Critical severity9.1NVD Advisory· Published Apr 24, 2025· Updated Apr 15, 2026
CVE-2025-43859
CVE-2025-43859
Description
h11 is a Python implementation of HTTP/1.1. Prior to version 0.16.0, a leniency in h11's parsing of line terminators in chunked-coding message bodies can lead to request smuggling vulnerabilities under certain conditions. This issue has been patched in version 0.16.0. Since exploitation requires the combination of buggy h11 with a buggy (reverse) proxy, fixing either component is sufficient to mitigate this issue.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
h11PyPI | < 0.16.0 | 0.16.0 |
Patches
21c5b07581f05114803a29ce5Merge commit from fork
2 files changed · +51 −26
h11/_readers.py+13 −10 modified@@ -148,10 +148,9 @@ def read_eof(self) -> NoReturn: class ChunkedReader: def __init__(self) -> None: self._bytes_in_chunk = 0 - # After reading a chunk, we have to throw away the trailing \r\n; if - # this is >0 then we discard that many bytes before resuming regular - # de-chunkification. - self._bytes_to_discard = 0 + # After reading a chunk, we have to throw away the trailing \r\n. + # This tracks the bytes that we need to match and throw away. + self._bytes_to_discard = b"" self._reading_trailer = False def __call__(self, buf: ReceiveBuffer) -> Union[Data, EndOfMessage, None]: @@ -160,15 +159,19 @@ def __call__(self, buf: ReceiveBuffer) -> Union[Data, EndOfMessage, None]: if lines is None: return None return EndOfMessage(headers=list(_decode_header_lines(lines))) - if self._bytes_to_discard > 0: - data = buf.maybe_extract_at_most(self._bytes_to_discard) + if self._bytes_to_discard: + data = buf.maybe_extract_at_most(len(self._bytes_to_discard)) if data is None: return None - self._bytes_to_discard -= len(data) - if self._bytes_to_discard > 0: + if data != self._bytes_to_discard[:len(data)]: + raise LocalProtocolError( + f"malformed chunk footer: {data!r} (expected {self._bytes_to_discard!r})" + ) + self._bytes_to_discard = self._bytes_to_discard[len(data):] + if self._bytes_to_discard: return None # else, fall through and read some more - assert self._bytes_to_discard == 0 + assert self._bytes_to_discard == b"" if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0: # We need to refill our chunk count chunk_header = buf.maybe_extract_next_line() @@ -194,7 +197,7 @@ def __call__(self, buf: ReceiveBuffer) -> Union[Data, EndOfMessage, None]: return None self._bytes_in_chunk -= len(data) if self._bytes_in_chunk == 0: - self._bytes_to_discard = 2 + self._bytes_to_discard = b"\r\n" chunk_end = True else: chunk_end = False
h11/tests/test_io.py+38 −16 modified@@ -348,22 +348,34 @@ def _run_reader(*args: Any) -> List[Event]: return normalize_data_events(events) -def t_body_reader(thunk: Any, data: bytes, expected: Any, do_eof: bool = False) -> None: +def t_body_reader(thunk: Any, data: bytes, expected: list, do_eof: bool = False) -> None: # Simple: consume whole thing print("Test 1") buf = makebuf(data) - assert _run_reader(thunk(), buf, do_eof) == expected + try: + assert _run_reader(thunk(), buf, do_eof) == expected + except LocalProtocolError: + if LocalProtocolError in expected: + pass + else: + raise # Incrementally growing buffer print("Test 2") reader = thunk() buf = ReceiveBuffer() events = [] - for i in range(len(data)): - events += _run_reader(reader, buf, False) - buf += data[i : i + 1] - events += _run_reader(reader, buf, do_eof) - assert normalize_data_events(events) == expected + try: + for i in range(len(data)): + events += _run_reader(reader, buf, False) + buf += data[i : i + 1] + events += _run_reader(reader, buf, do_eof) + assert normalize_data_events(events) == expected + except LocalProtocolError: + if LocalProtocolError in expected: + pass + else: + raise is_complete = any(type(event) is EndOfMessage for event in expected) if is_complete and not do_eof: @@ -424,14 +436,12 @@ def test_ChunkedReader() -> None: ) # refuses arbitrarily long chunk integers - with pytest.raises(LocalProtocolError): - # Technically this is legal HTTP/1.1, but we refuse to process chunk - # sizes that don't fit into 20 characters of hex - t_body_reader(ChunkedReader, b"9" * 100 + b"\r\nxxx", [Data(data=b"xxx")]) + # Technically this is legal HTTP/1.1, but we refuse to process chunk + # sizes that don't fit into 20 characters of hex + t_body_reader(ChunkedReader, b"9" * 100 + b"\r\nxxx", [LocalProtocolError]) # refuses garbage in the chunk count - with pytest.raises(LocalProtocolError): - t_body_reader(ChunkedReader, b"10\x00\r\nxxx", None) + t_body_reader(ChunkedReader, b"10\x00\r\nxxx", [LocalProtocolError]) # handles (and discards) "chunk extensions" omg wtf t_body_reader( @@ -445,10 +455,22 @@ def test_ChunkedReader() -> None: t_body_reader( ChunkedReader, - b"5 \r\n01234\r\n" + b"0\r\n\r\n", + b"5 \t \r\n01234\r\n" + b"0\r\n\r\n", [Data(data=b"01234"), EndOfMessage()], ) + # Chunked encoding with bad chunk termination characters are refused. Originally we + # simply dropped the 2 bytes after a chunk, instead of validating that the bytes + # were \r\n -- so we would successfully decode the data below as b"xxxa". And + # apparently there are other HTTP processors that ignore the chunk length and just + # keep reading until they see \r\n, so they would decode it as b"xxx__1a". Any time + # two HTTP processors accept the same input but interpret it differently, there's a + # possibility of request smuggling shenanigans. So we now reject this. + t_body_reader(ChunkedReader, b"3\r\nxxx__1a\r\n", [LocalProtocolError]) + + # Confirm we check both bytes individually + t_body_reader(ChunkedReader, b"3\r\nxxx\r_1a\r\n", [LocalProtocolError]) + t_body_reader(ChunkedReader, b"3\r\nxxx_\n1a\r\n", [LocalProtocolError]) def test_ContentLengthWriter() -> None: w = ContentLengthWriter(5) @@ -471,8 +493,8 @@ def test_ContentLengthWriter() -> None: dowrite(w, EndOfMessage()) w = ContentLengthWriter(5) - dowrite(w, Data(data=b"123")) == b"123" - dowrite(w, Data(data=b"45")) == b"45" + assert dowrite(w, Data(data=b"123")) == b"123" + assert dowrite(w, Data(data=b"45")) == b"45" with pytest.raises(LocalProtocolError): dowrite(w, EndOfMessage(headers=[("Etag", "asdf")]))
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
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