PickleScan Security Bypass via Bad CRC in ZIP Archive
Description
An Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in the ZIP archive scanning component of mmaitre314 picklescan allows a remote attacker to bypass security scans. This is achieved by crafting a ZIP archive containing a file with a bad Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), which causes the scanner to halt and fail to analyze the contents for malicious pickle files. When the file incorrectly considered safe is loaded, it can lead to the execution of malicious code.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Improper exception handling in picklescan's ZIP scanner allows an attacker to bypass malicious pickle detection using a crafted archive with a bad CRC.
Vulnerability
Overview
CVE-2025-10156 describes an Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in the ZIP archive scanning component of picklescan, a security tool that scans for malicious Python pickle files. The root cause is that picklescan stops scanning entirely when it encounters a file within a ZIP archive with a bad Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), rather than attempting to continue scanning other files or gracefully handling the CRC error [1][4]. This allows an attacker to craft a ZIP archive containing a malicious pickle file alongside a file with an incorrect CRC, causing the scanner to fail and report no results.
Exploitation and
Attack Surface
An attacker can exploit this issue by creating a ZIP archive with a file that has a CRC mismatch. When picklescan processes the archive, the ZIP module raises an exception (for example, BadZipFile) which is not properly caught or handled. Consequently, the scanner aborts the scan without analyzing the remaining contents of the archive [4]. The attack does not require authentication; a remote attacker can serve or host such a ZIP file (e.g., as a PyTorch model file on Hugging Face) and trick a user into scanning it. Notably, PyTorch itself often disables CRC checks when loading models from ZIP archives, meaning the same corrupted archive can be loaded by PyTorch while picklescan fails to detect any malicious content [4].
Impact
If the malicious pickle file is not detected and is subsequently loaded, it can lead to arbitrary code execution on the victim's system [1]. The attacker can bypass the security scan entirely, making the tool ineffective. The impact is especially severe in machine learning workflows where picklescan is used to vet models before loading them with PyTorch.
Mitigation
The vulnerability has been addressed in picklescan. A commit [2] improves error handling (e.g., adding debug logging and more robust parsing) to avoid failing on CRC errors and to scan files within the archive regardless of CRC validity. Users should update to the latest version of picklescan to ensure protection [3]. No workaround is mentioned; the advisory recommends updating as the primary mitigation [4].
AI Insight generated on May 19, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
picklescanPyPI | < 0.0.31 | 0.0.31 |
Affected products
2- mmaitre314/picklescanv5Range: 0
Patches
128a7b4ef7534Fix various vulnerabilities (#50)
6 files changed · +74 −17
setup.cfg+1 −1 modified@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [metadata] name = picklescan -version = 0.0.30 +version = 0.0.31 author = Matthieu Maitre author_email = mmaitre314@users.noreply.github.com description = Security scanner detecting Python Pickle files performing suspicious actions
src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.py+7 −2 modified@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # A more forgiving implementation of zipfile.ZipFile # Modified from Python code at # https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/edb69578ed74ff04ab78ab953355faa343a7e0ee/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py#L1606 -# Changes: removed flag/password/filename checks to align better with PyTorch's zip decoding +# Changes: removed flag/password/filename/CRC checks to align better with PyTorch's zip decoding import struct import zipfile @@ -85,7 +85,12 @@ def open(self, name, mode="r", pwd=None, *, force_zip64=False): if fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH]: zef_file.read(fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH]) - return zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd, True) + zef = zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd, True) + + # Disable CRC validation as PyTorch may not use it + zef._expected_crc = None + + return zef except BaseException: zef_file.close() raise
src/picklescan/scanner.py+42 −14 modified@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ def __str__(self) -> str: "open", "breakpoint", }, # Pickle versions 3, 4 have those function under 'builtins' - "aiohttp.client": "*", + "aiohttp": "*", "asyncio": "*", "bdb": "*", "commands": "*", # Python 2 precursor to subprocess @@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ def __str__(self) -> str: "ssl": "*", # DNS exfiltration via ssl.get_server_certificate() "subprocess": "*", "sys": "*", - "asyncio.unix_events": {"_UnixSubprocessTransport._start"}, "code": {"InteractiveInterpreter.runcode"}, "cProfile": {"runctx", "run"}, "doctest": {"debug_script"}, @@ -257,6 +256,7 @@ def _list_globals(data: IO[bytes], multiple_pickles=True) -> Set[Tuple[str, str] for op in pickletools.genops(data): ops.append(op) except Exception as e: + _log.debug(f"Error parsing pickle: {e}", exc_info=True) parsing_pkl_error = str(e) last_byte = data.read(1) data.seek(-1, 1) @@ -329,6 +329,11 @@ def _build_scan_result_from_raw_globals( g = Global(rg[0], rg[1], SafetyLevel.Dangerous) safe_filter = _safe_globals.get(g.module) unsafe_filter = _unsafe_globals.get(g.module) + + # If the module as a whole is marked as dangerous, submodules are also dangerous + if unsafe_filter is None and "." in g.module and _unsafe_globals.get(g.module.split(".")[0]) == "*": + unsafe_filter = "*" + if "unknown" in g.module or "unknown" in g.name: g.safety = SafetyLevel.Dangerous _log.warning("%s: %s import '%s %s' FOUND", file_id, g.safety.value, g.module, g.name) @@ -348,11 +353,12 @@ def _build_scan_result_from_raw_globals( def scan_pickle_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id, multiple_pickles=True) -> ScanResult: """Disassemble a Pickle stream and report issues""" + _log.debug(f"scan_pickle_bytes({file_id})") try: raw_globals = _list_globals(data, multiple_pickles) except GenOpsError as e: - _log.error(f"ERROR: parsing pickle in {file_id}: {e}") + _log.error(f"ERROR: parsing pickle in {file_id}: {e}", exc_info=_log.isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG)) if e.globals is not None: return _build_scan_result_from_raw_globals(e.globals, file_id, scan_err=True) else: @@ -365,6 +371,8 @@ def scan_pickle_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id, multiple_pickles=True) -> ScanRe # XXX: it appears there is not way to get the byte stream for a given file within the 7z archive and thus forcing us to unzip to disk before scanning def scan_7z_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_7z_bytes({file_id})") + try: import py7zr except ImportError: @@ -387,6 +395,8 @@ def scan_7z_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_zip_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_zip_bytes({file_id})") + result = ScanResult([]) with RelaxedZipFile(data, "r") as zip: @@ -415,6 +425,8 @@ def scan_zip_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_numpy(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_numpy({file_id})") + # Delay import to avoid dependency on NumPy import numpy as np @@ -445,6 +457,8 @@ def scan_numpy(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_pytorch(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_pytorch({file_id})") + # new pytorch format if _is_zipfile(data): return scan_zip_bytes(data, file_id) @@ -473,26 +487,34 @@ def scan_pytorch(data: IO[bytes], file_id) -> ScanResult: def scan_bytes(data: IO[bytes], file_id, file_ext: Optional[str] = None) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_bytes({file_id})") + if file_ext is not None and file_ext in _pytorch_file_extensions: try: return scan_pytorch(data, file_id) except InvalidMagicError as e: - _log.error(f"ERROR: Invalid magic number for file {e}") - return ScanResult([], scan_err=True) - elif file_ext is not None and file_ext in _numpy_file_extensions: + _log.warning( + f"WARNING: Invalid PyTorch magic number for file {e}. Trying to scan as non-PyTorch file.", + exc_info=_log.isEnabledFor(logging.DEBUG), + ) + data.seek(0) + + if file_ext is not None and file_ext in _numpy_file_extensions: return scan_numpy(data, file_id) + + is_zip = zipfile.is_zipfile(data) + data.seek(0) + if is_zip: + return scan_zip_bytes(data, file_id) + elif _is_7z_file(data): + return scan_7z_bytes(data, file_id) else: - is_zip = zipfile.is_zipfile(data) - data.seek(0) - if is_zip: - return scan_zip_bytes(data, file_id) - elif _is_7z_file(data): - return scan_7z_bytes(data, file_id) - else: - return scan_pickle_bytes(data, file_id) + return scan_pickle_bytes(data, file_id) def scan_huggingface_model(repo_id): + _log.debug(f"scan_huggingface_model({repo_id})") + # List model files model = json.loads(_http_get(f"https://huggingface.co/api/models/{repo_id}").decode("utf-8")) file_names = [file_name for file_name in (sibling.get("rfilename") for sibling in model["siblings"]) if file_name is not None] @@ -512,6 +534,8 @@ def scan_huggingface_model(repo_id): def scan_directory_path(path) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_directory_path({path})") + scan_result = ScanResult([]) for base_path, _, file_names in os.walk(path): @@ -532,10 +556,14 @@ def scan_directory_path(path) -> ScanResult: def scan_file_path(path) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_file_path({path})") + file_ext = os.path.splitext(path)[1] with open(path, "rb") as file: return scan_bytes(file, path, file_ext) def scan_url(url) -> ScanResult: + _log.debug(f"scan_url({url})") + return scan_bytes(io.BytesIO(_http_get(url)), url)
tests/data2/GHSA-jgw4-cr84-mqxg.bin+0 −0 addedtests/data2/malicious1_crc.zip+0 −0 addedtests/test_scanner.py+24 −0 modified@@ -438,6 +438,21 @@ def initialize_corrupt_zip_file_central_directory(path: str, file_name: str, dat f.write(modified_data) +def initialize_corrupt_zip_file_crc(path: str, file_name: str, data: bytes): + if not os.path.exists(path): + with io.BytesIO() as buffer: + with zipfile.ZipFile(buffer, "w") as zip: + zip.writestr(file_name, data) + data = buffer.getbuffer().tobytes() + + # Corrupt the data, leading to a CRC mismatch + modified_data = data.replace(b"print('456')", b"print('123')", 1) + + # Write the corrupted content + with open(path, "wb") as f: + f.write(modified_data) + + def initialize_numpy_files(): import numpy as np @@ -687,6 +702,12 @@ def initialize_pickle_files(): pickle.dumps(Malicious1(), protocol=4), ) + initialize_corrupt_zip_file_crc( + f"{_root_path}/data2/malicious1_crc.zip", + "data.pkl", + pickle.dumps(Malicious1(), protocol=4), + ) + initialize_zip_file( f"{_root_path}/data/malicious1_wrong_ext.zip", "data.txt", # Pickle file with a non-standard extension @@ -744,6 +765,7 @@ def initialize_pickle_files(): initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-9w88-8rmg-7g2p.pkl", reduce_GHSA_9w88_8rmg_7g2p) initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9.pkl", reduce_GHSA_49gj_c84q_6qm9) initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-q77w-mwjj-7mqx.pkl", reduce_GHSA_q77w_mwjj_7mqx) + initialize_pickle_file_from_reduce("GHSA-jgw4-cr84-mqxg.bin", reduce_GHSA_q77w_mwjj_7mqx) initialize_pickle_files() @@ -1022,6 +1044,8 @@ def test_scan_file_path(): assert_scan("GHSA-9w88-8rmg-7g2p.pkl", [Global("cProfile", "runctx", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) assert_scan("GHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9.pkl", [Global("cProfile", "run", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) assert_scan("GHSA-q77w-mwjj-7mqx.pkl", [Global("asyncio.unix_events", "_UnixSubprocessTransport._start", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) + assert_scan("GHSA-jgw4-cr84-mqxg.bin", [Global("asyncio.unix_events", "_UnixSubprocessTransport._start", SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) + assert_scan("malicious1_crc.zip", [Global("builtins", name="eval", safety=SafetyLevel.Dangerous)]) def test_scan_file_path_npz():
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
7- huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/resolve/main/pytorch_model.binghsaexploitWEB
- huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/tree/mainghsaexploitWEB
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-mjqp-26hc-grxgghsaADVISORY
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-mjqp-26hc-grxgghsavendor-advisoryWEB
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10156ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/v0.0.29/src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.pyghsarelatedWEB
- github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/28a7b4ef753466572bda3313737116eeb9b4e5c5ghsaWEB
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