CVE-2025-61672
Description
Synapse is an open source Matrix homeserver implementation. Lack of validation for device keys in Synapse before 1.138.3 and in Synapse 1.139.0 allow an attacker registered on the victim homeserver to degrade federation functionality, unpredictably breaking outbound federation to other homeservers. The issue is patched in Synapse 1.138.3, 1.138.4, 1.139.1, and 1.139.2. Note that even though 1.138.3 and 1.139.1 fix the vulnerability, they inadvertently introduced an unrelated regression. For this reason, the maintainers of Synapse recommend skipping these releases and upgrading straight to 1.138.4 and 1.139.2.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
matrix-synapsePyPI | < 1.138.3 | 1.138.3 |
matrix-synapsePyPI | >= 1.139.0rc2, < 1.139.1 | 1.139.1 |
Affected products
1- Range: hhs-1, hhs-2, hhs-3, …
Patches
226aaaf9e48ffValidate the body of requests to `/keys/upload` (#17097)
4 files changed · +280 −8
changelog.d/17097.misc+1 −0 added@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Extend validation of uploaded device keys. \ No newline at end of file
synapse/handlers/e2e_keys.py+11 −5 modified@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) - ONE_TIME_KEY_UPLOAD = "one_time_key_upload_lock" @@ -848,14 +847,22 @@ async def upload_keys_for_user( """ time_now = self.clock.time_msec() - # TODO: Validate the JSON to make sure it has the right keys. device_keys = keys.get("device_keys", None) if device_keys: + log_kv( + { + "message": "Updating device_keys for user.", + "user_id": user_id, + "device_id": device_id, + } + ) await self.upload_device_keys_for_user( user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, keys={"device_keys": device_keys}, ) + else: + log_kv({"message": "Did not update device_keys", "reason": "not a dict"}) one_time_keys = keys.get("one_time_keys", None) if one_time_keys: @@ -873,8 +880,9 @@ async def upload_keys_for_user( log_kv( {"message": "Did not update one_time_keys", "reason": "no keys given"} ) + fallback_keys = keys.get("fallback_keys") - if fallback_keys and isinstance(fallback_keys, dict): + if fallback_keys: log_kv( { "message": "Updating fallback_keys for device.", @@ -883,8 +891,6 @@ async def upload_keys_for_user( } ) await self.store.set_e2e_fallback_keys(user_id, device_id, fallback_keys) - elif fallback_keys: - log_kv({"message": "Did not update fallback_keys", "reason": "not a dict"}) else: log_kv( {"message": "Did not update fallback_keys", "reason": "no keys given"}
synapse/rest/client/keys.py+147 −3 modified@@ -23,10 +23,19 @@ import logging import re from collections import Counter -from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, Optional, Tuple +from http import HTTPStatus +from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, List, Mapping, Optional, Tuple, Union +from typing_extensions import Self + +from synapse._pydantic_compat import ( + StrictBool, + StrictStr, + validator, +) from synapse.api.auth.mas import MasDelegatedAuth from synapse.api.errors import ( + Codes, InteractiveAuthIncompleteError, InvalidAPICallError, SynapseError, @@ -37,11 +46,13 @@ parse_integer, parse_json_object_from_request, parse_string, + validate_json_object, ) from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest from synapse.logging.opentracing import log_kv, set_tag from synapse.rest.client._base import client_patterns, interactive_auth_handler from synapse.types import JsonDict, StreamToken +from synapse.types.rest import RequestBodyModel from synapse.util.cancellation import cancellable if TYPE_CHECKING: @@ -59,7 +70,6 @@ class KeyUploadServlet(RestServlet): "device_keys": { "user_id": "<user_id>", "device_id": "<device_id>", - "valid_until_ts": <millisecond_timestamp>, "algorithms": [ "m.olm.curve25519-aes-sha2", ] @@ -111,12 +121,123 @@ def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"): self._clock = hs.get_clock() self._store = hs.get_datastores().main + class KeyUploadRequestBody(RequestBodyModel): + """ + The body of a `POST /_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload` request. + + Based on https://spec.matrix.org/v1.16/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysupload. + """ + + class DeviceKeys(RequestBodyModel): + algorithms: List[StrictStr] + """The encryption algorithms supported by this device.""" + + device_id: StrictStr + """The ID of the device these keys belong to. Must match the device ID used when logging in.""" + + keys: Mapping[StrictStr, StrictStr] + """ + Public identity keys. The names of the properties should be in the + format `<algorithm>:<device_id>`. The keys themselves should be encoded as + specified by the key algorithm. + """ + + signatures: Mapping[StrictStr, Mapping[StrictStr, StrictStr]] + """Signatures for the device key object. A map from user ID, to a map from "<algorithm>:<device_id>" to the signature.""" + + user_id: StrictStr + """The ID of the user the device belongs to. Must match the user ID used when logging in.""" + + class KeyObject(RequestBodyModel): + key: StrictStr + """The key, encoded using unpadded base64.""" + + fallback: Optional[StrictBool] = False + """Whether this is a fallback key. Only used when handling fallback keys.""" + + signatures: Mapping[StrictStr, Mapping[StrictStr, StrictStr]] + """Signature for the device. Mapped from user ID to another map of key signing identifier to the signature itself. + + See the following for more detail: https://spec.matrix.org/v1.16/appendices/#signing-details + """ + + device_keys: Optional[DeviceKeys] = None + """Identity keys for the device. May be absent if no new identity keys are required.""" + + fallback_keys: Optional[Mapping[StrictStr, Union[StrictStr, KeyObject]]] + """ + The public key which should be used if the device's one-time keys are + exhausted. The fallback key is not deleted once used, but should be + replaced when additional one-time keys are being uploaded. The server + will notify the client of the fallback key being used through `/sync`. + + There can only be at most one key per algorithm uploaded, and the server + will only persist one key per algorithm. + + When uploading a signed key, an additional fallback: true key should be + included to denote that the key is a fallback key. + + May be absent if a new fallback key is not required. + """ + + @validator("fallback_keys", pre=True) + def validate_fallback_keys(cls: Self, v: Any) -> Any: + if v is None: + return v + if not isinstance(v, dict): + raise TypeError("fallback_keys must be a mapping") + + for k in v.keys(): + if not len(k.split(":")) == 2: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg=f"Invalid fallback_keys key {k!r}. " + 'Expected "<algorithm>:<device_id>".', + ) + return v + + one_time_keys: Optional[Mapping[StrictStr, Union[StrictStr, KeyObject]]] = None + """ + One-time public keys for "pre-key" messages. The names of the properties + should be in the format `<algorithm>:<key_id>`. + + The format of the key is determined by the key algorithm, see: + https://spec.matrix.org/v1.16/client-server-api/#key-algorithms. + """ + + @validator("one_time_keys", pre=True) + def validate_one_time_keys(cls: Self, v: Any) -> Any: + if v is None: + return v + if not isinstance(v, dict): + raise TypeError("one_time_keys must be a mapping") + + for k, _ in v.items(): + if not len(k.split(":")) == 2: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg=f"Invalid one_time_keys key {k!r}. " + 'Expected "<algorithm>:<device_id>".', + ) + return v + async def on_POST( self, request: SynapseRequest, device_id: Optional[str] ) -> Tuple[int, JsonDict]: requester = await self.auth.get_user_by_req(request, allow_guest=True) user_id = requester.user.to_string() + + # Parse the request body. Validate separately, as the handler expects a + # plain dict, rather than any parsed object. + # + # Note: It would be nice to work with a parsed object, but the handler + # needs to encode portions of the request body as canonical JSON before + # storing the result in the DB. There's little point in converted to a + # parsed object and then back to a dict. body = parse_json_object_from_request(request) + validate_json_object(body, self.KeyUploadRequestBody) if device_id is not None: # Providing the device_id should only be done for setting keys @@ -149,8 +270,31 @@ async def on_POST( 400, "To upload keys, you must pass device_id when authenticating" ) + if "device_keys" in body: + # Validate the provided `user_id` and `device_id` fields in + # `device_keys` match that of the requesting user. We can't do + # this directly in the pydantic model as we don't have access + # to the requester yet. + # + # TODO: We could use ValidationInfo when we switch to Pydantic v2. + # https://docs.pydantic.dev/latest/concepts/validators/#validation-info + if body["device_keys"]["user_id"] != user_id: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg="Provided `user_id` in `device_keys` does not match that of the authenticated user", + ) + if body["device_keys"]["device_id"] != device_id: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg="Provided `device_id` in `device_keys` does not match that of the authenticated user device", + ) + result = await self.e2e_keys_handler.upload_keys_for_user( - user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, keys=body + user_id=user_id, + device_id=device_id, + keys=body, ) return 200, result
tests/rest/client/test_keys.py+121 −0 modified@@ -40,6 +40,127 @@ from tests.utils import HAS_AUTHLIB +class KeyUploadTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase): + servlets = [ + keys.register_servlets, + admin.register_servlets_for_client_rest_resource, + login.register_servlets, + ] + + def test_upload_keys_fails_on_invalid_structure(self) -> None: + """Check that we validate the structure of keys upon upload. + + Regression test for https://github.com/element-hq/synapse/pull/17097 + """ + self.register_user("alice", "wonderland") + alice_token = self.login("alice", "wonderland") + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + # Error: device_keys must be a dict + "device_keys": ["some", "stuff", "weewoo"] + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + # Error: properties of fallback_keys must be in the form `<algorithm>:<device_id>` + "fallback_keys": {"invalid_key": "signature_base64"} + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + # Same as above, but for one_time_keys + "one_time_keys": {"invalid_key": "signature_base64"} + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + def test_upload_keys_fails_on_invalid_user_id_or_device_id(self) -> None: + """ + Validate that the requesting user is uploading their own keys and nobody + else's. + """ + device_id = "DEVICE_ID" + alice_user_id = self.register_user("alice", "wonderland") + alice_token = self.login("alice", "wonderland", device_id=device_id) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + "device_keys": { + # Included `user_id` does not match requesting user. + "user_id": "@unknown_user:test", + "device_id": device_id, + "algorithms": ["m.olm.curve25519-aes-sha2"], + "keys": { + f"ed25519:{device_id}": "publickey", + }, + "signatures": {}, + } + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + "device_keys": { + "user_id": alice_user_id, + # Included `device_id` does not match requesting user's. + "device_id": "UNKNOWN_DEVICE_ID", + "algorithms": ["m.olm.curve25519-aes-sha2"], + "keys": { + f"ed25519:{device_id}": "publickey", + }, + "signatures": {}, + } + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + class KeyQueryTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase): servlets = [ keys.register_servlets,
7069636c2d6dValidate the body of requests to `/keys/upload` (#17097)
4 files changed · +280 −8
changelog.d/17097.misc+1 −0 added@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Extend validation of uploaded device keys. \ No newline at end of file
synapse/handlers/e2e_keys.py+11 −5 modified@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) - ONE_TIME_KEY_UPLOAD = "one_time_key_upload_lock" @@ -848,14 +847,22 @@ async def upload_keys_for_user( """ time_now = self.clock.time_msec() - # TODO: Validate the JSON to make sure it has the right keys. device_keys = keys.get("device_keys", None) if device_keys: + log_kv( + { + "message": "Updating device_keys for user.", + "user_id": user_id, + "device_id": device_id, + } + ) await self.upload_device_keys_for_user( user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, keys={"device_keys": device_keys}, ) + else: + log_kv({"message": "Did not update device_keys", "reason": "not a dict"}) one_time_keys = keys.get("one_time_keys", None) if one_time_keys: @@ -873,8 +880,9 @@ async def upload_keys_for_user( log_kv( {"message": "Did not update one_time_keys", "reason": "no keys given"} ) + fallback_keys = keys.get("fallback_keys") - if fallback_keys and isinstance(fallback_keys, dict): + if fallback_keys: log_kv( { "message": "Updating fallback_keys for device.", @@ -883,8 +891,6 @@ async def upload_keys_for_user( } ) await self.store.set_e2e_fallback_keys(user_id, device_id, fallback_keys) - elif fallback_keys: - log_kv({"message": "Did not update fallback_keys", "reason": "not a dict"}) else: log_kv( {"message": "Did not update fallback_keys", "reason": "no keys given"}
synapse/rest/client/keys.py+147 −3 modified@@ -23,10 +23,19 @@ import logging import re from collections import Counter -from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, Optional, Tuple +from http import HTTPStatus +from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, List, Mapping, Optional, Tuple, Union +from typing_extensions import Self + +from synapse._pydantic_compat import ( + StrictBool, + StrictStr, + validator, +) from synapse.api.auth.mas import MasDelegatedAuth from synapse.api.errors import ( + Codes, InteractiveAuthIncompleteError, InvalidAPICallError, SynapseError, @@ -37,11 +46,13 @@ parse_integer, parse_json_object_from_request, parse_string, + validate_json_object, ) from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest from synapse.logging.opentracing import log_kv, set_tag from synapse.rest.client._base import client_patterns, interactive_auth_handler from synapse.types import JsonDict, StreamToken +from synapse.types.rest import RequestBodyModel from synapse.util.cancellation import cancellable if TYPE_CHECKING: @@ -59,7 +70,6 @@ class KeyUploadServlet(RestServlet): "device_keys": { "user_id": "<user_id>", "device_id": "<device_id>", - "valid_until_ts": <millisecond_timestamp>, "algorithms": [ "m.olm.curve25519-aes-sha2", ] @@ -111,12 +121,123 @@ def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"): self._clock = hs.get_clock() self._store = hs.get_datastores().main + class KeyUploadRequestBody(RequestBodyModel): + """ + The body of a `POST /_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload` request. + + Based on https://spec.matrix.org/v1.16/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysupload. + """ + + class DeviceKeys(RequestBodyModel): + algorithms: List[StrictStr] + """The encryption algorithms supported by this device.""" + + device_id: StrictStr + """The ID of the device these keys belong to. Must match the device ID used when logging in.""" + + keys: Mapping[StrictStr, StrictStr] + """ + Public identity keys. The names of the properties should be in the + format `<algorithm>:<device_id>`. The keys themselves should be encoded as + specified by the key algorithm. + """ + + signatures: Mapping[StrictStr, Mapping[StrictStr, StrictStr]] + """Signatures for the device key object. A map from user ID, to a map from "<algorithm>:<device_id>" to the signature.""" + + user_id: StrictStr + """The ID of the user the device belongs to. Must match the user ID used when logging in.""" + + class KeyObject(RequestBodyModel): + key: StrictStr + """The key, encoded using unpadded base64.""" + + fallback: Optional[StrictBool] = False + """Whether this is a fallback key. Only used when handling fallback keys.""" + + signatures: Mapping[StrictStr, Mapping[StrictStr, StrictStr]] + """Signature for the device. Mapped from user ID to another map of key signing identifier to the signature itself. + + See the following for more detail: https://spec.matrix.org/v1.16/appendices/#signing-details + """ + + device_keys: Optional[DeviceKeys] = None + """Identity keys for the device. May be absent if no new identity keys are required.""" + + fallback_keys: Optional[Mapping[StrictStr, Union[StrictStr, KeyObject]]] + """ + The public key which should be used if the device's one-time keys are + exhausted. The fallback key is not deleted once used, but should be + replaced when additional one-time keys are being uploaded. The server + will notify the client of the fallback key being used through `/sync`. + + There can only be at most one key per algorithm uploaded, and the server + will only persist one key per algorithm. + + When uploading a signed key, an additional fallback: true key should be + included to denote that the key is a fallback key. + + May be absent if a new fallback key is not required. + """ + + @validator("fallback_keys", pre=True) + def validate_fallback_keys(cls: Self, v: Any) -> Any: + if v is None: + return v + if not isinstance(v, dict): + raise TypeError("fallback_keys must be a mapping") + + for k in v.keys(): + if not len(k.split(":")) == 2: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg=f"Invalid fallback_keys key {k!r}. " + 'Expected "<algorithm>:<device_id>".', + ) + return v + + one_time_keys: Optional[Mapping[StrictStr, Union[StrictStr, KeyObject]]] = None + """ + One-time public keys for "pre-key" messages. The names of the properties + should be in the format `<algorithm>:<key_id>`. + + The format of the key is determined by the key algorithm, see: + https://spec.matrix.org/v1.16/client-server-api/#key-algorithms. + """ + + @validator("one_time_keys", pre=True) + def validate_one_time_keys(cls: Self, v: Any) -> Any: + if v is None: + return v + if not isinstance(v, dict): + raise TypeError("one_time_keys must be a mapping") + + for k, _ in v.items(): + if not len(k.split(":")) == 2: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg=f"Invalid one_time_keys key {k!r}. " + 'Expected "<algorithm>:<device_id>".', + ) + return v + async def on_POST( self, request: SynapseRequest, device_id: Optional[str] ) -> Tuple[int, JsonDict]: requester = await self.auth.get_user_by_req(request, allow_guest=True) user_id = requester.user.to_string() + + # Parse the request body. Validate separately, as the handler expects a + # plain dict, rather than any parsed object. + # + # Note: It would be nice to work with a parsed object, but the handler + # needs to encode portions of the request body as canonical JSON before + # storing the result in the DB. There's little point in converted to a + # parsed object and then back to a dict. body = parse_json_object_from_request(request) + validate_json_object(body, self.KeyUploadRequestBody) if device_id is not None: # Providing the device_id should only be done for setting keys @@ -149,8 +270,31 @@ async def on_POST( 400, "To upload keys, you must pass device_id when authenticating" ) + if "device_keys" in body: + # Validate the provided `user_id` and `device_id` fields in + # `device_keys` match that of the requesting user. We can't do + # this directly in the pydantic model as we don't have access + # to the requester yet. + # + # TODO: We could use ValidationInfo when we switch to Pydantic v2. + # https://docs.pydantic.dev/latest/concepts/validators/#validation-info + if body["device_keys"]["user_id"] != user_id: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg="Provided `user_id` in `device_keys` does not match that of the authenticated user", + ) + if body["device_keys"]["device_id"] != device_id: + raise SynapseError( + code=HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, + errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, + msg="Provided `device_id` in `device_keys` does not match that of the authenticated user device", + ) + result = await self.e2e_keys_handler.upload_keys_for_user( - user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, keys=body + user_id=user_id, + device_id=device_id, + keys=body, ) return 200, result
tests/rest/client/test_keys.py+121 −0 modified@@ -40,6 +40,127 @@ from tests.utils import HAS_AUTHLIB +class KeyUploadTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase): + servlets = [ + keys.register_servlets, + admin.register_servlets_for_client_rest_resource, + login.register_servlets, + ] + + def test_upload_keys_fails_on_invalid_structure(self) -> None: + """Check that we validate the structure of keys upon upload. + + Regression test for https://github.com/element-hq/synapse/pull/17097 + """ + self.register_user("alice", "wonderland") + alice_token = self.login("alice", "wonderland") + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + # Error: device_keys must be a dict + "device_keys": ["some", "stuff", "weewoo"] + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + # Error: properties of fallback_keys must be in the form `<algorithm>:<device_id>` + "fallback_keys": {"invalid_key": "signature_base64"} + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + # Same as above, but for one_time_keys + "one_time_keys": {"invalid_key": "signature_base64"} + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + def test_upload_keys_fails_on_invalid_user_id_or_device_id(self) -> None: + """ + Validate that the requesting user is uploading their own keys and nobody + else's. + """ + device_id = "DEVICE_ID" + alice_user_id = self.register_user("alice", "wonderland") + alice_token = self.login("alice", "wonderland", device_id=device_id) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + "device_keys": { + # Included `user_id` does not match requesting user. + "user_id": "@unknown_user:test", + "device_id": device_id, + "algorithms": ["m.olm.curve25519-aes-sha2"], + "keys": { + f"ed25519:{device_id}": "publickey", + }, + "signatures": {}, + } + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + channel = self.make_request( + "POST", + "/_matrix/client/v3/keys/upload", + { + "device_keys": { + "user_id": alice_user_id, + # Included `device_id` does not match requesting user's. + "device_id": "UNKNOWN_DEVICE_ID", + "algorithms": ["m.olm.curve25519-aes-sha2"], + "keys": { + f"ed25519:{device_id}": "publickey", + }, + "signatures": {}, + } + }, + alice_token, + ) + self.assertEqual(channel.code, HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, channel.result) + self.assertEqual( + channel.json_body["errcode"], + Codes.BAD_JSON, + channel.result, + ) + + class KeyQueryTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase): servlets = [ keys.register_servlets,
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
10- github.com/advisories/GHSA-fh66-fcv5-jjfrghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61672ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/commit/26aaaf9e48fff80cf67a20c691c75d670034b3c1nvdWEB
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/commit/7069636c2d6d1ef2022287addf3ed8b919ef2740nvdWEB
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/pull/17097nvdWEB
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/releases/tag/v1.138.3nvdWEB
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/releases/tag/v1.138.4ghsaWEB
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/releases/tag/v1.139.1nvdWEB
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/releases/tag/v1.139.2ghsaWEB
- github.com/element-hq/synapse/security/advisories/GHSA-fh66-fcv5-jjfrnvdWEB
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