PickleScan Bypasses Unsafe Globals Check Using Submodule Imports
Description
A Protection Mechanism Failure vulnerability in mmaitre314 picklescan versions up to and including 0.0.30 allows a remote attacker to bypass the unsafe globals check. This is possible because the scanner performs an exact match for module names, allowing malicious payloads to be loaded via submodules of dangerous packages (e.g., 'asyncio.unix_events' instead of 'asyncio').
When the incorrectly considered safe file is loaded after scan, it can lead to the execution of malicious code.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Picklescan <=0.0.30 fails to block dangerous submodules due to exact module name matching, allowing remote code execution.
Vulnerability
Picklescan versions up to 0.0.30 suffer from a protection mechanism failure where the unsafe globals check uses exact string matching for module names [1]. This allows an attacker to bypass the check by referencing submodules of dangerous packages (e.g., asyncio.unix_events instead of asyncio) [1]. The scanner incorrectly marks such payloads as safe.
Exploitation
An attacker can craft a malicious pickle file that imports a submodule of a known dangerous package, such as asyncio.unix_events._UnixSubprocessTransport._start [3]. The scanner, performing an exact match, does not flag this as dangerous [3]. The file is considered safe and, when loaded by a user, executes the malicious code [1]. The attack can be delivered remotely via any pickle file, for example through a Hugging Face model [4].
Impact
Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution on the victim's system, with the privileges of the process loading the pickle file [1]. This could lead to data theft, system compromise, or further lateral movement.
Mitigation
The issue was fixed in commit 28a7b4e (Pull Request #50) by adding logic that checks if a module's parent is marked as dangerous [2][3]. Users should update picklescan to a version after 0.0.30 to protect against this bypass [2][3].
AI Insight generated on May 19, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
picklescanPyPI | < 0.0.31 | 0.0.31 |
Affected products
2- Range: <=0.0.30
- mmaitre314/picklescanv5Range: 0
Patches
128a7b4ef7534Fix various vulnerabilities (#50)
6 files changed · +74 −17
setup.cfg+1 −1 modified@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [metadata] name = picklescan -version = 0.0.30 +version = 0.0.31 author = Matthieu Maitre author_email = mmaitre314@users.noreply.github.com description = Security scanner detecting Python Pickle files performing suspicious actions
src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.py+7 −2 modified@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # A more forgiving implementation of zipfile.ZipFile # Modified from Python code at # https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/edb69578ed74ff04ab78ab953355faa343a7e0ee/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py#L1606 -# Changes: removed flag/password/filename checks to align better with PyTorch's zip decoding +# Changes: removed flag/password/filename/CRC checks to align better with PyTorch's zip decoding import struct import zipfile @@ -85,7 +85,12 @@ def open(self, name, mode="r", pwd=None, *, force_zip64=False): if fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH]: zef_file.read(fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH]) - return zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd, True) + zef = zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd, True) + + # Disable CRC validation as PyTorch may not use it + zef._expected_crc = None + + return zef except BaseException: zef_file.close() raise
src/picklescan/scanner.py+42 −14 modified@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ def __str__(self) -> str: "open", "breakpoint", }, # Pickle versions 3, 4 have those function under 'builtins' - "aiohttp.client": "*", + "aiohttp": "*", "asyncio": "*", "bdb": "*", "commands": "*", # Python 2 precursor to subprocess @@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ def __str__(self) -> str: "ssl": "*", # DNS exfiltration via ssl.get_server_certificate() "subprocess": "*", "sys": "*", - "asyncio.unix_events": {"_UnixSubprocessTransport._start"}, "code": {"InteractiveInterpreter.runcode"}, "cProfile": {"runctx", "run"}, "doctest": {"debug_script"}, @@ -257,6 +256,7 @@ def _list_globals(data: IO[bytes], multiple_pickles=True) -> Set[Tuple[str, str] for op in pickletools.genops(data): ops.append(op) except Exception as e: + _log.debug(f"Error parsing pickle: {e}", exc_info=True) parsing_pkl_error = str(e) last_byte = data.read(1) data.seek(-1, 1) @@ -329,6 +329,11 @@ def _build_scan_result_from_raw_globals( g = Global(rg[0], rg[1], SafetyLevel.Dangerous) safe_filter = _safe_globals.get(g.module) unsafe_filter = _unsafe_globals.get(g.module) + + # If the module as a whole is marked as dangerous, submodules are also dangerous + if unsafe_filter is None and "." in g.module and _unsafe_globals.get(g.module.split(".")[0]) == "*": + unsafe_filter = "*" + if "unknown" in g.module or "unknown" in g.name: g.safety = SafetyLevel.Dangerous _log.warning("%s: %s import '%s %s' FOUND", file_id, g.safety.value, g.module, g.name) @@ -348,11 +353,12 @@ def _build_scan_result_from_raw_globals( def scan_pickle_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id, multiple_pickles=True) -> ScanResult: """Disassemble a Pickle stream and report issues""" + _log.debug(f"scan_pickle_bytes({file_id})") try: raw_globals = _list_globals(data, multiple_pickles) except GenOpsError as e: - _log.error(f"ERROR: parsing pickle in {file_id}: {e}") + _log.error(f"ERROR: parsing pickle in {file_id}: {e}", exc_info=_log.isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)) if e.globals is not None: return _build_scan_result_from_raw_globals(e.globals, file_id, scan_err=True) else: @@ -365,6 +371,8 @@ def scan_pickle_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id, multiple_pickles=True) -> ScanRe # XXX: it appears there is not way to get the byte stream for a given file within the 7z archive and thus forcing us to unzip to disk before scanning def scan_7z_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_7z_bytes({file_id})") + try: import py7zr except ImportError: @@ -387,6 +395,8 @@ def scan_7z_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_zip_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_zip_bytes({file_id})") + result = ScanResult([]) with RelaxedZipFile(data, "r") as zip: @@ -415,6 +425,8 @@ def scan_zip_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_numpy(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_numpy({file_id})") + # Delay import to avoid dependency on NumPy import numpy as np @@ -445,6 +457,8 @@ def scan_numpy(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_pytorch(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_pytorch({file_id})") + # new pytorch format if _is_zipfile(data): return scan_zip_bytes(data, file_id) @@ -473,26 +487,34 @@ def scan_pytorch(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id, file_ext: Optional[str] = None) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_bytes({file_id})") + if file_ext is not None and file_ext in _pytorch_file_extensions: try: return scan_pytorch(data, file_id) except InvalidMagicError as e: - _log.error(f"ERROR: Invalid magic number for file {e}") - return ScanResult([], scan_err=True) - elif file_ext is not None and file_ext in _numpy_file_extensions: + _log.warning( + f"WARNING: Invalid PyTorch magic number for file {e}. Trying to scan as non-PyTorch file.", + exc_info=_log.isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG), + ) + data.seek(0) + + if file_ext is not None and file_ext in _numpy_file_extensions: return scan_numpy(data, file_id) + + is_zip = zipfile.is_zipfile(data) + data.seek(0) + if is_zip: + return scan_zip_bytes(data, file_id) + elif _is_7z_file(data): + return scan_7z_bytes(data, file_id) else: - is_zip = zipfile.is_zipfile(data) - data.seek(0) - if is_zip: - return scan_zip_bytes(data, file_id) - elif _is_7z_file(data): - return scan_7z_bytes(data, file_id) - else: - return scan_pickle_bytes(data, file_id) + return scan_pickle_bytes(data, file_id) def scan_huggingface_model(repo_id): + _log.debug(f"scan_huggingface_model({repo_id})") + # List model files model = json.loads(_http_get(f"https://huggingface.co/api/models/{repo_id}").decode("utf-8")) file_names = [file_name for file_name in (sibling.get("rfilename") for sibling in model["siblings"]) if file_name is not None] @@ -512,6 +534,8 @@ def scan_huggingface_model(repo_id): def scan_directory_path(path) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_directory_path({path})") + scan_result = ScanResult([]) for base_path, _, file_names in os.walk(path): @@ -532,10 +556,14 @@ def scan_directory_path(path) -> ScanResult: def scan_file_path(path) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_file_path({path})") + file_ext = os.path.splitext(path)[1] with open(path, "rb") as file: return scan_bytes(file, path, file_ext) def scan_url(url) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_url({url})") + return scan_bytes(io.BytesIO(_http_get(url)), url)
tests/data2/GHSA-jgw4-cr84-mqxg.bin+0 −0 addedtests/data2/malicious1_crc.zip+0 −0 addedtests/test_scanner.py+24 −0 modified@@ -438,6 +438,21 @@ def initialize_corrupt_zip_file_central_directory(path: str, file_name: str, dat f.write(modified_data) +def initialize_corrupt_zip_file_crc(path: str, file_name: str, data: bytes): + if not os.path.exists(path): + with io.BytesIO() as buffer: + with zipfile.ZipFile(buffer, "w") as zip: + zip.writestr(file_name, data) + data = buffer.getbuffer().tobytes() + + # Corrupt the data, leading to a CRC mismatch + modified_data = data.replace(b"print('456')", b"print('123')", 1) + + # Write the corrupted content + with open(path, "wb") as f: + f.write(modified_data) + + def initialize_numpy_files(): import numpy as np @@ -687,6 +702,12 @@ def initialize_pickle_files(): pickle.dumps(Malicious1(), protocol=4), ) + initialize_corrupt_zip_file_crc( + f"{_root_path}/data2/malicious1_crc.zip", + "data.pkl", + pickle.dumps(Malicious1(), protocol=4), + ) + initialize_zip_file( f"{_root_path}/data/malicious1_wrong_ext.zip", "data.txt", # Pickle file with a non-standard extension @@ -744,6 +765,7 @@ def initialize_pickle_files(): initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-9w88-8rmg-7g2p.pkl", reduce_GHSA_9w88_8rmg_7g2p) initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9.pkl", reduce_GHSA_49gj_c84q_6qm9) initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-q77w-mwjj-7mqx.pkl", reduce_GHSA_q77w_mwjj_7mqx) + initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-jgw4-cr84-mqxg.bin", reduce_GHSA_q77w_mwjj_7mqx) initialize_pickle_files() @@ -1022,6 +1044,8 @@ def test_scan_file_path(): assert_scan("GHSA-9w88-8rmg-7g2p.pkl", [Global("cProfile", "runctx", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) assert_scan("GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9.pkl", [Global("cProfile", "run", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) assert_scan("GHSA-q77w-mwjj-7mqx.pkl", [Global("asyncio.unix_events", "_UnixSubprocessTransport._start", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) + assert_scan("GHSA-jgw4-cr84-mqxg.bin", [Global("asyncio.unix_events", "_UnixSubprocessTransport._start", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) + assert_scan("malicious1_crc.zip", [Global("builtins", name="eval", safety=SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) def test_scan_file_path_npz():
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
7- huggingface.co/iluem/linux_pkl/resolve/main/asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pklghsaexploitWEB
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84crghsaADVISORY
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84crghsavendor-advisoryexploitWEB
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10157ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/src/picklescan/scanner.pyghsaWEB
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/28a7b4ef753466572bda3313737116eeb9b4e5c5ghsaWEB
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/50ghsaWEB
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