Astro Development Server is Vulnerable to Arbitrary Local File Read

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+'astro': patch
+---
+
+Aligns dev image server file base with Vite rules

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+'@astrojs/cloudflare': patch
+'@astrojs/internal-helpers': patch
+'astro': patch
+---
+
+Refactor remote path detection

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ function getImageEndpointData(
 	const endpointEntrypoint =
 		settings.config.image.endpoint.entrypoint === undefined // If not set, use default endpoint
 			? mode === 'dev'
-				? 'astro/assets/endpoint/node'
+				? 'astro/assets/endpoint/dev'
 				: 'astro/assets/endpoint/generic'
 			: settings.config.image.endpoint.entrypoint;
 

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// @ts-expect-error
+import { root } from 'astro:config/server';
+import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { isParentDirectory } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/path';
+import type { APIRoute } from '../../types/public/common.js';
+import { handleImageRequest, loadRemoteImage } from './shared.js';
+
+function replaceFileSystemReferences(src: string) {
+	return os.platform().includes('win32') ? src.replace(/^\/@fs\//, '') : src.replace(/^\/@fs/, '');
+}
+
+async function loadLocalImage(src: string, url: URL) {
+	// Vite uses /@fs/ to denote filesystem access
+	if (src.startsWith('/@fs/')) {
+		src = replaceFileSystemReferences(src);
+		if (!isParentDirectory(fileURLToPath(root), src)) {
+			return undefined;
+		}
+	}
+	// Vite allows loading files directly from the filesystem
+	// as long as they are inside the project root.
+	if (isParentDirectory(fileURLToPath(root), src)) {
+		try {
+			return await readFile(src);
+		} catch {
+			return undefined;
+		}
+	} else {
+		// Otherwise we'll assume it's a local URL and try to load it via fetch
+		const sourceUrl = new URL(src, url.origin);
+		// This is only allowed if this is the same origin
+		if (sourceUrl.origin !== url.origin) {
+			return undefined;
+		}
+		return loadRemoteImage(sourceUrl);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Endpoint used in dev and SSR to serve optimized images by the base image services
+ */
+export const GET: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
+	if (!import.meta.env.DEV) {
+		console.error('The dev image endpoint can only be used in dev mode.');
+		return new Response('Invalid endpoint', { status: 500 });
+	}
+	try {
+		return await handleImageRequest({ request, loadLocalImage });
+	} catch (err: unknown) {
+		console.error('Could not process image request:', err);
+		return new Response(`Could not process image request: ${err}`, {
+			status: 500,
+		});
+	}
+};

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ export const GET: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
 		}
 
 		const sourceUrl = new URL(transform.src, url.origin);
+
+		// Have we been tricked into thinking this is local?
+		if (!isRemoteImage && sourceUrl.origin !== url.origin) {
+			return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
+		}
+
 		inputBuffer = await loadRemoteImage(sourceUrl, isRemoteImage ? new Headers() : request.headers);
 
 		if (!inputBuffer) {

@@ -1,133 +1,48 @@
 // @ts-expect-error
-import { assetsDir, imageConfig, outDir } from 'astro:assets';
+import { outDir } from 'astro:assets';
 import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
-import os from 'node:os';
-import { isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
-import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
-import { isRemotePath, removeQueryString } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/path';
-import { isRemoteAllowed } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/remote';
-import * as mime from 'mrmime';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { isParentDirectory } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/path';
 import type { APIRoute } from '../../types/public/common.js';
-import { getConfiguredImageService } from '../internal.js';
-import { etag } from '../utils/etag.js';
-
-function replaceFileSystemReferences(src: string) {
-	return os.platform().includes('win32') ? src.replace(/^\/@fs\//, '') : src.replace(/^\/@fs/, '');
-}
+import { handleImageRequest } from './shared.js';
 
 async function loadLocalImage(src: string, url: URL) {
-	const assetsDirPath = fileURLToPath(assetsDir);
-
-	let fileUrl;
-	if (import.meta.env.DEV) {
-		fileUrl = pathToFileURL(removeQueryString(replaceFileSystemReferences(src)));
-	} else {
-		try {
-			// If the _image segment isn't at the start of the path, we have a base
-			const idx = url.pathname.indexOf('/_image');
-			if (idx > 0) {
-				// Remove the base path
-				src = src.slice(idx);
-			}
-			fileUrl = new URL('.' + src, outDir);
-			const filePath = fileURLToPath(fileUrl);
-
-			if (!isAbsolute(filePath) || !filePath.startsWith(assetsDirPath)) {
-				return undefined;
-			}
-		} catch {
-			return undefined;
-		}
+	// If the _image segment isn't at the start of the path, we have a base
+	const idx = url.pathname.indexOf('/_image');
+	if (idx > 0) {
+		// Remove the base path
+		src = src.slice(idx);
 	}
-
-	let buffer: Buffer | undefined = undefined;
-
-	try {
-		buffer = await readFile(fileUrl);
-	} catch {
-		// Fallback to try to load the file using `fetch`
-		try {
-			const sourceUrl = new URL(src, url.origin);
-			buffer = await loadRemoteImage(sourceUrl);
-		} catch (err: unknown) {
-			console.error('Could not process image request:', err);
-			return undefined;
-		}
+	if (!URL.canParse('.' + src, outDir)) {
+		return undefined;
+	}
+	const fileUrl = new URL('.' + src, outDir);
+	if (fileUrl.protocol !== 'file:') {
+		return undefined;
+	}
+	if (!isParentDirectory(fileURLToPath(outDir), fileURLToPath(fileUrl))) {
+		return undefined;
 	}
 
-	return buffer;
-}
-
-async function loadRemoteImage(src: URL) {
 	try {
-		const res = await fetch(src);
-
-		if (!res.ok) {
-			return undefined;
-		}
-
-		return Buffer.from(await res.arrayBuffer());
+		return await readFile(fileUrl);
 	} catch {
 		return undefined;
 	}
 }
 
+
+
 /**
  * Endpoint used in dev and SSR to serve optimized images by the base image services
  */
 export const GET: APIRoute = async ({ request }) => {
 	try {
-		const imageService = await getConfiguredImageService();
-
-		if (!('transform' in imageService)) {
-			throw new Error('Configured image service is not a local service');
-		}
-
-		const url = new URL(request.url);
-		const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);
-
-		if (!transform?.src) {
-			const err = new Error(
-				'Incorrect transform returned by `parseURL`. Expected a transform with a `src` property.',
-			);
-			console.error('Could not parse image transform from URL:', err);
-			return new Response('Internal Server Error', { status: 500 });
-		}
-
-		let inputBuffer: Buffer | undefined = undefined;
-
-		if (isRemotePath(transform.src)) {
-			if (isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) {
-				return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
-			}
-
-			inputBuffer = await loadRemoteImage(new URL(transform.src));
-		} else {
-			inputBuffer = await loadLocalImage(transform.src, url);
-		}
-
-		if (!inputBuffer) {
-			return new Response('Internal Server Error', { status: 500 });
-		}
-
-		const { data, format } = await imageService.transform(inputBuffer, transform, imageConfig);
-
-		return new Response(data as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>, {
-			status: 200,
-			headers: {
-				'Content-Type': mime.lookup(format) ?? `image/${format}`,
-				'Cache-Control': 'public, max-age=31536000',
-				ETag: etag(data.toString()),
-				Date: new Date().toUTCString(),
-			},
-		});
+		return await handleImageRequest({ request, loadLocalImage });
 	} catch (err: unknown) {
 		console.error('Could not process image request:', err);
-		return new Response(
-			import.meta.env.DEV ? `Could not process image request: ${err}` : `Internal Server Error`,
-			{
-				status: 500,
-			},
-		);
+		return new Response('Internal Server Error', {
+			status: 500,
+		});
 	}
 };

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// @ts-expect-error
+import { imageConfig } from 'astro:assets';
+import { isRemotePath, removeQueryString } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/path';
+import { isRemoteAllowed } from '@astrojs/internal-helpers/remote';
+import * as mime from 'mrmime';
+import { getConfiguredImageService } from '../internal.js';
+import { etag } from '../utils/etag.js';
+
+export async function loadRemoteImage(src: URL): Promise<Buffer | undefined> {
+	try {
+		const res = await fetch(src);
+
+		if (!res.ok) {
+			return undefined;
+		}
+
+		return Buffer.from(await res.arrayBuffer());
+	} catch {
+		return undefined;
+	}
+}
+
+export const handleImageRequest = async ({
+	request,
+	loadLocalImage,
+}: {
+	request: Request;
+	loadLocalImage: (src: string, baseUrl: URL) => Promise<Buffer | undefined>;
+}) => {
+	const imageService = await getConfiguredImageService();
+
+	if (!('transform' in imageService)) {
+		throw new Error('Configured image service is not a local service');
+	}
+
+	const url = new URL(request.url);
+	const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);
+
+	if (!transform?.src) {
+		return new Response('Invalid request', { status: 400 });
+	}
+
+	let inputBuffer: Buffer | undefined = undefined;
+
+	if (isRemotePath(transform.src)) {
+		if (!isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig)) {
+			return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
+		}
+
+		inputBuffer = await loadRemoteImage(new URL(transform.src));
+	} else {
+		inputBuffer = await loadLocalImage(removeQueryString(transform.src), url);
+	}
+
+	if (!inputBuffer) {
+		return new Response('Internal Server Error', { status: 500 });
+	}
+
+	const { data, format } = await imageService.transform(inputBuffer, transform, imageConfig);
+
+	return new Response(data as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>, {
+		status: 200,
+		headers: {
+			'Content-Type': mime.lookup(format) ?? `image/${format}`,
+			'Cache-Control': 'public, max-age=31536000',
+			ETag: etag(data.toString()),
+			Date: new Date().toUTCString(),
+		},
+	});
+};

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ export function parseQuality(quality: string): string | number {
 	return result;
 }
 
-type ImageConfig<T> = Omit<AstroConfig['image'], 'service'> & {
+export type ImageConfig<T> = Omit<AstroConfig['image'], 'service'> & {
 	service: { entrypoint: string; config: T };
 };
 
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ interface SharedServiceProps<T extends Record<string, any> = Record<string, any>
 export type ExternalImageService<T extends Record<string, any> = Record<string, any>> =
 	SharedServiceProps<T>;
 
-type LocalImageTransform = {
+export type LocalImageTransform = {
 	src: string;
 	[key: string]: any;
 };

@@ -453,31 +453,28 @@ describe('astro:image', () => {
 
 				it('includes loading and decoding attributes', () => {
 					let $img = $('#remote img');
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('loading'), true);
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('decoding'), true);
+					assert.ok($img.attr('loading'));
+					assert.ok($img.attr('decoding'));
 				});
 
 				it('includes width and height attributes', () => {
 					let $img = $('#remote img');
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('width'), true);
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('height'), true);
+					assert.ok($img.attr('width'));
+					assert.ok($img.attr('height'));
 				});
 
 				it('support data: URI', () => {
 					let $img = $('#data-uri img');
-					assert.equal(
-						$img.attr('src'),
-						'',
-					);
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('width'), true);
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('height'), true);
+					assert.ok($img.attr('src').startsWith('/_image?href=data'));
+					assert.ok($img.attr('width'));
+					assert.ok($img.attr('height'));
 				});
 
 				it('support images from public', () => {
 					let $img = $('#public img');
 					assert.equal($img.attr('src'), '/penguin3.jpg');
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('width'), true);
-					assert.equal(!!$img.attr('height'), true);
+					assert.ok($img.attr('width'));
+					assert.ok($img.attr('height'));
 				});
 			});
 
@@ -1387,6 +1384,14 @@ describe('astro:image', () => {
 			const imgData = await fixture.readFile('/client' + src, null);
 			assert.equal(imgData instanceof Buffer, true);
 		});
+
+		it('can load images from public dir', async () => {
+			const app = await fixture.loadTestAdapterApp();
+			let request = new Request('http://example.com/_image?href=/penguin3.jpg&f=webp');
+			let response = await app.render(request);
+			assert.equal(response.status, 200);
+			assert.equal(response.headers.get('content-type'), 'image/webp');
+		});
 	});
 
 	describe('trailing slash on the endpoint', () => {

@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ describe('Integration API', () => {
 							},
 							{
 								isPrerendered: false,
-								entrypoint: '../../../../dist/assets/endpoint/node.js',
+								entrypoint: '../../../../dist/assets/endpoint/dev.js',
 								pattern: '/_image',
 								params: [],
 								origin: 'internal',
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ describe('Integration API', () => {
 							},
 							{
 								isPrerendered: false,
-								entrypoint: '../../../../dist/assets/endpoint/node.js',
+								entrypoint: '../../../../dist/assets/endpoint/dev.js',
 								pattern: '/_image',
 								params: [],
 								origin: 'internal',
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ describe('Integration API', () => {
 							},
 							{
 								isPrerendered: false,
-								entrypoint: '../../../../dist/assets/endpoint/node.js',
+								entrypoint: '../../../../dist/assets/endpoint/dev.js',
 								pattern: '/_image',
 								params: [],
 								origin: 'internal',

@@ -24,5 +24,11 @@ export const GET: APIRoute = (ctx) => {
 		}
 	}
 
-	return fetch(new URL(href, ctx.url.origin));
+	const proxied = new URL(href, ctx.url.origin);
+	// Have we been tricked into thinking this is local?
+	if (proxied.origin !== ctx.url.origin) {
+		return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
+	}
+
+	return fetch(proxied);
 };

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export default function createIntegration(userOptions: UserOptions): AstroIntegr
 	return {
 		name: '@astrojs/node',
 		hooks: {
-			'astro:config:setup': async ({ updateConfig, config, logger }) => {
+			'astro:config:setup': async ({ updateConfig, config, logger, command }) => {
 				let session = config.session;
 				_config = config;
 				if (!session?.driver) {
@@ -75,7 +75,9 @@ export default function createIntegration(userOptions: UserOptions): AstroIntegr
 					image: {
 						endpoint: {
 							route: config.image.endpoint.route ?? '_image',
-							entrypoint: config.image.endpoint.entrypoint ?? 'astro/assets/endpoint/node',
+							entrypoint:
+								config.image.endpoint.entrypoint ??
+								(command === 'dev' ? 'astro/assets/endpoint/dev' : 'astro/assets/endpoint/node'),
 						},
 					},
 					session,

@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
   "private": true,
   "dependencies": {
     "@astrojs/node": "workspace:*",
-    "astro": "workspace:*"
-  },
-  "peerDependencies": {
+    "astro": "workspace:*",
     "sharp": "^0.34.3"
   },
   "scripts": {

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ describe('Image endpoint', () => {
 		await devPreview.stop();
 	});
 
-	it('it returns local images', { skip: 'Check why the infer remote size fails' }, async () => {
+	it('it returns local images', async () => {
 		const res = await fixture.fetch('/');
 		assert.equal(res.status, 200);
 		const html = await res.text();
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ describe('Image endpoint', () => {
 		assert.equal(size.height, 33);
 	});
 
-	it('it returns remote images', { skip: 'Check why the infer remote size fails' }, async () => {
+	it('it returns remote images', async () => {
 		const res = await fixture.fetch('/');
 		assert.equal(res.status, 200);
 		const html = await res.text();
@@ -51,4 +51,39 @@ describe('Image endpoint', () => {
 		assert.equal(size.width, 400);
 		assert.equal(size.height, 300);
 	});
+
+
+
+	it('refuses images from unknown domains', async () => {
+		const res = await fixture.fetch('/_image?href=https://example.com/image.jpg&w=100&h=100&f=webp&q=75');
+		assert.equal(res.status, 403);
+	});
+
+	it("refuses common URL bypasses", async () => {
+
+		for (const href of [
+			"HTTP://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"HttpS://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"//raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"//raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg?param=https://example.com",
+			"/%2fraw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"/%5craw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"/\\raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"///raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"http:\\\\raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"\\\\raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"\\raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"    https://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"\thttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"\nhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+			"\rhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/refs/heads/main/helpers/payloads/retool-xss.svg",
+		]) {
+			const res = await fixture.fetch(
+				`/_image?href=${encodeURIComponent(href)}&f=svg`
+			);
+			assert.equal(res.status, 403, `Failed on href: ${href}`);
+		}
+
+	});
+
 });

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ export function isRelativePath(path: string) {
 	return startsWithDotDotSlash(path) || startsWithDotSlash(path);
 }
 
+export function isAbsolutePath(path: string) {
+	// Unix absolute paths start with /
+	// Windows absolute paths start with drive letter (C:, D:, etc)
+	return startsWithForwardSlash(path) || /^[a-zA-Z]:/.test(path);
+}
+
 function isString(path: unknown): path is string {
 	return typeof path === 'string' || path instanceof String;
 }
@@ -102,44 +108,133 @@ export function removeQueryString(path: string) {
 }
 
 /**
- * Regex that matches the following URLs like:
- * - http://example.com
- * - https://example.com
- * - ftp://example.com
- * - ws://example.com
- * - //example.com (protocol-relative URLs)
- */
-const URL_PROTOCOL_REGEX = /^(?:(?:http|ftp|https|ws):?\/\/|\/\/)/;
-
-/**
- * Checks whether the path is considered a remote path. Paths need to start with:
- * - `http://`
- * - `https://`
- * - `ftp://`
- * - `ws://`
- * - `//` (protocol-relative URLs)
- * - `data:` (base64 images)
- * - Backslash variants (e.g., `\\example.com`) that could normalize to remote URLs
- * - URL-encoded backslash variants (e.g., `%5C%5Cexample.com`)
+ * Checks whether the path is considered a remote path.
+ * Remote means untrusted in this context, so anything that isn't a straightforward
+ * local path is considered remote.
+ * 
  * @param src
  */
 export function isRemotePath(src: string) {
-	// First decode any URL-encoded backslashes
-	const decoded = src.replace(/%5C/gi, '\\');
+	if (!src) return false;
+
+	// Trim leading/trailing whitespace
+	const trimmed = src.trim();
+	if (!trimmed) return false;
+
+	// Recursively decode URL-encoded characters to catch multi-level obfuscation
+	let decoded = trimmed;
+	let previousDecoded = '';
+	let maxIterations = 10; // Prevent infinite loops on malformed input
+
+	while (decoded !== previousDecoded && maxIterations > 0) {
+		previousDecoded = decoded;
+		try {
+			decoded = decodeURIComponent(decoded);
+		} catch {
+			// If decoding fails (e.g., invalid %), stop and use what we have
+			break;
+		}
+		maxIterations--;
+	}
 
-	// Check for any backslash at the start (single or multiple)
-	// These can be normalized to protocol-relative URLs
+	// Check for Windows paths first (C:\, D:\, C:file, etc.)
+	// This needs to be before the backslash check
+	if (/^[a-zA-Z]:/.test(decoded)) {
+		// Windows path with drive letter - always local
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	// Check for Unix absolute path (starts with / but not // or /\)
+	// This needs to be before the backslash check
+	if (decoded[0] === '/' && decoded[1] !== '/' && decoded[1] !== '\\') {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	// Any backslash at the start is probably trouble. Treat as remote.
 	if (decoded[0] === '\\') {
 		return true;
 	}
 
-	// Check for protocols with backslashes (e.g., http:\\ or https:\\)
-	if (/^(?:http|https|ftp|ws):\\/.test(decoded)) {
+	// Protocol-relative URLs are remote
+	if (decoded.startsWith('//')) {
 		return true;
 	}
 
-	// Check standard URL patterns
-	return URL_PROTOCOL_REGEX.test(decoded) || decoded.startsWith('data:');
+	// Try to parse as URL to check for protocols and credentials
+	try {
+		// Try with a mock base URL for relative URLs that might have protocols
+		const url = new URL(decoded, 'http://n');
+		// Check for credentials first - ANY URL with credentials is suspicious
+		if (url.username || url.password) {
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		if(decoded.includes('@') && (!url.pathname.includes('@') && !url.search.includes('@'))) {
+			// If the original string had an @ but it wasn't in the pathname or search,
+			// it must have been in the authority section (credentials or domain).
+			// Since we already checked for credentials, this is something dodgy.
+			return true;
+		}
+		// If the input had its own protocol, it would override the base
+		if (url.origin !== 'http://n') {
+			// It had its own protocol - check what it is
+			const protocol = url.protocol.toLowerCase();
+
+			// Only file: protocol without credentials is considered local
+			if (protocol === 'file:') {
+				return false;
+			}
+			// All other protocols are remote (http:, https:, ftp:, ws:, data:, etc.)
+			return true;
+		}
+		// If we can parse it both with and without a base URL, it's probably remote
+		if(URL.canParse(decoded)) {
+			return true;
+		}
+		return false;
+
+	} catch(e) {
+		return true
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if parentPath is a parent directory of childPath.
+ */
+export function isParentDirectory(parentPath: string, childPath: string): boolean {
+	if (!parentPath || !childPath) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	// Reject any URLs
+	if (parentPath.includes('://') || childPath.includes('://')) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	// Reject remote or suspicious paths
+	if (isRemotePath(parentPath) || isRemotePath(childPath)) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	// Don't allow any .. in paths - too risky for traversal attacks
+	if (parentPath.includes('..') || childPath.includes('..')) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	// Reject null bytes - security risk
+	if (parentPath.includes('\0') || childPath.includes('\0')) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	const normalizedParent = appendForwardSlash(slash(parentPath).toLowerCase());
+	const normalizedChild = slash(childPath).toLowerCase();
+
+	// Don't allow same path (parent can't be parent of itself)
+	if (normalizedParent === normalizedChild || normalizedParent === normalizedChild + '/') {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return normalizedChild.startsWith(normalizedParent);
 }
 
 export function slash(path: string) {

@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ export function isRemoteAllowed(
 	}
 
 	const url = new URL(src);
+
+	// Data URLs are always allowed
+	if (url.protocol === 'data:') {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	// Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed
+	if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	return (
 		domains.some((domain) => matchHostname(url, domain)) ||
 		remotePatterns.some((remotePattern) => matchPattern(url, remotePattern))

@@ -1,107 +1,778 @@
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
-import { isRemotePath } from '../dist/path.js';
+import { isParentDirectory, isRemotePath } from '../dist/path.js';
 
 describe('isRemotePath', () => {
-	it('should return true if the path is remote', () => {
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('https://example.com/foo/bar.js'), true, 'should be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('http://example.com/foo/bar.js'), true, 'should be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('//example.com/foo/bar.js'), true, 'should be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('ws://example.com/foo/bar.js'), true, 'should be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('ftp://example.com/foo/bar.js'), true, 'should be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('data:someCode'), true, 'should be a remote path');
-		// false
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('/local/path/file.js'), false, 'should not be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('relative/path/file.js'), false, 'should not be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('./relative/path/file.js'), false, 'should not be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('../relative/path/file.js'), false, 'should not be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('C:\\windows\\path\\file.js'), false, 'should not be a remote path');
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('file://example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			false,
-			'should not be a remote path',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('sftp://example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			false,
-			'should not be a remote path',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('wss://example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			false,
-			'should not be a remote path',
-		);
-		assert.equal(isRemotePath('mailto:example@example.com'), false, 'should not be a remote path');
-
-		// Backslash bypass attempts - these SHOULD be treated as remote paths
-		// to prevent SSRF via URL normalization in downstream code
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'double backslash should be detected as remote',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('\\example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'single backslash should be detected as remote',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('\\\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'triple backslash should be detected as remote',
-		);
-
-		// Encoded backslash attempts - these should also be caught
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('%5C%5Cexample.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'encoded double backslash should be detected as remote',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('%5Cexample.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'encoded single backslash should be detected as remote',
-		);
+	const remotePaths = [
+		// Standard remote protocols
+		'https://example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'http://example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'//example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'ws://example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'wss://example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'ftp://example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'sftp://example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'mailto:example@example.com',
+		'data:someCode',
+		'',
+		'data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>',
+
+		// Backslash bypass attempts
+		'\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'\\\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'\\\\\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'\\raw.githubusercontent.com/test.svg',
+		'\\\\raw.githubusercontent.com/test.svg',
+
+		// URL-encoded backslash attempts
+		'%5C%5Cexample.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'%5Cexample.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'%5c%5cexample.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'%5cexample.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'%5C%5C%5Cexample.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'%5C%5C%5C%5Cexample.com/foo/bar.js',
+
+		// Mixed encoding
+		'%5C\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'\\%5Cexample.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'%5c\\example.com/test',
 
 		// Mixed forward and backslashes
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('\\//example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'mixed backslash-forward should be detected as remote',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('/\\example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			false,
-			'forward-backslash in path should not be remote',
-		);
-
-		// Backslashes with protocols (malformed but could be normalized)
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('http:\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'http with backslashes should be detected as remote',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('https:\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'https with backslashes should be detected as remote',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('http:\\example.com/foo/bar.js'),
-			true,
-			'http with single backslash should be detected as remote',
-		);
-
-		// Other backslash edge cases
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('\\raw.githubusercontent.com/test.svg'),
-			true,
-			'backslash with real domain should be detected as remote',
-		);
-		assert.equal(
-			isRemotePath('\\\\raw.githubusercontent.com/test.svg'),
-			true,
-			'double backslash with real domain should be detected as remote',
-		);
+		'\\//example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'\\//\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'/\\example.com/foo/bar.js', // Forward then backslash - suspicious
+		'/\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js', // Forward then double backslash - suspicious
+
+		// Protocol with backslashes
+		'http:\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'https:\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'http:\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'https:\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'ftp:\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'ws:\\\\example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'wss:\\\\example.com/test', // WSS with backslashes
+		'sftp:\\\\example.com/test', // SFTP with backslashes
+		'HTTP:\\\\example.com/test',
+		'HtTp:\\\\example.com/test',
+
+		// Unicode escapes
+		'\u005C\u005Cexample.com/test',
+		'\u005Cexample.com/test',
+		'\\u005C\\u005Cexample.com/test',
+
+		// Null byte injection
+		'\\example.com%00.jpg',
+		'%5Cexample.com%00.jpg',
+		'\\example.com\x00.jpg',
+
+		// Whitespace injection
+		'\\\texample.com/test',
+		'\\ example.com/test',
+		'\\%09example.com/test',
+		'\\%20example.com/test',
+
+		// Newline/carriage return injection
+		'\\\nexample.com/test',
+		'\\\rexample.com/test',
+		'\\%0Aexample.com/test',
+		'\\%0Dexample.com/test',
+
+		// IP addresses
+		'http://192.168.1.1/test',
+		'//192.168.1.1/test',
+		'\\\\192.168.1.1/test',
+		'http://[::1]/test',
+		'http://[2001:db8::1]/test',
+		'//[::1]/test',
+		'\\\\[::1]/test',
+
+		// Localhost
+		'http://localhost/test',
+		'//localhost/test',
+		'\\\\localhost/test',
+		'http://127.0.0.1/test',
+		'\\\\127.0.0.1/test',
+
+		// With ports
+		'http://example.com:8080/test',
+		'//example.com:8080/test',
+		'\\\\example.com:8080/test',
+		'http:\\\\example.com:8080/test',
+
+		// With auth - basic credential attacks
+		'http://user:pass@example.com/test',
+		'//user:pass@example.com/test',
+		'\\\\user:pass@example.com/test',
+
+		// Credential injection attempts to look like local paths
+		'//admin:admin@/var/www/html', // Protocol-relative with path-like ending
+		'\\\\admin:password@C:\\Windows\\System32', // UNC-style with Windows path
+		'user:pass@/home/user/file.js', // No protocol but has creds and Unix path
+		'admin:admin@C:\\Users\\Public', // No protocol but has creds and Windows path
+		'//user@/local/path', // Single user@ with local-looking path
+		'\\\\user@C:\\Program Files', // Backslash variant
+
+		// Encoded credentials to bypass detection
+		'http://%75ser:%70ass@example.com', // URL-encoded "user:pass"
+		'http://user%3Apass@example.com', // Encoded colon in creds
+		'http://user:pass%40example.com', // Encoded @ in password
+		'//%75%73%65%72:%70%61%73%73@example.com', // Fully encoded creds
+		'\\\\%75ser:%70ass@example.com', // Backslash with encoded creds
+
+		// Double/triple encoding credentials
+		'http://%2575ser:%2570ass@example.com', // Double encoded
+		'http://%252575ser:%252570ass@example.com', // Triple encoded
+
+		// Credentials with special characters trying to break parsing
+		'http://user:p@ss@example.com', // @ in password
+		'http://user:pass:extra@example.com', // Multiple colons
+		'http://user::@example.com', // Empty password with double colon
+		'http://:password@example.com', // Empty username
+		'http://@example.com', // Just @ symbol
+		'//user:@example.com', // Empty password
+		'//:pass@example.com', // Empty username protocol-relative
+
+		// Credentials with path traversal
+		'http://user:../../../etc/passwd@example.com', // Path traversal in password
+		'http://../../admin:pass@example.com', // Path traversal in username
+		'//user:pass@example.com/../../etc/passwd', // Creds with traversal after
+
+		// Credentials with null bytes and special chars
+		'http://user%00:pass@example.com', // Null byte in username
+		'http://user:pass%00@example.com', // Null byte in password
+		'http://user\x00:pass@example.com', // Hex null byte
+		'http://user:pass\0@example.com', // Escaped null
+
+		// OAuth/API key patterns that might be confused
+		'http://oauth2:CLIENT_SECRET_HERE@example.com',
+		'http://api_key:SECRET_KEY_123@example.com',
+		'//token:eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9@example.com', // JWT-like
+
+		// Credentials with port confusion
+		'http://user:pass@example.com:8080', // Standard with port
+		'http://user:8080@example.com', // Port-like password
+		'http://admin:3306@localhost', // MySQL port as password
+		'//root:22@server.com', // SSH port as password
+
+		// Unicode in credentials
+		'http://üser:pāss@example.com', // Unicode username/password
+		'http://用户:密码@example.com', // Chinese characters
+		'http://админ:пароль@example.com', // Cyrillic
+		'http://\u0075ser:\u0070ass@example.com', // Unicode escapes
+
+		// Homograph attacks in credentials
+		'http://аdmin:pаssword@example.com', // Cyrillic 'а' looks like Latin 'a'
+		'http://adⅿin:password@example.com', // Unicode small m lookalike
+
+		// Large credentials trying to overflow
+		'http://' + 'a'.repeat(1000) + ':' + 'b'.repeat(1000) + '@example.com',
+		'//' + 'x'.repeat(10000) + '@example.com', // Massive username
+
+		// Mixed slashes with credentials
+		'http:\\//user:pass@example.com', // Mixed slashes in protocol
+		'http://user:pass@example.com\\path', // Mixed slashes in path
+		'\\//user:pass@example.com', // Backslash then protocol-relative
+
+		// Credentials to bypass startsWith checks
+		// These try to trick checks like if(path.startsWith('/home')) or if(path.startsWith('src/'))
+		'//user:pass@/home/user/file.js', // Looks like /home but has protocol-relative with creds
+		'//token@/usr/local/bin', // Looks like /usr but is protocol-relative
+		'//api:key@/etc/passwd', // Looks like /etc but has creds
+		'//admin@/var/www/html/index.html', // Looks like /var but has creds
+		'//root@src/index.js', // Looks like src/ but protocol-relative with creds
+		'//user@public/assets/logo.png', // Looks like public/ but has creds
+		'//deploy@dist/bundle.js', // Looks like dist/ but has creds
+		'//ci:token@node_modules/package', // Looks like node_modules/ but has creds
+
+		// Using credentials patterns that parse as valid URLs
+		'user:pass@localhost/admin', // Credentials with localhost
+		'admin:admin@127.0.0.1:8080', // Credentials with IP and port
+		'root:toor@evil.com/payload', // Clear credential pattern
+
+		// Credentials with localhost/127.0.0.1 to look local
+		'//admin:admin@localhost/admin', // Localhost but still remote protocol
+		'//root:toor@127.0.0.1/phpmyadmin', // Loopback but still remote
+		'//user@localhost:3000/api', // Localhost with port
+		'//dev:dev@[::1]/graphql', // IPv6 localhost
+		'//test@0.0.0.0/test', // 0.0.0.0 binding address
+
+		// File URLs with @ trying to look like local paths
+		'file://user@/etc/hosts', // file:// but with user@
+		'file://admin:pass@localhost/C:/Windows/System32', // file:// localhost Windows
+		'file://root@127.0.0.1/home/user', // file:// with IP
+
+		// Encoded credentials in paths that might decode to look local
+		'//%2F%2Fhome/user', // Encoded // at start: //home/user
+		'//%2Fetc%2Fpasswd@evil.com', // Encoded /etc/passwd@evil.com
+		'%2F%2Fadmin:admin@/var/log', // Encoded //admin:admin@/var/log
+		'//%252Fhome%252Fuser@evil.com', // Double encoded /home/user
+
+		// Vite-like paths with credentials (trying to bypass Vite path detection)
+		'//user@/@fs/home/user/project', // Vite /@fs/ with creds before
+		'//admin@/@id/virtual:module', // Vite /@id/ with creds
+		'//dev@/@vite/client', // Vite client with creds
+		'//@react-refresh', // Vite React refresh with just @
+
+		// Query strings and fragments
+		'http://example.com/test?param=value',
+		'\\\\example.com/test?param=value',
+		'http://example.com/test#fragment',
+		'\\\\example.com/test#fragment',
+
+		// Edge cases with dots
+		'http://example..com/test',
+		'\\\\example..com/test',
+		'http://.example.com/test',
+		'\\\\.example.com/test',
+
+		// Long domains
+		'\\\\' + 'a'.repeat(1000) + '.com/test',
+		'http://' + 'a'.repeat(1000) + '.com/test',
+
+		// Minimal cases
+		'\\', // Single backslash
+		'\\\\', // Double backslash
+		'//', // Protocol-relative
+		'http://',
+		'https://',
+		'data:',
+
+		// Path traversal
+		'http://example.com/./../../test',
+		'\\\\example.com/./../../test',
+		'http://example.com/%2e%2e/test',
+		'\\\\example.com/%2e%2e/test',
+
+		// Windows special paths
+		'\\\\?\\C:\\test',
+		'\\\\.\\pipe\\test',
+		'\\\\LOCALHOST\\share',
+		'\\\\127.0.0.1\\share',
+
+		// Punycode and Unicode domains
+		'http://xn--e1afmkfd.xn--p1ai/test',
+		'\\\\xn--e1afmkfd.xn--p1ai/test',
+		'http://例え.jp/test',
+		'\\\\例え.jp/test',
+
+		// Case variations
+		'HtTp://example.com/test',
+		'HTTP://example.com/test',
+		'DATA:text/plain,hello', // Uppercase data URL
+		'Data:text/plain,test', // Mixed case data URL
+		'dAtA:text/plain,test', // Weird case data URL
+
+		// Mixed slashes in protocols
+		'http:\\//example.com/test',
+		'https:/\\example.com/test',
+		'ftp://\\example.com/test',
+		'ws:\\//example.com/test',
+
+		// Brackets
+		'http://[example.com]/test',
+		'\\\\[example.com]/test',
+		'http://(example.com)/test',
+		'\\\\(example.com)/test',
+
+		// Malformed but has protocol prefix (conservative: treated as remote)
+		'http:%2F%2Fexample.com/test', // Encoded slashes after colon
+
+		// JavaScript and other dangerous protocols
+		'javascript:alert(1)',
+		'JavaScript:alert(1)', // Case variant
+		'vbscript:msgbox',
+		'data:application/javascript,alert(1)',
+		'jar:http://example.com/evil.jar!/',
+		'view-source:http://example.com',
+		'about:blank',
+		'blob:http://example.com/uuid',
+		'filesystem:http://example.com/temp/',
+
+		// Browser/app specific protocols
+		'chrome://settings',
+		'chrome-extension://abc/page.html',
+		'moz-extension://abc/page.html',
+		'safari-extension://abc/page.html',
+		'opera://settings',
+		'edge://settings',
+		'resource://gre/modules/',
+
+		// Other network protocols
+		'git://github.com/user/repo.git',
+		'ssh://user@host.com',
+		'telnet://host.com',
+		'gopher://example.com',
+		'redis://localhost:6379',
+		'mongodb://localhost:27017',
+		'postgresql://localhost:5432',
+		'mysql://localhost:3306',
+		'ldap://example.com',
+		'nntp://news.example.com',
+
+		// Mobile/communication protocols
+		'tel:+1234567890',
+		'sms:+1234567890',
+		'mailto:test@test.com', // Already in list but keeping for completeness
+
+		// Authority confusion with @
+		'http://google.com@evil.com',
+		'http://user:pass@good.com@evil.com',
+		'//google.com@evil.com',
+		'\\\\google.com@evil.com',
+
+		// Windows UNC paths that could be URL bypass attempts
+		'\\\\example.com\\share\\file.js', // Could be //example.com
+		'\\\\evil.com\\payload', // Could be //evil.com
+		'\\\\localhost\\share\\file.js', // Even localhost could be suspicious
+		'\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\windows', // IP-based UNC
+		'\\\\LOCALHOST\\pipe\\test', // Uppercase variant
+		'\\Program Files\\app', // Single backslash - ambiguous
+		'\\Users\\Public\\Documents', // Single backslash - ambiguous
+		'\\\\?\\C:\\very\\long\\path', // Windows long path (treating as remote for safety)
+		'\\\\.\\COM1', // Device path (treating as remote for safety)
+		'\\\\.\\pipe\\pipename', // Named pipe (treating as remote for safety)
+
+		// Encoded @ attempts
+		'http://example.com%40evil.com/path',
+		'http://example.com%2540evil.com/path', // Double encoded @
+
+		// IP address encoding tricks
+		'http://2130706433/', // 127.0.0.1 as decimal
+		'http://0x7f.0x0.0x0.0x1/', // 127.0.0.1 as hex
+		'http://0177.0.0.1/', // 127.0.0.1 partial octal
+		'http://127.1/', // Short form IP
+		'http://127.0.1/', // Another short form
+		'http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/', // IPv4-mapped IPv6
+
+		'http://\0example.com', // Null before domain
+
+		// Multiple slashes and dots
+		'http:///example.com', // Triple slash
+		'http:////example.com', // Quad slash
+		'http://example.com..', // Double dots at end
+		'http://example.com./', // Dot slash at end
+		'http://example.com./.', // Multiple dots
+		'http://.example.com', // Leading dot (handled earlier but different context)
+
+
+		// Relative URLs that look suspicious
+		'http:example.com', // Missing slashes (relative URL in HTTP context)
+		'https:example.com', // Missing slashes
+		'//http://example.com', // Protocol-relative with protocol
+		'////example.com', // Multiple slashes
+
+		// Case sensitivity edge cases for data URLs
+		'DATA:,test',
+		'dAtA:,test',
+		'DaTa:,test',
+
+		'http:/\\example.com', // Mixed slash backslash (this is actually http:/\example.com)
+
+	];
+
+	const localPaths = [
+		// Standard Unix/Linux absolute paths
+		'/local/path/file.js',
+		'/usr/local/bin/node',
+		'/home/user/projects/app.js',
+		'/var/www/html/index.html',
+		'/opt/application/config.json',
+		'/tmp/build-output.js',
+		'/dev/null',
+		'/proc/self/exe',
+		'/etc/hosts',
+
+		// macOS specific paths
+		'/System/Library/Frameworks',
+		'/Applications/App.app/Contents',
+		'/Users/username/Documents',
+		'/Volumes/External Drive/file.js',
+		'/private/tmp/file.js',
+		'/Library/Application Support/app',
+
+		// Standard relative paths
+		'relative/path/file.js',
+		'./relative/path/file.js',
+		'../relative/path/file.js',
+		'../../parent/parent/file.js',
+		'./file.js',
+		'../file.js',
+		'file.js',
+		'index.html',
+		'src/components/Button.tsx',
+		'node_modules/package/dist/index.js',
+		'dist/assets/index-abc123.js',
+
+		// Single dot paths
+		'.',
+		'./',
+		'./.',
+
+		// Double dot paths
+		'..',
+		'../',
+		'../.',
+
+		// Windows absolute paths (various formats)
+		'C:\\windows\\path\\file.js',
+		'C:/windows/path/file.js', // Forward slashes on Windows
+		'D:\\Program Files\\app\\main.exe',
+		'E:/Projects/web/index.html',
+		'Z:\\network\\share\\file.doc',
+
+		// Windows drive-relative paths (uncommon but valid)
+		'C:file.txt', // Relative to current directory on C:
+		'D:folder\\file.js',
+
+		// file:// protocol is local (all variations)
+		'file://example.com/foo/bar.js',
+		'file:', // Just file protocol
+		'file://', // File with slashes
+		'file:///', // File with triple slash (absolute path)
+		'file:////', // File with quad slash
+		'file://///server/share', // UNC path via file protocol
+		'File://example.com', // Uppercase file
+		'FILE://example.com', // All caps file
+		'fILe://example.com', // Mixed case file
+
+		// file:// with backslashes is still local
+		'file:\\\\example.com/test',
+
+		// file:// URLs with legitimate @ symbols (NOT credentials)
+		'file:///home/user/package@1.0.0.tgz', // NPM package file
+		'file:///Users/dev/icon@2x.png', // Retina image file
+		'file:///C:/Projects/@company/app/index.js', // Scoped package path
+		'file:///var/cache/@cache_key.dat', // Cache file with @
+		'file://localhost/home/backup@2024.sql', // Backup file
+		'file:///opt/app/sprite@mobile.css', // Responsive asset
+		'file:///D:/Work/email@example.com.txt', // Email as filename
+		'file:///home/user/@types/node/index.d.ts', // TypeScript defs
+		'file:///app/test@integration.spec.js', // Test file
+		'file:///Users/john/logo@dark@2x.png', // Multiple @ in name
+
+		// Vite-specific paths (all should be local)
+		'/@fs/local/path/file.js',
+		'/@fs/C:/Users/project/src/main.js',
+		'/@fs/Users/mac/project/src/app.vue',
+		'/@id/local/path/file.js',
+		'/@id/__x00__virtual:file',
+		'/@vite/client',
+		'/@vite/env',
+		'/@react-refresh',
+		'/node_modules/.vite/deps/vue.js',
+		'/node_modules/.vite/deps/_metadata.json',
+		'/__vite_ping',
+		'/src/main.ts?t=1234567890',
+		'/src/assets/logo.png?import',
+		'/src/styles.css?direct',
+		'/@modules/my-package',
+		'/~partytown/debug/partytown.js',
+
+		// Fragment and query strings without protocols (local)
+		'#http://evil.com',
+		'#//evil.com',
+		'?http://evil.com',
+		'?//evil.com',
+
+		// Paths with spaces (valid local paths)
+		'/path with spaces/file.js',
+		'C:\\Program Files (x86)\\app\\file.exe',
+		'./folder with spaces/index.html',
+		'/Users/John Doe/Documents/file.txt',
+		'My Documents\\Projects\\app.js',
+
+		// Paths with special characters
+		'/path/to/file-name_2023.test.js',
+		'/path/to/file@2x.png',
+		'/path/to/file#1.js',
+		// Legitimate @ in filenames (NOT credentials)
+		'package@1.0.0.tgz', // NPM package versioning
+		'user@2x.png', // Retina image naming
+		'icon@3x.png', // iOS asset naming
+		'logo@2x@dark.png', // Multiple @ in filename
+		'@babel/core/lib/index.js', // Scoped package path
+		'/@babel/preset-env', // Scoped package in node_modules
+		'node_modules/@types/node/index.d.ts', // TypeScript definitions
+		'./@company/shared-ui/Button.tsx', // Monorepo package
+		'packages/@my-org/utils/index.js', // Lerna/workspace package
+		'email@example.com.txt', // Email as filename
+		'backup@2023-12-01.sql', // Backup file naming
+		'snapshot@latest.json', // Version/tag in filename
+		'test@integration.spec.js', // Test file naming
+		'sprite@mobile.css', // Responsive asset naming
+		'/var/cache/nginx/@cache_key', // Cache files with @
+		'/path/to/[bracketed]/file.js',
+		'/path/to/(parentheses)/file.js',
+		'/path/to/file$.js',
+		'/path/to/file+plus.js',
+		'/path/to/file=equals.js',
+		'/path/to/file&ampersand.js',
+		'/path/to/file,comma.js',
+		'/path/to/file;semicolon.js',
+		"/path/to/file'quote.js",
+		'/path/to/file`backtick.js',
+		'C:\\Users\\user!\\file%.txt',
+
+		// Paths with Unicode characters
+		'/用户/文档/文件.js',
+		'/путь/к/файлу.js',
+		'/مسار/إلى/ملف.js',
+		'/パス/ファイル.js',
+		'/경로/파일.js',
+		'C:\\文档\\项目\\app.js',
+
+		// Query parameters on local paths (common in dev servers)
+		'/src/main.js?v=12345',
+		'/assets/style.css?inline',
+		'/image.png?w=500&h=300',
+		'./component.vue?type=template',
+		'../styles/theme.scss?module',
+
+		// Hash fragments on local paths
+		'/docs/guide.html#introduction',
+		'/app.js#section',
+		'./page.html#top',
+		'index.html#/route/path',
+
+		// Edge case: paths that look like URLs but aren't
+		'http', // Just the word http as a filename
+		'https', // Just the word https as a filename
+		'ftp', // Just the word ftp as a filename
+		'ws', // Just the word ws as a filename
+		'C:http', // Windows drive with filename http
+		'./http', // Relative path to file named http
+		'../https', // Parent directory file named https
+
+		// Paths starting with URL-like strings but no protocol separator
+		'httpserver/file.js',
+		'https_server/file.js',
+		'ftpd/config.json',
+		'wss_module/index.js',
+		'data-processor/file.js',
+		'javascript-files/app.js',
+
+		// Build tool specific paths
+		'/.next/static/chunks/main.js',
+		'/_next/data/buildid/page.json',
+		'/.nuxt/dist/client/app.js',
+		'/public/build/bundle.js',
+		'/static/js/main.chunk.js',
+		'/dist/assets/index.js',
+		'/_app/immutable/chunks/index.js', // SvelteKit
+		'/.svelte-kit/generated/client/app.js',
+
+		// Package manager paths
+		'node_modules/react/index.js',
+		'.pnpm/react@18.0.0/node_modules/react/index.js',
+		'.yarn/cache/package.zip',
+		'bower_components/jquery/dist/jquery.js',
+
+		// Paths with multiple dots
+		'../../../file.js',
+		'./././file.js',
+		'.../weird/path.js', // Triple dots (valid but unusual)
+		'file...js', // Multiple dots in filename
+		'file.test.spec.js', // Multiple extensions
+
+		// Invalid/malformed encodings (should handle gracefully)
+		'%%36%38ttp://example.com', // Invalid double %
+		'%GGexample.com', // Invalid hex characters
+		'%1', // Incomplete encoding
+		'%', // Just a percent sign
+		'%%%', // Multiple percent signs
+
+		// Empty string
+		'',
+	];
+
+	it('should correctly identify remote paths', () => {
+		remotePaths.forEach((path) => {
+			assert.equal(isRemotePath(path), true, `Expected "${path}" to be remote`);
+		});
+	});
+
+	it('should correctly identify local paths', () => {
+		localPaths.forEach((path) => {
+			assert.equal(isRemotePath(path), false, `Expected "${path}" to be local`);
+		});
+	});
+});
+
+describe('isParentDirectory', () => {
+	it('should correctly identify parent-child relationships', () => {
+		const validCases = [
+			// Unix absolute paths
+			['/home', '/home/user'],
+			['/home', '/home/user/documents'],
+			['/home/user', '/home/user/documents/file.txt'],
+			['/var', '/var/www/html/index.html'],
+			['/usr/local', '/usr/local/bin/node'],
+			['/', '/home'],
+			['/', '/usr/local/bin'],
+
+			// Unix relative paths
+			['src', 'src/components'],
+			['src', 'src/components/Button.tsx'],
+			['.', './file.js'],
+			['.', './src/index.js'],
+
+			// Windows absolute paths
+			['C:\\Users', 'C:\\Users\\Admin'],
+			['C:\\Users', 'C:\\Users\\Admin\\Documents'],
+			['C:\\', 'C:\\Windows\\System32'],
+			['D:\\Projects', 'D:\\Projects\\app\\src\\main.js'],
+			['C:/', 'C:/Windows/System32'], // Forward slashes on Windows
+
+			// Windows relative paths
+			['src', 'src\\components'],
+			['.', '.\\file.js'],
+
+			// Mixed slashes (normalized internally)
+			['C:/Users', 'C:\\Users\\Admin\\Documents'],
+			['/home/user', '/home/user\\documents'],
+
+			// Paths with single dots that resolve correctly
+			['/home', '/home/./user'],
+			['src', 'src/./components'],
+
+			// Case insensitive for Windows
+			['c:\\users', 'C:\\Users\\Admin'],
+			['C:\\USERS', 'c:\\users\\admin'],
+
+			// Very long paths (valid parent-child)
+			['/' + 'a'.repeat(1000), '/' + 'a'.repeat(1000) + '/b'],
+		];
+
+		validCases.forEach(([parent, child]) => {
+			assert.equal(
+				isParentDirectory(parent, child),
+				true,
+				`Expected "${parent}" to be parent of "${child}"`,
+			);
+		});
+	});
+
+	it('should correctly reject non-parent relationships', () => {
+		const invalidCases = [
+			// Different directories
+			['/home', '/usr'],
+			['/home/user', '/home/otheruser'],
+			['src/components', 'src/utils'],
+			['C:\\Users', 'C:\\Windows'],
+
+			// Child is not descendant
+			['/home/user/documents', '/home/user'], // Parent longer than child
+			['src/components/Button', 'src/components'], // Parent longer
+			['/home/user', '/home'], // Reversed relationship
+
+			// Different drives on Windows
+			['C:\\Users', 'D:\\Users'],
+			['C:\\', 'D:\\'],
+
+			// Absolute vs relative
+			['/home', 'home'],
+			['C:\\Users', 'Users'],
+			['home', '/home'],
+
+			// Path traversal attempts
+			['/home', '/etc/../home/user'], // Resolves to /home/user but starts elsewhere
+			['/restricted', '/restricted/../../../etc/passwd'], // Traversal outside
+
+			// Empty or null paths
+			['', '/home'],
+			['/home', ''],
+			['', ''],
+			[null, '/home'],
+			['/home', null],
+			[undefined, '/home'],
+
+			// Same path (not parent-child)
+			['/home/user', '/home/user'],
+			['src', 'src'],
+			['C:\\Users', 'C:\\Users'],
+
+			// Partial name match but not parent
+			['/home', '/homepage'],
+			['/home', '/home2'],
+			['src', 'src2'],
+			['test', 'test-utils'],
+
+			// Special characters and null bytes
+			['/home\0', '/home/user'],
+			['/home', '/home\0/user'],
+			['/home', '/home/\0user'],
+		];
+
+		invalidCases.forEach(([parent, child]) => {
+			assert.equal(
+				isParentDirectory(parent, child),
+				false,
+				`Expected "${parent}" NOT to be parent of "${child}"`,
+			);
+		});
+	});
+
+	it('should handle adversarial inputs safely', () => {
+		const adversarialCases = [
+			// Path traversal attacks
+			['/safe', '/safe/../../../etc/passwd'],
+			['/app', '/app/../../../../root/.ssh'],
+			['C:\\Safe', 'C:\\Safe\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32'],
+
+			// URL-like paths
+			['http://evil.com', 'http://evil.com/payload'],
+			['//evil.com', '//evil.com/hack'],
+			['file://host', 'file://host/etc/passwd'],
+
+			// Encoded paths
+			['/home', '/%2e%2e/home/user'], // Encoded ..
+			['/home', '/home%2Fuser'], // Encoded /
+
+			// Very long paths that don't match
+			['/short', '/' + 'a'.repeat(10000)],
+
+			// Symlink-like patterns
+			['/real', '/real/../../symlink/target'],
+			['/app', '/app/node_modules/.bin/../../../outside'],
+
+			// Credentials in paths
+			['/home/safe', 'file:///home/safe/user:@/etc/passwd'],
+			['C:\\Safe', 'file:///C:\\Safe\\user:@\\Windows\\System32'],
+		];
+
+		adversarialCases.forEach(([parent, child]) => {
+			// Should safely return false for all adversarial inputs
+			assert.equal(
+				isParentDirectory(parent, child),
+				false,
+				`Expected adversarial input "${parent}" vs "${child}" to return false safely`,
+			);
+		});
+	});
+
+	it('should handle edge cases correctly', () => {
+		// Root paths
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('/', '/home'), true);
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('/', '/'), false); // Same path
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('C:\\', 'C:\\Windows'), true);
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('C:\\', 'C:\\'), false);
+
+		// Current directory
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('.', './src'), true);
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('.', '.'), false);
+
+		// Parent directory references not allowed (.. paths rejected)
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('..', '../src'), false);
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('../..', '../../src/main.js'), false);
+
+		// Trailing slashes
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('/home/', '/home/user'), true);
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('/home', '/home/user/'), true);
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('/home/', '/home/user/'), true);
+
+		// Multiple slashes
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('/home', '/home//user'), true);
+		assert.equal(isParentDirectory('/home', '/home///user///docs'), true);
 	});
 });

@@ -5649,6 +5649,9 @@ importers:
       astro:
         specifier: workspace:*
         version: link:../../../../../astro
+      sharp:
+        specifier: ^0.34.3
+        version: 0.34.3
 
   packages/integrations/node/test/fixtures/locals:
     dependencies: