Potential SQL injection via raster lookups on PostGIS

@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ def check_raster(self, lookup, template_params):
 
         # Look for band indices and inject them if provided.
         if lookup.band_lhs is not None and lhs_is_raster:
+            if not isinstance(lookup.band_lhs, int):
+                name = lookup.band_lhs.__class__.__name__
+                raise TypeError(f"Band index must be an integer, but got {name!r}.")
             if not self.func:
                 raise ValueError(
                     "Band indices are not allowed for this operator, it works on bbox "
@@ -62,6 +65,9 @@ def check_raster(self, lookup, template_params):
             )
 
         if lookup.band_rhs is not None and rhs_is_raster:
+            if not isinstance(lookup.band_rhs, int):
+                name = lookup.band_rhs.__class__.__name__
+                raise TypeError(f"Band index must be an integer, but got {name!r}.")
             if not self.func:
                 raise ValueError(
                     "Band indices are not allowed for this operator, it works on bbox "

@@ -29,3 +29,15 @@ produced super-linear computation resulting in service degradation or outage.
 
 This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
 policy <security-disclosure>`.
+
+CVE-2026-1207: Potential SQL injection via raster lookups on PostGIS
+====================================================================
+
+:ref:`Raster lookups <spatial-lookup-raster>` on GIS fields (only implemented
+on PostGIS) were subject to SQL injection if untrusted data was used as a band
+index.
+
+As a reminder, all untrusted user input should be validated before use.
+
+This issue has severity "high" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
+<security-disclosure>`.

@@ -29,3 +29,15 @@ produced super-linear computation resulting in service degradation or outage.
 
 This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
 policy <security-disclosure>`.
+
+CVE-2026-1207: Potential SQL injection via raster lookups on PostGIS
+====================================================================
+
+:ref:`Raster lookups <spatial-lookup-raster>` on GIS fields (only implemented
+on PostGIS) were subject to SQL injection if untrusted data was used as a band
+index.
+
+As a reminder, all untrusted user input should be validated before use.
+
+This issue has severity "high" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
+<security-disclosure>`.

@@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ produced super-linear computation resulting in service degradation or outage.
 This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
 policy <security-disclosure>`.
 
+CVE-2026-1207: Potential SQL injection via raster lookups on PostGIS
+====================================================================
+
+:ref:`Raster lookups <spatial-lookup-raster>` on GIS fields (only implemented
+on PostGIS) were subject to SQL injection if untrusted data was used as a band
+index.
+
+As a reminder, all untrusted user input should be validated before use.
+
+This issue has severity "high" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
+<security-disclosure>`.
+
 Bugfixes
 ========
 

@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@
 
 from django.contrib.gis.db.models.fields import BaseSpatialField
 from django.contrib.gis.db.models.functions import Distance
-from django.contrib.gis.db.models.lookups import DistanceLookupBase, GISLookup
+from django.contrib.gis.db.models.lookups import (
+    DistanceLookupBase,
+    GISLookup,
+    RasterBandTransform,
+)
 from django.contrib.gis.gdal import GDALRaster
 from django.contrib.gis.geos import GEOSGeometry
 from django.contrib.gis.measure import D
@@ -356,6 +360,47 @@ def test_lookup_input_band_not_allowed(self):
         with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg):
             qs.count()
 
+    def test_lookup_invalid_band_rhs(self):
+        rast = GDALRaster(json.loads(JSON_RASTER))
+        qs = RasterModel.objects.filter(rast__contains=(rast, "evil"))
+        msg = "Band index must be an integer, but got 'str'."
+        with self.assertRaisesMessage(TypeError, msg):
+            qs.count()
+
+    def test_lookup_invalid_band_lhs(self):
+        """
+        Typical left-hand side usage is protected against non-integers, but for
+        defense-in-depth purposes, construct custom lookups that evade the
+        `int()` and `+ 1` checks in the lookups shipped by django.contrib.gis.
+        """
+
+        # Evade the int() call in RasterField.get_transform().
+        class MyRasterBandTransform(RasterBandTransform):
+            band_index = "evil"
+
+            def process_band_indices(self, *args, **kwargs):
+                self.band_lhs = self.lhs.band_index
+                self.band_rhs, *self.rhs_params = self.rhs_params
+
+        # Evade the `+ 1` call in BaseSpatialField.process_band_indices().
+        ContainsLookup = RasterModel._meta.get_field("rast").get_lookup("contains")
+
+        class MyContainsLookup(ContainsLookup):
+            def process_band_indices(self, *args, **kwargs):
+                self.band_lhs = self.lhs.band_index
+                self.band_rhs, *self.rhs_params = self.rhs_params
+
+        RasterField = RasterModel._meta.get_field("rast")
+        RasterField.register_lookup(MyContainsLookup, "contains")
+        self.addCleanup(RasterField.register_lookup, ContainsLookup, "contains")
+
+        qs = RasterModel.objects.annotate(
+            transformed=MyRasterBandTransform("rast")
+        ).filter(transformed__contains=(F("transformed"), 1))
+        msg = "Band index must be an integer, but got 'str'."
+        with self.assertRaisesMessage(TypeError, msg):
+            list(qs)
+
     def test_isvalid_lookup_with_raster_error(self):
         qs = RasterModel.objects.filter(rast__isvalid=True)
         msg = (