CVE-2025-40214
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Initialise scc_index in unix_add_edge().
Quang Le reported that the AF_UNIX GC could garbage-collect a receive queue of an alive in-flight socket, with a nice repro.
The repro consists of three stages.
1) 1-a. Create a single cyclic reference with many sockets 1-b. close() all sockets 1-c. Trigger GC
2) 2-a. Pass sk-A to an embryo sk-B 2-b. Pass sk-X to sk-X 2-c. Trigger GC
3) 3-a. accept() the embryo sk-B 3-b. Pass sk-B to sk-C 3-c. close() the in-flight sk-A 3-d. Trigger GC
As of 2-c, sk-A and sk-X are linked to unix_unvisited_vertices, and unix_walk_scc() groups them into two different SCCs:
unix_sk(sk-A)->vertex->scc_index = 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START) unix_sk(sk-X)->vertex->scc_index = 3
Once GC completes, unix_graph_grouped is set to true. Also, unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is set to true due to sk-X's cyclic self-reference, which makes close() trigger GC.
At 3-b, unix_add_edge() allocates unix_sk(sk-B)->vertex and links it to unix_unvisited_vertices.
unix_update_graph() is called at 3-a. and 3-b., but neither unix_graph_grouped nor unix_graph_maybe_cyclic is changed because both sk-B's listener and sk-C are not in-flight.
3-c decrements sk-A's file refcnt to 1.
Since unix_graph_grouped is true at 3-d, unix_walk_scc_fast() is finally called and iterates 3 sockets sk-A, sk-B, and sk-X:
sk-A -> sk-B (-> sk-C) sk-X -> sk-X
This is totally fine. All of them are not yet close()d and should be grouped into different SCCs.
However, unix_vertex_dead() misjudges that sk-A and sk-B are in the same SCC and sk-A is dead.
unix_sk(sk-A)->scc_index == unix_sk(sk-B)->scc_index <-- Wrong! && sk-A's file refcnt == unix_sk(sk-A)->vertex->out_degree ^-- 1 in-flight count for sk-B -> sk-A is dead !?
The problem is that unix_add_edge() does not initialise scc_index.
Stage 1) is used for heap spraying, making a newly allocated vertex have vertex->scc_index == 2 (UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_START) set by unix_walk_scc() at 1-c.
Let's track the max SCC index from the previous unix_walk_scc() call and assign the max + 1 to a new vertex's scc_index.
This way, we can continue to avoid Tarjan's algorithm while preventing misjudgments.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Uninitialized scc_index in AF_UNIX garbage collector causes incorrect garbage collection leading to use-after-free of in-flight socket receive queues.
The vulnerability resides in the AF_UNIX garbage collector (GC) in the Linux kernel. When unix_add_edge() adds a new vertex, it fails to initialize the scc_index field. This oversight becomes critical during GC when unix_vertex_dead() misjudges the membership of sockets in strongly connected components (SCCs), potentially marking an alive socket as dead [1].
Exploitation requires a crafted sequence of socket operations: first, create a cyclic reference among multiple sockets and close them to trigger GC; second, pass a socket to an embryo socket and create a self-reference; third, accept the embryo, pass it to another socket, close the in-flight socket, and trigger GC again. The attacker needs to be able to create and pass AF_UNIX sockets, requiring local access [1].
Successful exploitation can result in the garbage collector prematurely freeing the receive queue of an in-use socket, leading to a use-after-free condition. This could be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges or cause a denial of service [1].
The issue has been addressed in multiple stable kernel releases. The fix involves initializing scc_index in unix_add_edge(). Patches are available in the stable kernel repositories [2][3][4].
AI Insight generated on May 19, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected products
2Patches
520003fbb91744cd8d755c7d4db81ad20fd8a1aa7e40ee85060e6489f8e3bVulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
5- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1aa7e40ee850c9053e769957ce6541173891204dnvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/20003fbb9174121b27bd1da6ebe61542ac4c327dnvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cd8d755c7d4f515dd9abf483316aca2f1b7b0f3nvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/60e6489f8e3b086bd1130ad4450a2c112e863791nvd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/db81ad20fd8aef7cc7d536c52ee5ea4c1f979128nvd
News mentions
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