CVE-2025-55203

@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
     User,
     EstimatePoint,
 )
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+    validate_binary_data,
+)
 
 from .base import BaseSerializer
 from .cycle import CycleLiteSerializer, CycleSerializer
@@ -83,6 +88,22 @@ def validate(self, data):
         except Exception:
             raise serializers.ValidationError("Invalid HTML passed")
 
+        # Validate description content for security
+        if data.get("description"):
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description": error_msg})
+
+        if data.get("description_html"):
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_html_content(data["description_html"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_html": error_msg})
+
+        if data.get("description_binary"):
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_binary_data(data["description_binary"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_binary": error_msg})
+
         # Validate assignees are from project
         if data.get("assignees", []):
             data["assignees"] = ProjectMember.objects.filter(
@@ -648,7 +669,6 @@ class IssueExpandSerializer(BaseSerializer):
     assignees = serializers.SerializerMethodField()
     state = StateLiteSerializer(read_only=True)
 
-
     def get_labels(self, obj):
         expand = self.context.get("expand", [])
         if "labels" in expand:
@@ -666,7 +686,6 @@ def get_assignees(self, obj):
             ).data
         return [ia.assignee_id for ia in obj.issue_assignee.all()]
 
-
     class Meta:
         model = Issue
         fields = "__all__"

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
     Estimate,
 )
 
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+)
 from .base import BaseSerializer
 
 
@@ -191,6 +195,29 @@ def validate(self, data):
                 "Default assignee should be a user in the workspace"
             )
 
+        # Validate description content for security
+        if "description" in data and data["description"]:
+            # For Project, description might be text field, not JSON
+            if isinstance(data["description"], dict):
+                is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description"])
+                if not is_valid:
+                    raise serializers.ValidationError({"description": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_text" in data and data["description_text"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description_text"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_text": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_html" in data and data["description_html"]:
+            if isinstance(data["description_html"], dict):
+                is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description_html"])
+            else:
+                is_valid, error_msg = validate_html_content(
+                    str(data["description_html"])
+                )
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_html": error_msg})
+
         return data
 
     def create(self, validated_data):

@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@
     ProjectMember,
     EstimatePoint,
 )
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+    validate_binary_data,
+)
 from plane.app.permissions import ROLE
 
 
@@ -70,14 +75,21 @@ def validate(self, attrs):
         ):
             raise serializers.ValidationError("Start date cannot exceed target date")
 
-        try:
-            if attrs.get("description_html", None) is not None:
-                parsed = html.fromstring(attrs["description_html"])
-                parsed_str = html.tostring(parsed, encoding="unicode")
-                attrs["description_html"] = parsed_str
-
-        except Exception:
-            raise serializers.ValidationError("Invalid HTML passed")
+        # Validate description content for security
+        if "description" in attrs and attrs["description"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(attrs["description"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_html" in attrs and attrs["description_html"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_html_content(attrs["description_html"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_html": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_binary" in attrs and attrs["description_binary"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_binary_data(attrs["description_binary"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_binary": error_msg})
 
         # Validate assignees are from project
         if attrs.get("assignee_ids", []):

@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@
     SubPageSerializer,
     PageDetailSerializer,
     PageVersionSerializer,
+    PageBinaryUpdateSerializer,
     PageVersionDetailSerializer,
 )
 

@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@
     ProjectMember,
     EstimatePoint,
 )
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+    validate_binary_data,
+)
 
 
 class IssueFlatSerializer(BaseSerializer):
@@ -122,14 +127,21 @@ def validate(self, attrs):
         ):
             raise serializers.ValidationError("Start date cannot exceed target date")
 
-        try:
-            if attrs.get("description_html", None) is not None:
-                parsed = html.fromstring(attrs["description_html"])
-                parsed_str = html.tostring(parsed, encoding="unicode")
-                attrs["description_html"] = parsed_str
-
-        except Exception:
-            raise serializers.ValidationError("Invalid HTML passed")
+        # Validate description content for security
+        if "description" in attrs and attrs["description"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(attrs["description"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_html" in attrs and attrs["description_html"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_html_content(attrs["description_html"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_html": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_binary" in attrs and attrs["description_binary"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_binary_data(attrs["description_binary"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_binary": error_msg})
 
         # Validate assignees are from project
         if attrs.get("assignee_ids", []):

@@ -1,8 +1,14 @@
 # Third party imports
 from rest_framework import serializers
+import base64
 
 # Module imports
 from .base import BaseSerializer
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_binary_data,
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+)
 from plane.db.models import (
     Page,
     PageLog,
@@ -186,3 +192,71 @@ class Meta:
             "updated_by",
         ]
         read_only_fields = ["workspace", "page"]
+
+
+class PageBinaryUpdateSerializer(serializers.Serializer):
+    """Serializer for updating page binary description with validation"""
+
+    description_binary = serializers.CharField(required=False, allow_blank=True)
+    description_html = serializers.CharField(required=False, allow_blank=True)
+    description = serializers.JSONField(required=False, allow_null=True)
+
+    def validate_description_binary(self, value):
+        """Validate the base64-encoded binary data"""
+        if not value:
+            return value
+
+        try:
+            # Decode the base64 data
+            binary_data = base64.b64decode(value)
+
+            # Validate the binary data
+            is_valid, error_message = validate_binary_data(binary_data)
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError(
+                    f"Invalid binary data: {error_message}"
+                )
+
+            return binary_data
+        except Exception as e:
+            if isinstance(e, serializers.ValidationError):
+                raise
+            raise serializers.ValidationError("Failed to decode base64 data")
+
+    def validate_description_html(self, value):
+        """Validate the HTML content"""
+        if not value:
+            return value
+
+        # Use the validation function from utils
+        is_valid, error_message = validate_html_content(value)
+        if not is_valid:
+            raise serializers.ValidationError(error_message)
+
+        return value
+
+    def validate_description(self, value):
+        """Validate the JSON description"""
+        if not value:
+            return value
+
+        # Use the validation function from utils
+        is_valid, error_message = validate_json_content(value)
+        if not is_valid:
+            raise serializers.ValidationError(error_message)
+
+        return value
+
+    def update(self, instance, validated_data):
+        """Update the page instance with validated data"""
+        if "description_binary" in validated_data:
+            instance.description_binary = validated_data.get("description_binary")
+
+        if "description_html" in validated_data:
+            instance.description_html = validated_data.get("description_html")
+
+        if "description" in validated_data:
+            instance.description = validated_data.get("description")
+
+        instance.save()
+        return instance

@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@
     DeployBoard,
     ProjectPublicMember,
 )
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+    validate_binary_data,
+)
 
 
 class ProjectSerializer(BaseSerializer):
@@ -58,6 +63,32 @@ def validate_identifier(self, identifier):
 
         return identifier
 
+    def validate(self, data):
+        # Validate description content for security
+        if "description" in data and data["description"]:
+            # For Project, description might be text field, not JSON
+            if isinstance(data["description"], dict):
+                is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description"])
+                if not is_valid:
+                    raise serializers.ValidationError({"description": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_text" in data and data["description_text"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description_text"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_text": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_html" in data and data["description_html"]:
+            if isinstance(data["description_html"], dict):
+                is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description_html"])
+            else:
+                is_valid, error_msg = validate_html_content(
+                    str(data["description_html"])
+                )
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_html": error_msg})
+
+        return data
+
     def create(self, validated_data):
         workspace_id = self.context["workspace_id"]
 

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@
 )
 from plane.utils.constants import RESTRICTED_WORKSPACE_SLUGS
 from plane.utils.url import contains_url
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+    validate_binary_data,
+)
 
 # Django imports
 from django.core.validators import URLValidator
@@ -312,6 +317,25 @@ class Meta:
         read_only_fields = ["workspace", "owner"]
         extra_kwargs = {"name": {"required": False}}
 
+    def validate(self, data):
+        # Validate description content for security
+        if "description" in data and data["description"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_html" in data and data["description_html"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_html_content(data["description_html"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_html": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_binary" in data and data["description_binary"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_binary_data(data["description_binary"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_binary": error_msg})
+
+        return data
+
 
 class WorkspaceUserPreferenceSerializer(BaseSerializer):
     class Meta:

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
     PageSerializer,
     SubPageSerializer,
     PageDetailSerializer,
+    PageBinaryUpdateSerializer,
 )
 from plane.db.models import (
     Page,
@@ -538,32 +539,27 @@ def partial_update(self, request, slug, project_id, pk):
             {"description_html": page.description_html}, cls=DjangoJSONEncoder
         )
 
-        # Get the base64 data from the request
-        base64_data = request.data.get("description_binary")
-
-        # If base64 data is provided
-        if base64_data:
-            # Decode the base64 data to bytes
-            new_binary_data = base64.b64decode(base64_data)
-            # capture the page transaction
+        # Use serializer for validation and update
+        serializer = PageBinaryUpdateSerializer(page, data=request.data, partial=True)
+        if serializer.is_valid():
+            # Capture the page transaction
             if request.data.get("description_html"):
                 page_transaction.delay(
                     new_value=request.data, old_value=existing_instance, page_id=pk
                 )
-            # Store the updated binary data
-            page.description_binary = new_binary_data
-            page.description_html = request.data.get("description_html")
-            page.description = request.data.get("description")
-            page.save()
-            # Return a success response
+
+            # Update the page using serializer
+            updated_page = serializer.save()
+
+            # Run background tasks
             page_version.delay(
-                page_id=page.id,
+                page_id=updated_page.id,
                 existing_instance=existing_instance,
                 user_id=request.user.id,
             )
             return Response({"message": "Updated successfully"})
         else:
-            return Response({"error": "No binary data provided"})
+            return Response(serializer.errors, status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST)
 
 
 class PageDuplicateEndpoint(BaseAPIView):

@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
     IssueVote,
     IssueRelation,
 )
+from plane.utils.content_validator import (
+    validate_html_content,
+    validate_json_content,
+    validate_binary_data,
+)
 
 
 class IssueStateFlatSerializer(BaseSerializer):
@@ -283,6 +288,23 @@ def validate(self, data):
             and data.get("start_date", None) > data.get("target_date", None)
         ):
             raise serializers.ValidationError("Start date cannot exceed target date")
+
+        # Validate description content for security
+        if "description" in data and data["description"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_json_content(data["description"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_html" in data and data["description_html"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_html_content(data["description_html"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_html": error_msg})
+
+        if "description_binary" in data and data["description_binary"]:
+            is_valid, error_msg = validate_binary_data(data["description_binary"])
+            if not is_valid:
+                raise serializers.ValidationError({"description_binary": error_msg})
+
         return data
 
     def create(self, validated_data):

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+# Python imports
+import base64
+import json
+import re
+
+
+# Maximum allowed size for binary data (10MB)
+MAX_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024
+
+# Maximum recursion depth to prevent stack overflow
+MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH = 20
+
+# Dangerous text patterns that could indicate XSS or script injection
+DANGEROUS_TEXT_PATTERNS = [
+    r"<script[^>]*>.*?</script>",
+    r"javascript\s*:",
+    r"data\s*:\s*text/html",
+    r"eval\s*\(",
+    r"document\s*\.",
+    r"window\s*\.",
+    r"location\s*\.",
+]
+
+# Dangerous attribute patterns for HTML attributes
+DANGEROUS_ATTR_PATTERNS = [
+    r"javascript\s*:",
+    r"data\s*:\s*text/html",
+    r"eval\s*\(",
+    r"alert\s*\(",
+    r"document\s*\.",
+    r"window\s*\.",
+]
+
+# Suspicious patterns for binary data content
+SUSPICIOUS_BINARY_PATTERNS = [
+    "<html",
+    "<!doctype",
+    "<script",
+    "javascript:",
+    "data:",
+    "<iframe",
+]
+
+# Malicious HTML patterns for content validation
+MALICIOUS_HTML_PATTERNS = [
+    # Script tags with any content
+    r"<script[^>]*>",
+    r"</script>",
+    # JavaScript URLs in various attributes
+    r'(?:href|src|action)\s*=\s*["\']?\s*javascript:',
+    # Data URLs with text/html (potential XSS)
+    r'(?:href|src|action)\s*=\s*["\']?\s*data:text/html',
+    # Dangerous event handlers with JavaScript-like content
+    r'on(?:load|error|click|focus|blur|change|submit|reset|select|resize|scroll|unload|beforeunload|hashchange|popstate|storage|message|offline|online)\s*=\s*["\']?[^"\']*(?:javascript|alert|eval|document\.|window\.|location\.|history\.)[^"\']*["\']?',
+    # Object and embed tags that could load external content
+    r"<(?:object|embed)[^>]*(?:data|src)\s*=",
+    # Base tag that could change relative URL resolution
+    r"<base[^>]*href\s*=",
+    # Dangerous iframe sources
+    r'<iframe[^>]*src\s*=\s*["\']?(?:javascript:|data:text/html)',
+    # Meta refresh redirects
+    r'<meta[^>]*http-equiv\s*=\s*["\']?refresh["\']?',
+    # Link tags - simplified patterns
+    r'<link[^>]*rel\s*=\s*["\']?stylesheet["\']?',
+    r'<link[^>]*href\s*=\s*["\']?https?://',
+    r'<link[^>]*href\s*=\s*["\']?//',
+    r'<link[^>]*href\s*=\s*["\']?(?:data:|javascript:)',
+    # Style tags with external imports
+    r"<style[^>]*>.*?@import.*?(?:https?://|//)",
+    # Link tags with dangerous rel types
+    r'<link[^>]*rel\s*=\s*["\']?(?:import|preload|prefetch|dns-prefetch|preconnect)["\']?',
+    # Forms with action attributes
+    r"<form[^>]*action\s*=",
+]
+
+# Dangerous JavaScript patterns for event handlers
+DANGEROUS_JS_PATTERNS = [
+    r"alert\s*\(",
+    r"eval\s*\(",
+    r"document\s*\.",
+    r"window\s*\.",
+    r"location\s*\.",
+    r"fetch\s*\(",
+    r"XMLHttpRequest",
+    r"innerHTML\s*=",
+    r"outerHTML\s*=",
+    r"document\.write",
+    r"script\s*>",
+]
+
+# HTML self-closing tags that don't need closing tags
+SELF_CLOSING_TAGS = {
+    "img",
+    "br",
+    "hr",
+    "input",
+    "meta",
+    "link",
+    "area",
+    "base",
+    "col",
+    "embed",
+    "source",
+    "track",
+    "wbr",
+}
+
+
+def validate_binary_data(data):
+    """
+    Validate that binary data appears to be valid document format and doesn't contain malicious content.
+
+    Args:
+        data (bytes or str): The binary data to validate, or base64-encoded string
+
+    Returns:
+        tuple: (is_valid: bool, error_message: str or None)
+    """
+    if not data:
+        return True, None  # Empty is OK
+
+    # Handle base64-encoded strings by decoding them first
+    if isinstance(data, str):
+        try:
+            binary_data = base64.b64decode(data)
+        except Exception:
+            return False, "Invalid base64 encoding"
+    else:
+        binary_data = data
+
+    # Size check - 10MB limit
+    if len(binary_data) > MAX_SIZE:
+        return False, "Binary data exceeds maximum size limit (10MB)"
+
+    # Basic format validation
+    if len(binary_data) < 4:
+        return False, "Binary data too short to be valid document format"
+
+    # Check for suspicious text patterns (HTML/JS)
+    try:
+        decoded_text = binary_data.decode("utf-8", errors="ignore")[:200]
+        if any(
+            pattern in decoded_text.lower() for pattern in SUSPICIOUS_BINARY_PATTERNS
+        ):
+            return False, "Binary data contains suspicious content patterns"
+    except Exception:
+        pass  # Binary data might not be decodable as text, which is fine
+
+    return True, None
+
+
+def validate_html_content(html_content):
+    """
+    Validate that HTML content is safe and doesn't contain malicious patterns.
+
+    Args:
+        html_content (str): The HTML content to validate
+
+    Returns:
+        tuple: (is_valid: bool, error_message: str or None)
+    """
+    if not html_content:
+        return True, None  # Empty is OK
+
+    # Size check - 10MB limit (consistent with binary validation)
+    if len(html_content.encode("utf-8")) > MAX_SIZE:
+        return False, "HTML content exceeds maximum size limit (10MB)"
+
+    # Check for specific malicious patterns (simplified and more reliable)
+    for pattern in MALICIOUS_HTML_PATTERNS:
+        if re.search(pattern, html_content, re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL):
+            return (
+                False,
+                f"HTML content contains potentially malicious patterns: {pattern}",
+            )
+
+    # Additional check for inline event handlers that contain suspicious content
+    # This is more permissive - only blocks if the event handler contains actual dangerous code
+    event_handler_pattern = r'on\w+\s*=\s*["\']([^"\']*)["\']'
+    event_matches = re.findall(event_handler_pattern, html_content, re.IGNORECASE)
+
+    for handler_content in event_matches:
+        for js_pattern in DANGEROUS_JS_PATTERNS:
+            if re.search(js_pattern, handler_content, re.IGNORECASE):
+                return (
+                    False,
+                    f"HTML content contains dangerous JavaScript in event handler: {handler_content[:100]}",
+                )
+
+    # Basic HTML structure validation - check for common malformed tags
+    try:
+        # Count opening and closing tags for basic structure validation
+        opening_tags = re.findall(r"<(\w+)[^>]*>", html_content)
+        closing_tags = re.findall(r"</(\w+)>", html_content)
+
+        # Filter out self-closing tags from opening tags
+        opening_tags_filtered = [
+            tag for tag in opening_tags if tag.lower() not in SELF_CLOSING_TAGS
+        ]
+
+        # Basic check - if we have significantly more opening than closing tags, it might be malformed
+        if len(opening_tags_filtered) > len(closing_tags) + 10:  # Allow some tolerance
+            return False, "HTML content appears to be malformed (unmatched tags)"
+
+    except Exception:
+        # If HTML parsing fails, we'll allow it
+        pass
+
+    return True, None
+
+
+def validate_json_content(json_content):
+    """
+    Validate that JSON content is safe and doesn't contain malicious patterns.
+
+    Args:
+        json_content (dict): The JSON content to validate
+
+    Returns:
+        tuple: (is_valid: bool, error_message: str or None)
+    """
+    if not json_content:
+        return True, None  # Empty is OK
+
+    try:
+        # Size check - 10MB limit (consistent with other validations)
+        json_str = json.dumps(json_content)
+        if len(json_str.encode("utf-8")) > MAX_SIZE:
+            return False, "JSON content exceeds maximum size limit (10MB)"
+
+        # Basic structure validation for page description JSON
+        if isinstance(json_content, dict):
+            # Check for expected page description structure
+            # This is based on ProseMirror/Tiptap JSON structure
+            if "type" in json_content and json_content.get("type") == "doc":
+                # Valid document structure
+                if "content" in json_content and isinstance(
+                    json_content["content"], list
+                ):
+                    # Recursively check content for suspicious patterns
+                    is_valid, error_msg = _validate_json_content_array(
+                        json_content["content"]
+                    )
+                    if not is_valid:
+                        return False, error_msg
+            elif "type" not in json_content and "content" not in json_content:
+                # Allow other JSON structures but validate for suspicious content
+                is_valid, error_msg = _validate_json_content_recursive(json_content)
+                if not is_valid:
+                    return False, error_msg
+        else:
+            return False, "JSON description must be a valid object"
+
+    except (TypeError, ValueError) as e:
+        return False, "Invalid JSON structure"
+    except Exception as e:
+        return False, "Failed to validate JSON content"
+
+    return True, None
+
+
+def _validate_json_content_array(content, depth=0):
+    """
+    Validate JSON content array for suspicious patterns.
+
+    Args:
+        content (list): Array of content nodes to validate
+        depth (int): Current recursion depth (default: 0)
+
+    Returns:
+        tuple: (is_valid: bool, error_message: str or None)
+    """
+    # Check recursion depth to prevent stack overflow
+    if depth > MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH:
+        return False, f"Maximum recursion depth ({MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH}) exceeded"
+
+    if not isinstance(content, list):
+        return True, None
+
+    for node in content:
+        if isinstance(node, dict):
+            # Check text content for suspicious patterns (more targeted)
+            if node.get("type") == "text" and "text" in node:
+                text_content = node["text"]
+                for pattern in DANGEROUS_TEXT_PATTERNS:
+                    if re.search(pattern, text_content, re.IGNORECASE):
+                        return (
+                            False,
+                            "JSON content contains suspicious script patterns in text",
+                        )
+
+            # Check attributes for suspicious content (more targeted)
+            if "attrs" in node and isinstance(node["attrs"], dict):
+                for attr_name, attr_value in node["attrs"].items():
+                    if isinstance(attr_value, str):
+                        # Only check specific attributes that could be dangerous
+                        if attr_name.lower() in [
+                            "href",
+                            "src",
+                            "action",
+                            "onclick",
+                            "onload",
+                            "onerror",
+                        ]:
+                            for pattern in DANGEROUS_ATTR_PATTERNS:
+                                if re.search(pattern, attr_value, re.IGNORECASE):
+                                    return (
+                                        False,
+                                        f"JSON content contains dangerous pattern in {attr_name} attribute",
+                                    )
+
+            # Recursively check nested content
+            if "content" in node and isinstance(node["content"], list):
+                is_valid, error_msg = _validate_json_content_array(
+                    node["content"], depth + 1
+                )
+                if not is_valid:
+                    return False, error_msg
+
+    return True, None
+
+
+def _validate_json_content_recursive(obj, depth=0):
+    """
+    Recursively validate JSON object for suspicious content.
+
+    Args:
+        obj: JSON object (dict, list, or primitive) to validate
+        depth (int): Current recursion depth (default: 0)
+
+    Returns:
+        tuple: (is_valid: bool, error_message: str or None)
+    """
+    # Check recursion depth to prevent stack overflow
+    if depth > MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH:
+        return False, f"Maximum recursion depth ({MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH}) exceeded"
+    if isinstance(obj, dict):
+        for key, value in obj.items():
+            if isinstance(value, str):
+                # Check for dangerous patterns using module constants
+                for pattern in DANGEROUS_TEXT_PATTERNS:
+                    if re.search(pattern, value, re.IGNORECASE):
+                        return (
+                            False,
+                            "JSON content contains suspicious script patterns",
+                        )
+            elif isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
+                is_valid, error_msg = _validate_json_content_recursive(value, depth + 1)
+                if not is_valid:
+                    return False, error_msg
+    elif isinstance(obj, list):
+        for item in obj:
+            is_valid, error_msg = _validate_json_content_recursive(item, depth + 1)
+            if not is_valid:
+                return False, error_msg
+
+    return True, None