Meshtastic firmware allows forged DMs with no PKC to show up as encrypted
Description
Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. The Meshtastic firmware (starting from version 2.5) introduces asymmetric encryption (PKI) for direct messages, but when the pki_encrypted flag is missing, the firmware silently falls back to legacy AES-256-CTR channel encryption. This was an intentional decision to maintain backwards compatibility. However, the end-user applications, like Web app, iOS/Android app, and applications built on top of Meshtastic using the SDK, did not have a way to differentiate between end-to-end encrypted DMs and the legacy DMs. This creates a downgrade attack path where adversaries who know a shared channel key can craft and inject spoofed direct messages that are displayed as if they were PKC encrypted. Users are not given any feedback of whether a direct message was decrypted with PKI or with legacy symmetric encryption, undermining the expected security guarantees of the PKI rollout. Version 2.7.15 fixes this issue.
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Affected products
2- Range: 0.0.3, 0.1.10, 0.1.6, …
- Range: >=2.5, <2.7.15
Patches
Vulnerability mechanics
References
1- github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-377p-prwp-4hwfmitrex_refsource_CONFIRM
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