/+$/, "") || "/";
+}
+
+/**
+ * String-only blocked-path check (no filesystem I/O).
+ * Blocks:
+ * - binds that target blocked paths (equal or under)
+ * - binds that cover blocked paths (ancestor mounts like /run or /var)
+ * - non-absolute source paths (relative / volume names) because they are hard to validate safely
+ */
+export function getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly(bind: string): BlockedBindReason | null {
+  const sourceRaw = parseBindSourcePath(bind);
+  if (!sourceRaw.startsWith("/")) {
+    return { kind: "non_absolute", sourcePath: sourceRaw };
+  }
+
+  const normalized = normalizeHostPath(sourceRaw);
+
+  for (const blocked of BLOCKED_HOST_PATHS) {
+    if (normalized === blocked || normalized.startsWith(blocked + "/")) {
+      return { kind: "targets", blockedPath: blocked };
+    }
+    // Ancestor mounts: mounting /run exposes /run/docker.sock.
+    if (normalized === "/") {
+      return { kind: "covers", blockedPath: blocked };
+    }
+    if (blocked.startsWith(normalized + "/")) {
+      return { kind: "covers", blockedPath: blocked };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+function tryRealpathAbsolute(path: string): string {
+  if (!path.startsWith("/")) {
+    return path;
+  }
+  if (!existsSync(path)) {
+    return path;
+  }
+  try {
+    // Use native when available (keeps platform semantics); normalize for prefix checks.
+    return normalizeHostPath(realpathSync.native(path));
+  } catch {
+    return path;
+  }
+}
+
+function formatBindBlockedError(params: { bind: string; reason: BlockedBindReason }): Error {
+  if (params.reason.kind === "non_absolute") {
+    return new Error(
+      `Sandbox security: bind mount "${params.bind}" uses a non-absolute source path ` +
+        `"${params.reason.sourcePath}". Only absolute POSIX paths are supported for sandbox binds.`,
+    );
+  }
+  const verb = params.reason.kind === "covers" ? "covers" : "targets";
+  return new Error(
+    `Sandbox security: bind mount "${params.bind}" ${verb} blocked path "${params.reason.blockedPath}". ` +
+      "Mounting system directories (or Docker socket paths) into sandbox containers is not allowed. " +
+      "Use project-specific paths instead (e.g. /home/user/myproject).",
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate bind mounts — throws if any source path is dangerous.
+ * Includes a symlink/realpath pass when the source path exists.
+ */
+export function validateBindMounts(binds: string[] | undefined): void {
+  if (!binds?.length) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  for (const rawBind of binds) {
+    const bind = rawBind.trim();
+    if (!bind) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Fast string-only check (covers .., //, ancestor/descendant logic).
+    const blocked = getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly(bind);
+    if (blocked) {
+      throw formatBindBlockedError({ bind, reason: blocked });
+    }
+
+    // Symlink escape hardening: resolve existing absolute paths and re-check.
+    const sourceRaw = parseBindSourcePath(bind);
+    const sourceNormalized = normalizeHostPath(sourceRaw);
+    const sourceReal = tryRealpathAbsolute(sourceNormalized);
+    if (sourceReal !== sourceNormalized) {
+      for (const blockedPath of BLOCKED_HOST_PATHS) {
+        if (sourceReal === blockedPath || sourceReal.startsWith(blockedPath + "/")) {
+          throw formatBindBlockedError({
+            bind,
+            reason: { kind: "targets", blockedPath },
+          });
+        }
+        if (sourceReal === "/") {
+          throw formatBindBlockedError({
+            bind,
+            reason: { kind: "covers", blockedPath },
+          });
+        }
+        if (blockedPath.startsWith(sourceReal + "/")) {
+          throw formatBindBlockedError({
+            bind,
+            reason: { kind: "covers", blockedPath },
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export function validateNetworkMode(network: string | undefined): void {
+  if (network && BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES.has(network.trim().toLowerCase())) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Sandbox security: network mode "${network}" is blocked. ` +
+        'Network "host" mode bypasses container network isolation. ' +
+        'Use "bridge" or "none" instead.',
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+export function validateSeccompProfile(profile: string | undefined): void {
+  if (profile && BLOCKED_SECCOMP_PROFILES.has(profile.trim().toLowerCase())) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Sandbox security: seccomp profile "${profile}" is blocked. ` +
+        "Disabling seccomp removes syscall filtering and weakens sandbox isolation. " +
+        "Use a custom seccomp profile file or omit this setting.",
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+export function validateApparmorProfile(profile: string | undefined): void {
+  if (profile && BLOCKED_APPARMOR_PROFILES.has(profile.trim().toLowerCase())) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Sandbox security: apparmor profile "${profile}" is blocked. ` +
+        "Disabling AppArmor removes mandatory access controls and weakens sandbox isolation. " +
+        "Use a named AppArmor profile or omit this setting.",
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+export function validateSandboxSecurity(cfg: {
+  binds?: string[];
+  network?: string;
+  seccompProfile?: string;
+  apparmorProfile?: string;
+}): void {
+  validateBindMounts(cfg.binds);
+  validateNetworkMode(cfg.network);
+  validateSeccompProfile(cfg.seccompProfile);
+  validateApparmorProfile(cfg.apparmorProfile);
+}

@@ -3,13 +3,13 @@ import { resolveSandboxBrowserConfig } from "../agents/sandbox/config.js";
 import { validateConfigObject } from "./config.js";
 
 describe("sandbox docker config", () => {
-  it("accepts binds array in sandbox.docker config", () => {
+  it("accepts safe binds array in sandbox.docker config", () => {
     const res = validateConfigObject({
       agents: {
         defaults: {
           sandbox: {
             docker: {
-              binds: ["/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock", "/home/user/source:/source:rw"],
+              binds: ["/home/user/source:/source:rw", "/var/data/myapp:/data:ro"],
             },
           },
         },
@@ -29,15 +29,60 @@ describe("sandbox docker config", () => {
     expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
     if (res.ok) {
       expect(res.config.agents?.defaults?.sandbox?.docker?.binds).toEqual([
-        "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock",
         "/home/user/source:/source:rw",
+        "/var/data/myapp:/data:ro",
       ]);
       expect(res.config.agents?.list?.[0]?.sandbox?.docker?.binds).toEqual([
         "/home/user/projects:/projects:ro",
       ]);
     }
   });
 
+  it("rejects network host mode via Zod schema validation", () => {
+    const res = validateConfigObject({
+      agents: {
+        defaults: {
+          sandbox: {
+            docker: {
+              network: "host",
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects seccomp unconfined via Zod schema validation", () => {
+    const res = validateConfigObject({
+      agents: {
+        defaults: {
+          sandbox: {
+            docker: {
+              seccompProfile: "unconfined",
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects apparmor unconfined via Zod schema validation", () => {
+    const res = validateConfigObject({
+      agents: {
+        defaults: {
+          sandbox: {
+            docker: {
+              apparmorProfile: "unconfined",
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it("rejects non-string values in binds array", () => {
     const res = validateConfigObject({
       agents: {

@@ -125,6 +125,34 @@ export const SandboxDockerSchema = z
     binds: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
   })
   .strict()
+  .superRefine((data, ctx) => {
+    if (data.network?.trim().toLowerCase() === "host") {
+      ctx.addIssue({
+        code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+        path: ["network"],
+        message:
+          'Sandbox security: network mode "host" is blocked. Use "bridge" or "none" instead.',
+      });
+    }
+    if (data.seccompProfile?.trim().toLowerCase() === "unconfined") {
+      ctx.addIssue({
+        code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+        path: ["seccompProfile"],
+        message:
+          'Sandbox security: seccomp profile "unconfined" is blocked. ' +
+          "Use a custom seccomp profile file or omit this setting.",
+      });
+    }
+    if (data.apparmorProfile?.trim().toLowerCase() === "unconfined") {
+      ctx.addIssue({
+        code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+        path: ["apparmorProfile"],
+        message:
+          'Sandbox security: apparmor profile "unconfined" is blocked. ' +
+          "Use a named AppArmor profile or omit this setting.",
+      });
+    }
+  })
   .optional();
 
 export const SandboxBrowserSchema = z

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
   resolveSandboxConfigForAgent,
   resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent,
 } from "../agents/sandbox.js";
+import { getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly } from "../agents/sandbox/validate-sandbox-security.js";
 import { resolveToolProfilePolicy } from "../agents/tool-policy.js";
 import { resolveBrowserConfig } from "../browser/config.js";
 import { formatCliCommand } from "../cli/command-format.js";
@@ -584,6 +585,104 @@ export function collectSandboxDockerNoopFindings(cfg: OpenClawConfig): SecurityA
   return findings;
 }
 
+export function collectSandboxDangerousConfigFindings(cfg: OpenClawConfig): SecurityAuditFinding[] {
+  const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
+  const agents = Array.isArray(cfg.agents?.list) ? cfg.agents.list : [];
+
+  const configs: Array<{ source: string; docker: Record<string, unknown> }> = [];
+  const defaultDocker = cfg.agents?.defaults?.sandbox?.docker;
+  if (defaultDocker && typeof defaultDocker === "object") {
+    configs.push({
+      source: "agents.defaults.sandbox.docker",
+      docker: defaultDocker as Record<string, unknown>,
+    });
+  }
+  for (const entry of agents) {
+    if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || typeof entry.id !== "string") {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const agentDocker = entry.sandbox?.docker;
+    if (agentDocker && typeof agentDocker === "object") {
+      configs.push({
+        source: `agents.list.${entry.id}.sandbox.docker`,
+        docker: agentDocker as Record<string, unknown>,
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const { source, docker } of configs) {
+    const binds = Array.isArray(docker.binds) ? docker.binds : [];
+    for (const bind of binds) {
+      if (typeof bind !== "string") {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const blocked = getBlockedBindReasonStringOnly(bind);
+      if (!blocked) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (blocked.kind === "non_absolute") {
+        findings.push({
+          checkId: "sandbox.bind_mount_non_absolute",
+          severity: "warn",
+          title: "Sandbox bind mount uses a non-absolute source path",
+          detail:
+            `${source}.binds contains "${bind}" which uses source path "${blocked.sourcePath}". ` +
+            "Non-absolute bind sources are hard to validate safely and may resolve unexpectedly.",
+          remediation: `Rewrite "${bind}" to use an absolute host path (for example: /home/user/project:/project:ro).`,
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+      const verb = blocked.kind === "covers" ? "covers" : "targets";
+      findings.push({
+        checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_bind_mount",
+        severity: "critical",
+        title: "Dangerous bind mount in sandbox config",
+        detail:
+          `${source}.binds contains "${bind}" which ${verb} blocked path "${blocked.blockedPath}". ` +
+          "This can expose host system directories or the Docker socket to sandbox containers.",
+        remediation: `Remove "${bind}" from ${source}.binds. Use project-specific paths instead.`,
+      });
+    }
+
+    const network = typeof docker.network === "string" ? docker.network : undefined;
+    if (network && network.trim().toLowerCase() === "host") {
+      findings.push({
+        checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_network_mode",
+        severity: "critical",
+        title: "Network host mode in sandbox config",
+        detail: `${source}.network is "host" which bypasses container network isolation entirely.`,
+        remediation: `Set ${source}.network to "bridge" or "none".`,
+      });
+    }
+
+    const seccompProfile =
+      typeof docker.seccompProfile === "string" ? docker.seccompProfile : undefined;
+    if (seccompProfile && seccompProfile.trim().toLowerCase() === "unconfined") {
+      findings.push({
+        checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_seccomp_profile",
+        severity: "critical",
+        title: "Seccomp unconfined in sandbox config",
+        detail: `${source}.seccompProfile is "unconfined" which disables syscall filtering.`,
+        remediation: `Remove ${source}.seccompProfile or use a custom seccomp profile file.`,
+      });
+    }
+
+    const apparmorProfile =
+      typeof docker.apparmorProfile === "string" ? docker.apparmorProfile : undefined;
+    if (apparmorProfile && apparmorProfile.trim().toLowerCase() === "unconfined") {
+      findings.push({
+        checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_apparmor_profile",
+        severity: "critical",
+        title: "AppArmor unconfined in sandbox config",
+        detail: `${source}.apparmorProfile is "unconfined" which disables AppArmor enforcement.`,
+        remediation: `Remove ${source}.apparmorProfile or use a named AppArmor profile.`,
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  return findings;
+}
+
 export function collectNodeDenyCommandPatternFindings(cfg: OpenClawConfig): SecurityAuditFinding[] {
   const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
   const denyListRaw = cfg.gateway?.nodes?.denyCommands;

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ export {
   collectMinimalProfileOverrideFindings,
   collectModelHygieneFindings,
   collectNodeDenyCommandPatternFindings,
+  collectSandboxDangerousConfigFindings,
   collectSandboxDockerNoopFindings,
   collectSecretsInConfigFindings,
   collectSmallModelRiskFindings,

@@ -486,6 +486,48 @@ describe("security audit", () => {
     expect(res.findings.some((f) => f.checkId === "sandbox.docker_config_mode_off")).toBe(false);
   });
 
+  it("flags dangerous sandbox docker config (binds/network/seccomp/apparmor)", async () => {
+    const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
+      agents: {
+        defaults: {
+          sandbox: {
+            mode: "all",
+            docker: {
+              binds: ["/etc/passwd:/mnt/passwd:ro", "/run:/run"],
+              network: "host",
+              seccompProfile: "unconfined",
+              apparmorProfile: "unconfined",
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    };
+
+    const res = await runSecurityAudit({
+      config: cfg,
+      includeFilesystem: false,
+      includeChannelSecurity: false,
+    });
+
+    expect(res.findings).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining([
+        expect.objectContaining({ checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_bind_mount", severity: "critical" }),
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_network_mode",
+          severity: "critical",
+        }),
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_seccomp_profile",
+          severity: "critical",
+        }),
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          checkId: "sandbox.dangerous_apparmor_profile",
+          severity: "critical",
+        }),
+      ]),
+    );
+  });
+
   it("flags ineffective gateway.nodes.denyCommands entries", async () => {
     const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
       gateway: {

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import {
   collectModelHygieneFindings,
   collectNodeDenyCommandPatternFindings,
   collectSmallModelRiskFindings,
+  collectSandboxDangerousConfigFindings,
   collectSandboxDockerNoopFindings,
   collectPluginsTrustFindings,
   collectSecretsInConfigFindings,
@@ -621,6 +622,7 @@ export async function runSecurityAudit(opts: SecurityAuditOptions): Promise<Secu
   findings.push(...collectHooksHardeningFindings(cfg, env));
   findings.push(...collectGatewayHttpSessionKeyOverrideFindings(cfg));
   findings.push(...collectSandboxDockerNoopFindings(cfg));
+  findings.push(...collectSandboxDangerousConfigFindings(cfg));
   findings.push(...collectNodeDenyCommandPatternFindings(cfg));
   findings.push(...collectMinimalProfileOverrideFindings(cfg));
   findings.push(...collectSecretsInConfigFindings(cfg));