coollabsio coolify Image Name os command injection

An attacker with the ability to control deployment image references (e.g., a low-privileged user who can configure a service's Docker image field) can inject shell metacharacters such as `;` into the image name. Because Coolify builds the `docker pull` command by concatenating the unsanitized image reference into a shell string, a payload like `alpine; printf ...` breaks out of the intended command and executes arbitrary OS commands on the deployment worker [ref_id=1]. The attack is remote and requires no special network access beyond the Coolify web interface.

The vulnerability resides in Coolify's deployment image parsing logic, specifically how Docker image reference fields are normalized and embedded into shell command strings for `docker pull`. The sink is in the component that constructs the shell command from user-supplied image names [ref_id=1].

The advisory does not include a published patch, but the vendor's changelog for version 4.1.2 states "[i]mproved image, branch, proxy, and deployment input validation," which likely addresses this injection vector. The recommended remediation is to never construct Docker commands through shell strings; instead, use argument-array process execution, validate image references against OCI grammar, and reject shell metacharacters and whitespace/control characters [ref_id=1].