CVE-2025-30204
Description
golang-jwt is a Go implementation of JSON Web Tokens. Starting in version 3.2.0 and prior to versions 5.2.2 and 4.5.2, the function parse.ParseUnverified splits (via a call to strings.Split) its argument (which is untrusted data) on periods. As a result, in the face of a malicious request whose Authorization header consists of Bearer followed by many period characters, a call to that function incurs allocations to the tune of O(n) bytes (where n stands for the length of the function's argument), with a constant factor of about 16. This issue is fixed in 5.2.2 and 4.5.2.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5Go | >= 5.0.0-rc.1, < 5.2.2 | 5.2.2 |
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4Go | < 4.5.2 | 4.5.2 |
github.com/golang-jwt/jwtGo | >= 3.2.0, <= 3.2.2 | — |
Patches
30951d184286dMerge commit from fork
2 files changed · +122 −3
jwt_test.go+89 −0 added@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +package jwt + +import ( + "testing" +) + +func TestSplitToken(t *testing.T) { + t.Parallel() + + tests := []struct { + name string + input string + expected []string + isValid bool + }{ + { + name: "valid token with three parts", + input: "header.claims.signature", + expected: []string{"header", "claims", "signature"}, + isValid: true, + }, + { + name: "invalid token with two parts only", + input: "header.claims", + expected: nil, + isValid: false, + }, + { + name: "invalid token with one part only", + input: "header", + expected: nil, + isValid: false, + }, + { + name: "invalid token with extra delimiter", + input: "header.claims.signature.extra", + expected: nil, + isValid: false, + }, + { + name: "invalid empty token", + input: "", + expected: nil, + isValid: false, + }, + { + name: "valid token with empty parts", + input: "..signature", + expected: []string{"", "", "signature"}, + isValid: true, + }, + { + // We are just splitting the token into parts, so we don't care about the actual values. + // It is up to the caller to validate the parts. + name: "valid token with all parts empty", + input: "..", + expected: []string{"", "", ""}, + isValid: true, + }, + { + name: "invalid token with just delimiters and extra part", + input: "...", + expected: nil, + isValid: false, + }, + { + name: "invalid token with many delimiters", + input: "header.claims.signature..................", + expected: nil, + isValid: false, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + parts, ok := splitToken(tt.input) + if ok != tt.isValid { + t.Errorf("expected %t, got %t", tt.isValid, ok) + } + if ok { + for i, part := range tt.expected { + if parts[i] != part { + t.Errorf("expected %s, got %s", part, parts[i]) + } + } + } + }) + } +}
parser.go+33 −3 modified@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import ( "strings" ) +const tokenDelimiter = "." + type Parser struct { // If populated, only these methods will be considered valid. validMethods []string @@ -136,9 +138,10 @@ func (p *Parser) ParseWithClaims(tokenString string, claims Claims, keyFunc Keyf // It's only ever useful in cases where you know the signature is valid (since it has already // been or will be checked elsewhere in the stack) and you want to extract values from it. func (p *Parser) ParseUnverified(tokenString string, claims Claims) (token *Token, parts []string, err error) { - parts = strings.Split(tokenString, ".") - if len(parts) != 3 { - return nil, parts, newError("token contains an invalid number of segments", ErrTokenMalformed) + var ok bool + parts, ok = splitToken(tokenString) + if !ok { + return nil, nil, newError("token contains an invalid number of segments", ErrTokenMalformed) } token = &Token{Raw: tokenString} @@ -196,6 +199,33 @@ func (p *Parser) ParseUnverified(tokenString string, claims Claims) (token *Toke return token, parts, nil } +// splitToken splits a token string into three parts: header, claims, and signature. It will only +// return true if the token contains exactly two delimiters and three parts. In all other cases, it +// will return nil parts and false. +func splitToken(token string) ([]string, bool) { + parts := make([]string, 3) + header, remain, ok := strings.Cut(token, tokenDelimiter) + if !ok { + return nil, false + } + parts[0] = header + claims, remain, ok := strings.Cut(remain, tokenDelimiter) + if !ok { + return nil, false + } + parts[1] = claims + // One more cut to ensure the signature is the last part of the token and there are no more + // delimiters. This avoids an issue where malicious input could contain additional delimiters + // causing unecessary overhead parsing tokens. + signature, _, unexpected := strings.Cut(remain, tokenDelimiter) + if unexpected { + return nil, false + } + parts[2] = signature + + return parts, true +} + // DecodeSegment decodes a JWT specific base64url encoding. This function will // take into account whether the [Parser] is configured with additional options, // such as [WithStrictDecoding] or [WithPaddingAllowed].
2f0e9add6207bf316c48137aIntroduce (*Parser).ParseUnverified
1 file changed · +62 −48
parser.go+62 −48 modified@@ -21,55 +21,9 @@ func (p *Parser) Parse(tokenString string, keyFunc Keyfunc) (*Token, error) { } func (p *Parser) ParseWithClaims(tokenString string, claims Claims, keyFunc Keyfunc) (*Token, error) { - parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".") - if len(parts) != 3 { - return nil, NewValidationError("token contains an invalid number of segments", ValidationErrorMalformed) - } - - var err error - token := &Token{Raw: tokenString} - - // parse Header - var headerBytes []byte - if headerBytes, err = DecodeSegment(parts[0]); err != nil { - if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(tokenString), "bearer ") { - return token, NewValidationError("tokenstring should not contain 'bearer '", ValidationErrorMalformed) - } - return token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} - } - if err = json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &token.Header); err != nil { - return token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} - } - - // parse Claims - var claimBytes []byte - token.Claims = claims - - if claimBytes, err = DecodeSegment(parts[1]); err != nil { - return token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} - } - dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewBuffer(claimBytes)) - if p.UseJSONNumber { - dec.UseNumber() - } - // JSON Decode. Special case for map type to avoid weird pointer behavior - if c, ok := token.Claims.(MapClaims); ok { - err = dec.Decode(&c) - } else { - err = dec.Decode(&claims) - } - // Handle decode error + token, parts, err := p.ParseUnverified(tokenString, claims) if err != nil { - return token, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} - } - - // Lookup signature method - if method, ok := token.Header["alg"].(string); ok { - if token.Method = GetSigningMethod(method); token.Method == nil { - return token, NewValidationError("signing method (alg) is unavailable.", ValidationErrorUnverifiable) - } - } else { - return token, NewValidationError("signing method (alg) is unspecified.", ValidationErrorUnverifiable) + return token, err } // Verify signing method is in the required set @@ -129,3 +83,63 @@ func (p *Parser) ParseWithClaims(tokenString string, claims Claims, keyFunc Keyf return token, vErr } + +// WARNING: Don't use this method unless you know what you're doing +// +// This method parses the token but doesn't validate the signature. It's only +// ever useful in cases where you know the signature is valid (because it has +// been checked previously in the stack) and you want to extract values from +// it. +func (p *Parser) ParseUnverified(tokenString string, claims Claims) (token *Token, parts []string, err error) { + parts = strings.Split(tokenString, ".") + if len(parts) != 3 { + return nil, parts, NewValidationError("token contains an invalid number of segments", ValidationErrorMalformed) + } + + token = &Token{Raw: tokenString} + + // parse Header + var headerBytes []byte + if headerBytes, err = DecodeSegment(parts[0]); err != nil { + if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(tokenString), "bearer ") { + return token, parts, NewValidationError("tokenstring should not contain 'bearer '", ValidationErrorMalformed) + } + return token, parts, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} + } + if err = json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &token.Header); err != nil { + return token, parts, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} + } + + // parse Claims + var claimBytes []byte + token.Claims = claims + + if claimBytes, err = DecodeSegment(parts[1]); err != nil { + return token, parts, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} + } + dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewBuffer(claimBytes)) + if p.UseJSONNumber { + dec.UseNumber() + } + // JSON Decode. Special case for map type to avoid weird pointer behavior + if c, ok := token.Claims.(MapClaims); ok { + err = dec.Decode(&c) + } else { + err = dec.Decode(&claims) + } + // Handle decode error + if err != nil { + return token, parts, &ValidationError{Inner: err, Errors: ValidationErrorMalformed} + } + + // Lookup signature method + if method, ok := token.Header["alg"].(string); ok { + if token.Method = GetSigningMethod(method); token.Method == nil { + return token, parts, NewValidationError("signing method (alg) is unavailable.", ValidationErrorUnverifiable) + } + } else { + return token, parts, NewValidationError("signing method (alg) is unspecified.", ValidationErrorUnverifiable) + } + + return token, parts, nil +}
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
7- github.com/advisories/GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cpghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30204ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/0951d184286dece21f73c85673fd308786ffe9c3nvdWEB
- github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/bf316c48137a1212f8d0af9288cc9ce8e59f1afbnvdWEB
- github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cpnvdWEB
- security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250404-0002ghsaWEB
- security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250404-0002/nvd
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