CVE-2024-56509

@@ -69,22 +69,29 @@ def _runner_test_various_file_slash(client, file_uri):
     wait_for_all_checks(client)
     res = client.get(url_for("index"))
 
+    substrings = [b"URLs with hostname components are not permitted", b"No connection adapters were found for"]
+
+
     # If it is enabled at test time
     if strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):
-        # So it should permit it, but it should fall back to the 'requests' library giving an error
-        # (but means it gets passed to playwright etc)
-        assert b"URLs with hostname components are not permitted" in res.data
-        assert b"_runner_test_various_file_slash" in res.data # Can read this file OK
-    else:
-        # Default should be here
-        assert b'file:// type access is denied for security reasons.' in res.data
+        if file_uri.startswith('file:///'):
+            # This one should be the full qualified path to the file and should get the contents of this file
+            res = client.get(
+                url_for("preview_page", uuid="first"),
+                follow_redirects=True
+            )
+            assert b'_runner_test_various_file_slash' in res.data
+        else:
+            # This will give some error from requests or if it went to chrome, will give some other error :-)
+            assert any(s in res.data for s in substrings)
 
     res = client.get(url_for("form_delete", uuid="all"), follow_redirects=True)
     assert b'Deleted' in res.data
 
 def test_file_slash_access(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage):
     #live_server_setup(live_server)
-    # file: is permitted by default, but it will be caught by ALLOW_FILE_URI
+
+    # file: is NOT permitted by default, so it will be caught by ALLOW_FILE_URI check
 
     test_file_path = os.path.abspath(__file__)
     _runner_test_various_file_slash(client, file_uri=f"file://{test_file_path}")

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ def call_browser(self, preferred_proxy_id=None):
 
         url = self.watch.link
 
-        # Protect against file://, file:/ access, check the real "link" without any meta "source:" etc prepended.
-        if re.search(r'^file:/', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):
+        # Protect against file:, file:/, file:// access, check the real "link" without any meta "source:" etc prepended.
+        if re.search(r'^file:', url.strip(), re.IGNORECASE):
             if not strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):
                 raise Exception(
                     "file:// type access is denied for security reasons."

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
 import os
 
 from flask import url_for
-from .util import set_original_response, set_modified_response, live_server_setup, wait_for_all_checks
-import time
-
+from .util import live_server_setup, wait_for_all_checks
 from .. import strtobool
 
 
@@ -61,54 +59,37 @@ def test_bad_access(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage):
     assert b'Watch protocol is not permitted by SAFE_PROTOCOL_REGEX' in res.data
 
 
-def test_file_slashslash_access(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage):
-    #live_server_setup(live_server)
-
-    test_file_path = os.path.abspath(__file__)
+def _runner_test_various_file_slash(client, file_uri):
 
-    # file:// is permitted by default, but it will be caught by ALLOW_FILE_URI
     client.post(
         url_for("form_quick_watch_add"),
-        data={"url": f"file://{test_file_path}", "tags": ''},
+        data={"url": file_uri, "tags": ''},
         follow_redirects=True
     )
     wait_for_all_checks(client)
     res = client.get(url_for("index"))
 
     # If it is enabled at test time
     if strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):
-        res = client.get(
-            url_for("preview_page", uuid="first"),
-            follow_redirects=True
-        )
-
-        assert b"test_file_slashslash_access" in res.data
+        # So it should permit it, but it should fall back to the 'requests' library giving an error
+        # (but means it gets passed to playwright etc)
+        assert b"URLs with hostname components are not permitted" in res.data
+        assert b"_runner_test_various_file_slash" in res.data # Can read this file OK
     else:
         # Default should be here
         assert b'file:// type access is denied for security reasons.' in res.data
 
+    res = client.get(url_for("form_delete", uuid="all"), follow_redirects=True)
+    assert b'Deleted' in res.data
+
 def test_file_slash_access(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage):
     #live_server_setup(live_server)
+    # file: is permitted by default, but it will be caught by ALLOW_FILE_URI
 
     test_file_path = os.path.abspath(__file__)
-
-    # file:// is permitted by default, but it will be caught by ALLOW_FILE_URI
-    client.post(
-        url_for("form_quick_watch_add"),
-        data={"url": f"file:/{test_file_path}", "tags": ''},
-        follow_redirects=True
-    )
-    wait_for_all_checks(client)
-    res = client.get(url_for("index"))
-
-    # If it is enabled at test time
-    if strtobool(os.getenv('ALLOW_FILE_URI', 'false')):
-        # So it should permit it, but it should fall back to the 'requests' library giving an error
-        # (but means it gets passed to playwright etc)
-        assert b"URLs with hostname components are not permitted" in res.data
-    else:
-        # Default should be here
-        assert b'file:// type access is denied for security reasons.' in res.data
+    _runner_test_various_file_slash(client, file_uri=f"file://{test_file_path}")
+    _runner_test_various_file_slash(client, file_uri=f"file:/{test_file_path}")
+    _runner_test_various_file_slash(client, file_uri=f"file:{test_file_path}") # CVE-2024-56509
 
 def test_xss(client, live_server, measure_memory_usage):
     #live_server_setup(live_server)