OpenClaw < 2026.3.12 - Scope Elevation in WebSocket Shared-Auth Connections

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/exec approvals: escape invisible Unicode format characters in approval prompts so zero-width command text renders as visible `\u{...}` escapes instead of spoofing the reviewed command. (`GHSA-pcqg-f7rg-xfvv`)(#43687) Thanks @EkiXu and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/exec detection: normalize compatibility Unicode and strip invisible formatting code points before obfuscation checks so zero-width and fullwidth command tricks no longer suppress heuristic detection. (`GHSA-9r3v-37xh-2cf6`)(#44091) Thanks @wooluo and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/exec allowlist: preserve POSIX case sensitivity and keep `?` within a single path segment so exact-looking allowlist patterns no longer overmatch executables across case or directory boundaries. (`GHSA-f8r2-vg7x-gh8m`)(#43798) Thanks @zpbrent and @vincentkoc.
+- Security/gateway auth: clear unbound client-declared scopes on shared-token WebSocket connects so device-less shared-token operators cannot self-declare elevated scopes. (`GHSA-rqpp-rjj8-7wv8`)(#44306) Thanks @LUOYEcode and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/browser.request: block persistent browser profile create/delete routes from write-scoped `browser.request` so callers can no longer persist admin-only browser profile changes through the browser control surface. (`GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q`)(#43800) Thanks @tdjackey and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/agent: reject public spawned-run lineage fields and keep workspace inheritance on the internal spawned-session path so external `agent` callers can no longer override the gateway workspace boundary. (`GHSA-2rqg-gjgv-84jm`)(#43801) Thanks @tdjackey and @vincentkoc.
 - Security/session_status: enforce sandbox session-tree visibility and shared agent-to-agent access guards before reading or mutating target session state, so sandboxed subagents can no longer inspect parent session metadata or write parent model overrides via `session_status`. (`GHSA-wcxr-59v9-rxr8`)(#43754) Thanks @tdjackey and @vincentkoc.

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   getFreePort,
   openWs,
   originForPort,
+  rpcReq,
   restoreGatewayToken,
   startGatewayServer,
   testState,
@@ -62,6 +63,24 @@ describe("gateway auth compatibility baseline", () => {
       }
     });
 
+    test("clears client-declared scopes for shared-token operator connects", async () => {
+      const ws = await openWs(port);
+      try {
+        const res = await connectReq(ws, {
+          token: "secret",
+          scopes: ["operator.admin"],
+          device: null,
+        });
+        expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
+
+        const adminRes = await rpcReq(ws, "set-heartbeats", { enabled: false });
+        expect(adminRes.ok).toBe(false);
+        expect(adminRes.error?.message).toBe("missing scope: operator.admin");
+      } finally {
+        ws.close();
+      }
+    });
+
     test("returns stable token-missing details for control ui without token", async () => {
       const ws = await openWs(port, { origin: originForPort(port) });
       try {
@@ -163,6 +182,24 @@ describe("gateway auth compatibility baseline", () => {
         ws.close();
       }
     });
+
+    test("clears client-declared scopes for shared-password operator connects", async () => {
+      const ws = await openWs(port);
+      try {
+        const res = await connectReq(ws, {
+          password: "secret",
+          scopes: ["operator.admin"],
+          device: null,
+        });
+        expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
+
+        const adminRes = await rpcReq(ws, "set-heartbeats", { enabled: false });
+        expect(adminRes.ok).toBe(false);
+        expect(adminRes.error?.message).toBe("missing scope: operator.admin");
+      } finally {
+        ws.close();
+      }
+    });
   });
 
   describe("none mode", () => {

@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ export function registerControlUiAndPairingSuite(): void {
     expect(health.ok).toBe(true);
   };
 
+  const expectAdminRpcOk = async (ws: WebSocket) => {
+    const admin = await rpcReq(ws, "set-heartbeats", { enabled: false });
+    expect(admin.ok).toBe(true);
+  };
+
   const connectControlUiWithoutDeviceAndExpectOk = async (params: {
     ws: WebSocket;
     token?: string;
@@ -104,6 +109,7 @@ export function registerControlUiAndPairingSuite(): void {
     });
     expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
     await expectStatusAndHealthOk(params.ws);
+    await expectAdminRpcOk(params.ws);
   };
 
   const createOperatorIdentityFixture = async (identityPrefix: string) => {
@@ -217,6 +223,9 @@ export function registerControlUiAndPairingSuite(): void {
         }
         if (tc.expectStatusChecks) {
           await expectStatusAndHealthOk(ws);
+          if (tc.role === "operator") {
+            await expectAdminRpcOk(ws);
+          }
         }
         ws.close();
       });

@@ -643,15 +643,12 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {
           close(1008, truncateCloseReason(authMessage));
         };
         const clearUnboundScopes = () => {
-          if (scopes.length > 0 && !controlUiAuthPolicy.allowBypass && !sharedAuthOk) {
+          if (scopes.length > 0) {
             scopes = [];
             connectParams.scopes = scopes;
           }
         };
         const handleMissingDeviceIdentity = (): boolean => {
-          if (!device) {
-            clearUnboundScopes();
-          }
           const trustedProxyAuthOk = isTrustedProxyControlUiOperatorAuth({
             isControlUi,
             role,
@@ -670,6 +667,9 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {
             hasSharedAuth,
             isLocalClient,
           });
+          if (!device && (!isControlUi || decision.kind !== "allow")) {
+            clearUnboundScopes();
+          }
           if (decision.kind === "allow") {
             return true;
           }