VYPR
Medium severity6.1NVD Advisory· Published Jan 13, 2025· Updated Apr 15, 2026

CVE-2025-23026

CVE-2025-23026

Description

jte (Java Template Engine) is a secure and lightweight template engine for Java and Kotlin. In affected versions Jte HTML templates with script tags or script attributes that include a Javascript template string (backticks) are subject to XSS. The javaScriptBlock and javaScriptAttribute methods in the Escape class do not escape backticks, which are used for Javascript template strings. Dollar signs in template strings should also be escaped as well to prevent undesired interpolation. HTML templates rendered by Jte's OwaspHtmlTemplateOutput in versions less than or equal to 3.1.15 with script tags or script attributes that contain Javascript template strings (backticks) are vulnerable. Users are advised to upgrade to version 3.1.16 or later to resolve this issue. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Affected packages

Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.

PackageAffected versionsPatched versions
gg.jte:jteMaven
< 3.1.163.1.16
gg.jte:jte-runtimeMaven
< 3.1.163.1.16

Patches

2
d50dce8119b7
a6fb00d53c7b

Merge commit from fork

https://github.com/casid/jteAndreas HagerJan 13, 2025via ghsa
2 files changed · +86 0
  • jte-runtime/src/main/java/gg/jte/html/escape/Escape.java+4 0 modified
    @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ public static void javaScriptBlock(String value, TemplateOutput output) {
                 switch (c) {
                     case '\'' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\'", output);
                     case '"' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\\"", output);
    +                case '`' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\`", output);
    +                case '$' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\$", output);
                     case '/' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\/", output);
                     case '-' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\-", output);
                     case '\\' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\\\", output);
    @@ -73,6 +75,8 @@ public static void javaScriptAttribute(String value, TemplateOutput output) {
                 switch (c) {
                     case '\'' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\x27", output);
                     case '"' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\x22", output);
    +                case '`' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\x60", output);
    +                case '$' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\x24", output);
                     case '\\' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\\\", output);
                     case '\n' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\n", output);
                     case '\t' -> lastIndex = flushAndEscape(value, lastIndex, i, "\\t", output);
    
  • jte/src/test/java/gg/jte/TemplateEngine_HtmlOutputEscapingTest.java+82 0 modified
    @@ -1313,6 +1313,88 @@ void invalidAttribute_semicolon() {
             assertThat(throwable).isInstanceOf(TemplateException.class).hasMessage("Failed to compile template.jte, error at line 1: Invalid HTML attribute name ;!");
         }
     
    +    @Test
    +    void templateStringInJavaScriptBlock_backtick() {
    +        codeResolver.givenCode("template.jte", """
    +                @param String someMessage
    +                <!DOCTYPE html>
    +                <html lang="en">
    +                <head>
    +                    <title>XSS Test</title>
    +                    <script>window.someVariable = `${someMessage}`;</script>
    +                </head>
    +                <body>
    +                <h1>XSS Test</h1>
    +                </body>
    +                </html>
    +                """);
    +
    +        templateEngine.render("template.jte", "` + alert(`xss`) + `", output);
    +
    +        assertThat(output.toString()).isEqualTo("""
    +                <!DOCTYPE html>
    +                <html lang="en">
    +                <head>
    +                    <title>XSS Test</title>
    +                    <script>window.someVariable = `\\` + alert(\\`xss\\`) + \\``;</script>
    +                </head>
    +                <body>
    +                <h1>XSS Test</h1>
    +                </body>
    +                </html>
    +                """);
    +    }
    +
    +    @Test
    +    void templateStringInJavaScriptBlock_dollar() {
    +        codeResolver.givenCode("template.jte", """
    +                @param String someMessage
    +                <!DOCTYPE html>
    +                <html lang="en">
    +                <head>
    +                    <title>XSS Test</title>
    +                    <script>window.someVariable = `${someMessage}`;</script>
    +                </head>
    +                <body>
    +                <h1>XSS Test</h1>
    +                </body>
    +                </html>
    +                """);
    +
    +        templateEngine.render("template.jte", "${secret}", output);
    +
    +        assertThat(output.toString()).isEqualTo("""
    +                <!DOCTYPE html>
    +                <html lang="en">
    +                <head>
    +                    <title>XSS Test</title>
    +                    <script>window.someVariable = `\\${secret}`;</script>
    +                </head>
    +                <body>
    +                <h1>XSS Test</h1>
    +                </body>
    +                </html>
    +                """);
    +    }
    +
    +    @Test
    +    void templateStringInJavaScriptAttribute_backtick() {
    +        codeResolver.givenCode("template.jte", "@param String p\n<span onClick=\"console.log(`${p}`)\">foo</span>");
    +
    +        templateEngine.render("template.jte", "` + alert(`xss`) + `", output);
    +
    +        assertThat(output.toString()).isEqualTo("<span onClick=\"console.log(`\\x60 + alert(\\x60xss\\x60) + \\x60`)\">foo</span>");
    +    }
    +
    +    @Test
    +    void templateStringInJavaScriptAttribute_dollar() {
    +        codeResolver.givenCode("template.jte", "@param String p\n<span onClick=\"console.log(`${p}`)\">foo</span>");
    +
    +        templateEngine.render("template.jte", "${secret}", output);
    +
    +        assertThat(output.toString()).isEqualTo("<span onClick=\"console.log(`\\x24{secret}`)\">foo</span>");
    +    }
    +
         @Test
         void localization_notFound_noParams() {
             codeResolver.givenCode("template.jte", """
    

Vulnerability mechanics

Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

6

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