Potential denial-of-service vulnerability via repeated headers when using ASGI

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 import sys
 import tempfile
 import traceback
+from collections import defaultdict
 from contextlib import aclosing, closing
 
 from asgiref.sync import ThreadSensitiveContext, sync_to_async
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ def __init__(self, scope, body_file):
             self.META["SERVER_NAME"] = "unknown"
             self.META["SERVER_PORT"] = "0"
         # Headers go into META.
+        _headers = defaultdict(list)
         for name, value in self.scope.get("headers", []):
             name = name.decode("latin1")
             if name == "content-length":
@@ -96,11 +98,10 @@ def __init__(self, scope, body_file):
             value = value.decode("latin1")
             if corrected_name == "HTTP_COOKIE":
                 value = value.rstrip("; ")
-                if "HTTP_COOKIE" in self.META:
-                    value = self.META[corrected_name] + "; " + value
-            elif corrected_name in self.META:
-                value = self.META[corrected_name] + "," + value
-            self.META[corrected_name] = value
+            _headers[corrected_name].append(value)
+        if cookie_header := _headers.pop("HTTP_COOKIE", None):
+            self.META["HTTP_COOKIE"] = "; ".join(cookie_header)
+        self.META.update({name: ",".join(value) for name, value in _headers.items()})
         # Pull out request encoding, if provided.
         self._set_content_type_params(self.META)
         # Directly assign the body file to be our stream.

@@ -17,3 +17,15 @@ allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack.
 
 This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
 <security-disclosure>`.
+
+CVE-2025-14550: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability via repeated headers when using ASGI
+==============================================================================================
+
+When receiving duplicates of a single header, ``ASGIRequest`` allowed a remote
+attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service via a specifically created
+request with multiple duplicate headers. The vulnerability resulted from
+repeated string concatenation while combining repeated headers, which
+produced super-linear computation resulting in service degradation or outage.
+
+This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
+policy <security-disclosure>`.

@@ -17,3 +17,15 @@ allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack.
 
 This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
 <security-disclosure>`.
+
+CVE-2025-14550: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability via repeated headers when using ASGI
+==============================================================================================
+
+When receiving duplicates of a single header, ``ASGIRequest`` allowed a remote
+attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service via a specifically created
+request with multiple duplicate headers. The vulnerability resulted from
+repeated string concatenation while combining repeated headers, which
+produced super-linear computation resulting in service degradation or outage.
+
+This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
+policy <security-disclosure>`.

@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@ allowed remote attackers to enumerate users via a timing attack.
 This issue has severity "low" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
 <security-disclosure>`.
 
+CVE-2025-14550: Potential denial-of-service vulnerability via repeated headers when using ASGI
+==============================================================================================
+
+When receiving duplicates of a single header, ``ASGIRequest`` allowed a remote
+attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service via a specifically created
+request with multiple duplicate headers. The vulnerability resulted from
+repeated string concatenation while combining repeated headers, which
+produced super-linear computation resulting in service degradation or outage.
+
+This issue has severity "moderate" according to the :ref:`Django security
+policy <security-disclosure>`.
+
 Bugfixes
 ========
 

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ async def test_post_body(self):
         self.assertEqual(response_body["type"], "http.response.body")
         self.assertEqual(response_body["body"], b"Echo!")
 
-    async def test_create_request_error(self):
+    async def test_request_too_big_request_error(self):
         # Track request_finished signal.
         signal_handler = SignalHandler()
         request_finished.connect(signal_handler)
@@ -254,6 +254,32 @@ class TestASGIHandler(ASGIHandler):
             signal_handler.calls[0]["thread"], threading.current_thread()
         )
 
+    async def test_meta_not_modified_with_repeat_headers(self):
+        scope = self.async_request_factory._base_scope(path="/", http_version="2.0")
+        scope["headers"] = [(b"foo", b"bar")] * 200_000
+
+        setitem_count = 0
+
+        class InstrumentedDict(dict):
+            def __setitem__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+                nonlocal setitem_count
+                setitem_count += 1
+                super().__setitem__(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        class InstrumentedASGIRequest(ASGIRequest):
+            @property
+            def META(self):
+                return self._meta
+
+            @META.setter
+            def META(self, value):
+                self._meta = InstrumentedDict(**value)
+
+        request = InstrumentedASGIRequest(scope, None)
+
+        self.assertEqual(len(request.headers["foo"].split(",")), 200_000)
+        self.assertLessEqual(setitem_count, 100)
+
     async def test_cancel_post_request_with_sync_processing(self):
         """
         The request.body object should be available and readable in view