Cross site scripting via missing binding syntax validation In ACS location in github.com/crewjam/saml
Description
github.com/crewjam/saml is a saml library for the go language. In affected versions the package does not validate the ACS Location URI according to the SAML binding being parsed. If abused, this flaw allows attackers to register malicious Service Providers at the IdP and inject Javascript in the ACS endpoint definition, achieving Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) in the IdP context during the redirection at the end of a SAML SSO Flow. Consequently, an attacker may perform any authenticated action as the victim once the victim’s browser loaded the SAML IdP initiated SSO link for the malicious service provider. Note: SP registration is commonly an unrestricted operation in IdPs, hence not requiring particular permissions or publicly accessible to ease the IdP interoperability. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.14. Users unable to upgrade may perform external validation of URLs provided in SAML metadata, or restrict the ability for end-users to upload arbitrary metadata.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
The crewjam/saml Go library fails to validate ACS Location URIs per SAML binding, allowing XSS via malicious Service Provider registration.
Root
Cause
The vulnerability lies in the crewjam/saml Go library, which does not validate the ACS (Assertion Consumer Service) Location URI according to the SAML binding being parsed [1][4]. This missing validation allows an attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript into the ACS endpoint definition when registering a malicious Service Provider (SP) at an Identity Provider (IdP).
Exploitation
Attackers can exploit this flaw by registering a malicious SP at the IdP, a process that is commonly unrestricted to ease interoperability [1][4]. The injected JavaScript is embedded in the ACS endpoint URL. When a victim user clicks an IdP-initiated SSO link for the malicious SP, the browser executes the script in the context of the IdP, achieving Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [1][4].
Impact
Successful exploitation allows the attacker to perform any authenticated action as the victim within the IdP session, including modifying user data or initiating further attacks [1][4]. The severity is rated High because SP registration is often open to all users.
Mitigation
The issue is fixed in version 0.4.14 of the library [1][3][4]. Users unable to upgrade should perform external validation of URLs provided in SAML metadata or restrict the ability for end-users to upload arbitrary metadata [1][4].
AI Insight generated on May 20, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
github.com/crewjam/samlGo | < 0.4.14 | 0.4.14 |
Affected products
1Patches
1b07b16cf83c4Merge pull request from GHSA-267v-3v32-g6q5
3 files changed · +116 −0
metadata.go+107 −0 modified@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package saml import ( "encoding/xml" + "fmt" + "net/url" "time" "github.com/beevik/etree" @@ -19,6 +21,9 @@ const HTTPArtifactBinding = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Artifact" // SOAPBinding is the official URN for the SOAP binding (transport) const SOAPBinding = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:SOAP" +// SOAPBindingV1 is the URN for the SOAP binding in SAML 1.0 +const SOAPBindingV1 = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:bindings:SOAP-binding" + // EntitiesDescriptor represents the SAML object of the same name. // // See http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf §2.3.1 @@ -188,6 +193,76 @@ type Endpoint struct { ResponseLocation string `xml:"ResponseLocation,attr,omitempty"` } +func checkEndpointLocation(binding string, location string) (string, error) { + // Within the SAML standard, the complex type EndpointType describes a + // SAML protocol binding endpoint at which a SAML entity can be sent + // protocol messages. In particular, the location of an endpoint type is + // defined as follows in the Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion + // Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 - 2.2.2 Complex Type EndpointType: + // + // Location [Required] A required URI attribute that specifies the + // location of the endpoint. The allowable syntax of this URI depends + // on the protocol binding. + switch binding { + case HTTPPostBinding, + HTTPRedirectBinding, + HTTPArtifactBinding, + SOAPBinding, + SOAPBindingV1: + locationURL, err := url.Parse(location) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url %q: %w", location, err) + } + switch locationURL.Scheme { + case "http", "https": + // ok + default: + return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid url scheme %q for binding %q", + locationURL.Scheme, binding) + } + default: + // We don't know what form location should take, but the protocol + // requires that we validate its syntax. + // + // In practice, lots of metadata contains random bindings, for example + // "urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:profiles:AuthnRequest" from our own test suite. + // + // We can't fail, but we also can't allow a location parameter whose syntax we + // cannot verify. The least-bad course of action here is to set location to + // and empty string, and hope the caller doesn't care need it. + location = "" + } + + return location, nil +} + +// UnmarshalXML implements xml.Unmarshaler +func (m *Endpoint) UnmarshalXML(d *xml.Decoder, start xml.StartElement) error { + type Alias Endpoint + aux := &struct { + *Alias + }{ + Alias: (*Alias)(m), + } + if err := d.DecodeElement(aux, &start); err != nil { + return err + } + + var err error + m.Location, err = checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, m.Location) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if m.ResponseLocation != "" { + m.ResponseLocation, err = checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, m.ResponseLocation) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + return nil +} + // IndexedEndpoint represents the SAML IndexedEndpointType object. // // See http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf §2.2.3 @@ -199,6 +274,38 @@ type IndexedEndpoint struct { IsDefault *bool `xml:"isDefault,attr"` } +// UnmarshalXML implements xml.Unmarshaler +func (m *IndexedEndpoint) UnmarshalXML(d *xml.Decoder, start xml.StartElement) error { + type Alias IndexedEndpoint + aux := &struct { + *Alias + }{ + Alias: (*Alias)(m), + } + if err := d.DecodeElement(aux, &start); err != nil { + return err + } + + var err error + m.Location, err = checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, m.Location) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if m.ResponseLocation != nil { + responseLocation, err := checkEndpointLocation(m.Binding, *m.ResponseLocation) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if responseLocation != "" { + m.ResponseLocation = &responseLocation + } else { + m.ResponseLocation = nil + } + } + + return nil +} + // SSODescriptor represents the SAML complex type SSODescriptor // // See http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf §2.4.2
metadata_test.go+8 −0 modified@@ -165,3 +165,11 @@ cvCsEFiJZ4AbF+DgmO6TarJ8O05t8zvnOwJlNCASPZRH/JmF8tX0hoHuAQ==`, assert.Check(t, err) golden.Assert(t, string(buf), "TestCanProduceSPMetadata_expected") } + +func TestMetadataValidatesUrlSchemeForProtocolBinding(t *testing.T) { + buf := golden.Get(t, "TestMetadataValidatesUrlSchemeForProtocolBinding_metadata.xml") + + metadata := EntityDescriptor{} + err := xml.Unmarshal(buf, &metadata) + assert.Error(t, err, "invalid url scheme \"javascript\" for binding \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST\"") +}
testdata/TestMetadataValidatesUrlSchemeForProtocolBinding_metadata.xml+1 −0 added@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><md:EntityDescriptor ID='_af805d1c-c2e3-444e-9cf5-efc664eeace6' entityID='https://dev.aa.kndr.org/users/auth/saml/metadata' validUntil='2001-02-03T04:05:06.789' cacheDuration='PT1H' xmlns:md='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata' xmlns:saml='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion'><md:SPSSODescriptor AuthnRequestsSigned='false' WantAssertionsSigned='false' protocolSupportEnumeration='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol'><md:AssertionConsumerService Binding='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST' Location='javascript:alert(true)' index='0' isDefault='true'/><md:AttributeConsumingService index='1' isDefault='true'><md:ServiceName xml:lang='en'>Required attributes</md:ServiceName><md:RequestedAttribute FriendlyName='Email address' Name='email' NameFormat='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic'/><md:RequestedAttribute FriendlyName='Full name' Name='name' NameFormat='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic'/><md:RequestedAttribute FriendlyName='Given name' Name='first_name' NameFormat='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic'/><md:RequestedAttribute FriendlyName='Family name' Name='last_name' NameFormat='urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic'/></md:AttributeConsumingService></md:SPSSODescriptor></md:EntityDescriptor> \ No newline at end of file
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
4- github.com/advisories/GHSA-267v-3v32-g6q5ghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45683ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/crewjam/saml/commit/b07b16cf83c4171d16da4d85608cb827f183cd79ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/crewjam/saml/security/advisories/GHSA-267v-3v32-g6q5ghsax_refsource_CONFIRMWEB
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